Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Paul Krugman. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Paul Krugman. Mostrar todas as mensagens

sexta-feira, 24 de julho de 2026

O Atolamento das Vaidades


Ontem, Donald Trump declarou que a guerra com o Irão está a correr “melhor do que qualquer um esperava”. Está a delirar, é claro. E os seus delírios são a razão pela qual o preço do petróleo voltou a cerca de 100 dólares por barril e - como explicarei em breve  - o preço real é muito superior a isso.

A guerra gratuita de Trump contra o Irão transformou-se num atoleiro notável - notável porque a única coisa que mantém a guerra em curso é a vaidade de Trump. Perdeu efectivamente a guerra nos primeiros tempos, quando se tornou evidente que o regime de linha dura do Irão tinha sobrevivido ao ataque inicial e que os militares norte-americanos não conseguiam manter o Estreito de Ormuz aberto. Mas Trump é psicologicamente incapaz de admitir o fracasso. Assim, a guerra continua, enfraquecendo os Estados Unidos a cada dia, enquanto ele procura alguma forma de transformar a sua derrota abjeta numa vitória.

E as declarações de que as consequências económicas da guerra foram contidas parecem agora perigosamente prematuras.

É verdade que, durante o primeiro fecho do Estreito, os preços do petróleo não subiram tanto como muitos analistas - incluindo eu próprio, em certa medida - esperavam. Parte do petróleo do Golfo Pérsico chegou aos mercados contornando o Estreito de Ormuz, principalmente através do oleoduto saudita para o Mar Vermelho. A China reduziu drasticamente as suas importações de petróleo. E o mundo compensou uma parte substancial da escassez de oferta reduzindo os seus stocks.

O segundo encerramento de Ormuz pode ser pior, por vários motivos. Os aliados houthis do Irão estão agora a atacar navios no Mar Vermelho, ameaçando esta válvula de segurança. Além disso, os stocks estão agora muito mais baixos do que quando o conflito começou e não podem servir de reserva daqui para a frente.

Talvez o mais importante a perceber sobre a situação actual, no entanto, é que o petróleo é mais caro do que parece.

Ninguém queima petróleo bruto. O petróleo precisa de ser refinado para se transformar em combustíveis utilizáveis, principalmente gasolina e gasóleo. E há uma escassez global de capacidade de refinação. Isto reflecte em parte a guerra no Irão, mas também a campanha surpreendentemente eficaz da Ucrânia contra a infra-estrutura energética de Vladimir Putin.

Esta escassez de capacidade de refinação ajudou a manter os preços do crude baixos - porquê comprar crude se não se pode refiná-lo? Mais importante, porém, significa que os preços dos produtos petrolíferos para os consumidores finais são muito mais elevados do que seria de esperar, tendo em conta o preço do petróleo bruto. O gráfico no início deste post mostra o preço do gasóleo no mercado grossista, que mesmo durante o cessar-fogo falhado estava muito acima do seu nível pré-guerra e está agora próximo do seu pico anterior.

O spread geral - a diferença de preço entre um barril de crude e o preço dos produtos refinados a partir desse barril - explodiu, de cerca de 25 dólares por barril antes da guerra para mais de 65 dólares agora:

Do ponto de vista dos consumidores finais, isto equivale a um aumento de 40 dólares por barril no preço do crude. Na prática, o mundo está a lidar com o equivalente a 140 dólares pelo petróleo, embora o preço anunciado ronde "apenas" os 100 dólares.

Prenuncia uma catástrofe económica? Não, ainda não. Mas não é um bom sinal.

A desaceleração da inflação no mês passado parece agora temporária. Com os preços da energia a subirem novamente - para não falar do impacto inflacionista da nova ronda tarifária de Trump, imposta sob a desculpa absurda de que as nações não estão a fazer o suficiente para acabar com o trabalho forçado - as taxas de juro vão quase certamente subir, intensificando a pressão sobre as famílias e as empresas. As taxas de longo prazo, refletindo os futuros aumentos esperados da Fed, são já demasiado elevadas:

Ainda assim, as coisas podiam ser piores. E podem estar prestes a piorar. O Wall Street Journal refere que Trump está em "modo de vingança" e que as forças armadas dos EUA estão a enviar tropas para o Médio Oriente.

E se Trump insistir no fracasso, intensificando drasticamente a sua guerra desastrosa, os impactos económicos, para não falar dos humanos, serão muito mais graves.

quinta-feira, 25 de junho de 2026

Paul Krugman - Porque é que toda a gente odeia a IA


Muitos leitores estarão provavelmente parados na cena do vídeo acima: Eric Schmidt, o antigo CEO da Google, fez recentemente um discurso de formatura no qual anunciou a chegada da IA - e foi fortemente vaiado pelos estudantes. Isto não foi um caso isolado. Têm ocorrido vários incidentes semelhantes ultimamente, prova de que muita gente odeia agora genuinamente a IA.

Estaremos a falar de uma minoria barulhenta mas não representativa? Não. Uma sondagem recente do Pew Research Center revelou que os adultos americanos acreditam, por uma margem larga, que a IA será negativa para a sociedade e, por uma margem menor, que será má para eles a nível pessoal.


Mas não se sentirá o público sempre assim perante a inovação? A análise do Pew sobre as suas próprias conclusões deu a entender isso mesmo, declarando que:
"A nova tecnologia é frequentemente recebida com um certo grau de curiosidade, bem como de ceticismo. À medida que mais americanos incorporam a IA nas suas vidas, surgem preocupações generalizadas sobre o seu impacto, a sua velocidade e sobre se o governo a consegue regular adequadamente."
Contudo, as próprias sondagens passadas do Pew sugerem que, historicamente, a maioria dos americanos acolheu bem os avanços nas tecnologias de informação. Uma sondagem de 1999 sobre as atitudes face à internet (que ainda era uma novidade) revelou visões extremamente positivas sobre os computadores e a tecnologia, especialmente entre os utilizadores da internet.

E em 2015, quando as redes sociais eram ainda relativamente recentes, o Pew descobriu que 71% do público afirmava que as empresas tecnológicas "têm um impacto positivo na forma como as coisas estão a correr neste país", com apenas 17% a expressar uma opinião negativa.

O facto é que, no passado, os americanos geralmente recebiam as tecnologias emergentes com otimismo. O que explica, então, a atual hostilidade contra a IA? Permitam-me oferecer várias explicações que não se excluem mutuamente.

Primeiro, tememos que a IA faça coisas terríveis porque as empresas que a vendem nos disseram que ela faria coisas terríveis. No ano passado, por exemplo, o CEO da Anthropic, Dario Amodei, declarou numa entrevista à Axios que a IA poderia eliminar metade dos empregos administrativos de nível de entrada e elevar o desemprego geral para uns impressionantes 20% no espaço de 1 a 5 anos.

Mais recentemente, Amodei e Sam Altman, da OpenAI, tentaram recuar nas suas previsões de um "apocalipse do emprego". Mas por que razão estiveram eles tão dispostos a promover visões apocalípticas em primeiro lugar? A resposta é dinheiro. Eles promoveram a ideia de que tinham uma tecnologia que iria transformar rápida e radicalmente a economia, em parte para deslumbrar Wall Street e garantir financiamento, e em parte para assustar as empresas, levando-as a correr para a adoção da IA por medo de ficarem para trás.

Só tardiamente se deram conta de que declarar que a sua tecnologia iria causar devastação geraria uma reação pública adversa, e que essa reação seria um problema sério. Na verdade, não é apenas o público em geral que está a atacar as empresas que usam ameaças de um apocalipse como estratégia de marketing. Até as grandes corporações dizem que já basta. Satya Nadella, CEO da Microsoft, que se tem mostrado visivelmente relutante em alinhar no fanatismo da IA, disse recentemente ao Wall Street Journal:
"Não se pode dizer, 'olhem, todos os empregos administrativos desapareceram, isto pode até ser uma arma e vamos usar toda a energia disponível para construir centros de dados'."
Segundo, muitas pessoas comuns veem a IA de forma negativa porque sentem que esta lhes está a ser imposta.
É verdade que muitas pessoas utilizam voluntariamente grandes modelos de linguagem (LLMs) por conveniência pessoal ou como ferramenta de produtividade profissional. Mas uma parte significativa do uso da IA não é voluntária. Esta manchete do Wall Street Journal de fevereiro diz tudo: "Empresas obrigam trabalhadores a usar ferramentas de IA".

Porque estão as empresas a fazer isto? Presumivelmente, acreditam que a IA irá aumentar a produtividade. Mas, de igual modo, estão a responder à pressão dos mercados financeiros, que estão a recompensar as empresas que adotam rapidamente a IA, aparentemente sem olhar a resultados demonstrados.

E enquanto os trabalhadores americanos são coagidos a usar a IA, os consumidores americanos estão a ser alimentados à força com IA, queiram ou não. O caso mais dramático é o da Google, que substituiu o seu motor de busca pela IA, sem oferecer a opção de desativar essa função. É preciso recorrer a truques obscuros ou a sites de terceiros para obter os resultados de pesquisa tradicionais.

Portanto, muitas pessoas sentem, com razão, que não estão a ter a liberdade de escolher se querem ou não usar a IA — não usar IA tornou-se difícil, tanto como trabalhador quanto como consumidor.

Terceiro, os centros de dados (datacenters) são uma lembrança altamente visível dos custos da IA. Os centros de dados ocupam extensões enormes de terra — um local proposto no Utah terá o dobro do tamanho de Manhattan. Eles devoram eletricidade e água. Quando geram parte da sua própria energia, criam uma enorme poluição local. Como seria de esperar, há uma oposição intensa à construção de centros de dados. De acordo com uma sondagem da Reuters/Ipsos, 57% os americanos — dois terços dos democratas e metade dos republicanos — opor-se-iam a um centro de dados no seu bairro. Apenas 14% apoiariam.

Quarto, mesmo antes do advento da IA, as empresas tecnológicas já tinham perdido a confiança do público. Ao longo dos anos, o Pew tem questionado regularmente o público sobre as suas opiniões acerca das empresas de tecnologia, perguntando se estas têm um efeito positivo ou negativo "na forma como as coisas estão a correr". Em 2015, a opinião pública sobre as tecnológicas era esmagadoramente positiva. Em 2022, o ano em que o ChatGPT foi lançado, essa boa vontade tinha-se evaporado.


Porque é que os americanos se viraram contra as empresas tecnológicas? Embora isso reflita certamente uma crescente consciencialização dos danos psicológicos e sociais causados pelas redes sociais, muito deve-se também à "merdificação" (enshittification) dos produtos tecnológicos.

Finalmente, a IA está fortemente ligada, na mente do público, aos oligarcas tecnológicos que a estão a impulsionar. Há uma perceção generalizada da crescente concentração de riqueza e poder no topo, e de como isso está a distorcer a nossa política e a prejudicar a nossa sociedade. À exceção dos fiéis do movimento MAGA, os americanos apoiam esmagadoramente políticas governamentais para reduzir a desigualdade de riqueza.



E a IA é amplamente vista, com boas razões, como uma tecnologia que irá aumentar a concentração de riqueza no topo. De facto, como referi, as próprias empresas de IA já nos disseram que a tecnologia terá efeitos extremamente negativos nos trabalhadores.

Existem, portanto, múltiplas razões que se reforçam mutuamente para o público ver a IA de forma negativa. E não, isto não é o ceticismo normal diante da mudança. Esta reação adversa intensa é especial.

E esta reação já está a ter grandes consequências políticas. É verdade que a indústria da IA, fiel ao seu estilo, tem injetado dinheiro nas eleições num esforço para impulsionar políticos amigáveis e derrotar os críticos. Mas a maioria destes esforços falhou. Na verdade, aceitar dinheiro da IA ou estar associado à tecnologia em geral está a começar a parecer politicamente tóxico.

Há um forte elemento de justiça poética nesta reviravolta. A indústria da IA tornou-se deliberadamente ameaçadora como estratégia financeira, acreditando que os mercados recompensariam a aparência de estar na "vanguarda radical". Ao fazê-lo, no entanto, a tecnologia tornou-se altamente impopular. E mesmo numa era em que o dinheiro compra o poder demasiadas vezes, a opinião pública importa.

quarta-feira, 17 de junho de 2026

The Theory of the Vulgar Class


On Sunday Donald Trump celebrated his 80th birthday with a cage match on the White House lawn. The match and the events that surrounded it — especially the press conference with UFC fighters, shown above, held on the steps of the Lincoln Memorial — were a desecration of America’s capital, whose monuments and buildings have always endeavored to represent small-r republican virtues. The whole affair was an affront to the values on which this nation was founded and also unspeakably vulgar.

That last criticism may strike some readers as elitist and trivial. Yet the vulgarity that is the hallmark of Trump and his surrounding circle of oligarchs is a symptom of something not at all trivial: The collapse of social norms. As I argued yesterday, these norms historically played a key role in mitigating abuses of power and privilege during the Gilded Age, the last time America suffered from extreme income and wealth inequality (though not nearly as extreme as what we have now).

Norms matter. In his classic book The Theory of the Leisure Class — published in 1899, at the apogee of the Gilded Age — Thorstein Veblen famously argued that much of the behavior of his era’s elite was driven not by the desire to enjoy life but by the desire to impress others. Partly they did this through conspicuous consumption. Thus they built lavish mansions staffed by legions of servants.

However, members of the Gilded Age elite didn’t solely aim to display their wealth. They also tried to appear respectable. There were surely many private affairs and betrayals we will never know about. But the important point is that the super-wealthy of that era presented to the American public an image of being responsible members of society:

John D. Rockefeller and family

The contrast with the public behavior of Trump’s band of uber-wealthy is startling:


In addition to modeling upstanding behavior, the extremely rich of the Gilded Age were expected to have, or pretend to have, some virtues that were part of the aristocratic ideal, including a sense of noblesse oblige displayed by good works. Veblen was quite cynical about philanthropy, yet even he didn’t dismiss it completely, stating that:
The fact itself that distinction or a decent good fame is sought by this method [such as the endowment of a university, public library or museum] is evidence of a prevalent sense of the legitimacy, and of the presumptive effectual presence, of a non-emulative, non-invidious interest, as a consistent factor in the habits of thought of modern communities.
(Veblen’s lasting intellectual influence did not come from his sparkling prose style.)

Today’s oligarchs, by contrast, have largely given up on the old norms of social and individual responsibility. They give very little money to good causes and their vulgar taste reflects their in-your-face attitude towards the public. In our current hyper-Gilded Age, extreme vulgarity and the decline of philanthropy are really different aspects of the same phenomenon: the rise of an elite so disconnected from ordinary Americans that it feels no need to even appear to be honorable.

So in a real sense we are living in the midst of a reenactment of the decline and fall of the Roman Republic, not a second American Gilded Age. No, I’m not one of those men who thinks about ancient Rome all the time. But there are some obvious parallels.

While the causes of the decline of republican government and Rome’s eventual transition to one-man rule were doubtless complex, there is broad consensus among historians that a key factor was the emergence of extreme inequality. A handful of men became incredibly wealthy from the spoils of Rome’s eastern conquests, and their wealth and power eventually became too great for the rules of constitutional, republican government to contain. Sound uncomfortably familiar?

The death throes of the Republic went on for many years. Politicians declared their rivals enemies of the state, deployed violent gangs to disrupt the rule of law, established temporary dictatorships, and more. The installation of Augustus as emperor in 27 BC was just the final act.

And during this long twilight of constitutional government, one of the ways the extremely wealthy and powerful sought both to demonstrate their wealth and to curry favor with the mob was by sponsoring gladiatorial games.

The vulgarity of the Trumpian elite isn’t in itself that important. But it’s a symptom of a collapse in values and norms that, unless confronted and reversed, may herald the end of the American experiment. We should heed the words of the Stoic philosopher Seneca about the rise and fall of the Roman Republic: “Increases are of sluggish growth, but the way to ruin is rapid.”

terça-feira, 9 de junho de 2026

Money and Machismo are Undermining America


Drones have rapidly transformed modern war. The U.S. military, the most sophisticated, best supplied force in history, has been humiliated by Iran, largely thanks to Iran’s effective use of inexpensive drones to menace shipping, energy production, and even U.S. bases. Meanwhile, Ukraine’s growing superiority in drone warfare is increasingly giving it the upper hand over Russia. Remember, not so long ago the American far right celebrated Putin’s macho posturing and his supposed military invincibility.

Given this radical turn of events, shouldn’t the United States be eager to make a drone deal with Ukraine, benefiting from its technology and expertise?

Apparently not. The Hill reports that Donald Trump has been dragging his feet on such a deal, quoting U.S. military analysts who say that they don’t understand the delay and that they are “mystified.” But I assume that they’re being disingenuous and prefer to avoid saying the obvious. In fact, Trump’s unwillingness to make a deal that would clearly benefit America’s national interest is no mystery at all.

I’ll get to the obvious in a moment. First, let me take a slight detour into something that seems unrelated but in fact helps explain drone aversion: this administration’s hostility to renewable energy and its desperate, doomed and wasteful effort to revive the coal industry.

There was a time when “drill, baby, drill” could be portrayed as a realistic, hard-headed position. Does anyone remember the Cheney Energy Task Force? However, in the past few years, radical declines in the cost of solar power, wind power, and batteries — which solve the problem that the sun doesn’t always shine and the wind doesn’t always blow — have made renewables the most cost-effective way to generate electricity. By contrast, coal is completely unviable. Here are the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s estimates for utility capacity additions in 2025:



Yet Trump is trying to block renewable energy projects any way he can and has just invoked wartime authority to spend $700 million subsidizing new power plants using “clean, beautiful” coal.

Why? Part of the answer is big money. Fossil fuel interests were huge supporters of Trump in 2024. In fact, the Trump presidency is itself the result of billions of dollars spent by the Koch Brothers and others to corrupt and undermine U.S. political institutions -- the Supreme Court very much included. Anti-renewable, pro-fossil fuel policy is their reward, along with the destruction of the Voting Rights Act and the adoption of Project 2025.

What’s the other part? Clean energy has become a bogeyman in the culture wars: mining and burning coal are considered “manly” activities, while renewable energy is portrayed as woke and effeminate. Real men don’t worry about black lung and airborne particulates, let alone climate change.

So a combination of big money and fragile male egos drives Green Derangement Syndrome. And the same is true for both the Iran debacle and the refusal to learn from the catastrophe by turning to Ukraine.

Why was the United States so unprepared for the Iranian drone threat, despite the obvious successes of Ukrainian drones against Russia? Well, as investigative reporters delve into the story, I would urge them to follow the money.

America has a huge, highly profitable defense industry, dedicated to a suite of technologies that are rapidly being rendered obsolete, as $4 million Patriot missiles, that take years to build, are being used to shoot down $35,000 Shahed drones that can be manufactured in months.

So it wouldn’t be surprising if defense-industry interests are playing a significant role in the Trump administration’s refusal to admit that the rules of war have changed — the same way that fossil fuel companies have campaigned against the new realities of energy technology. After all, a deal with drone-savvy Ukrainians would mean less money going to US defense contractors.

While this is speculative, we do know that recognition of the drone revolution in warfare by Trump and his inner circle would require that they abandon their fantasy of macho military power. Pete Hegseth has been purging the military of capable officers — especially Blacks and women — he considers insufficiently loyal to Donald Trump. Beyond loyalty tests, however, he has exalted the importance of “warrior ethos” and physical fitness, as if he were leading the 300 Spartans rather than a high-tech military in an age of drones and electronic warfare.

It’s true that Hegseth, perhaps chastened by his abject failure in Iran — why does he still have a job? — recently admitted that the U.S. has learned from Ukraine. But an admission that his entire conception of war was wrongheaded will be a step too far for him.

Likewise, Trump himself is in love with big, expensive weapons as symbols of virility and power. He’s still pushing for giant “Trump-class” battleships, even though they would be sitting ducks in a modern war. Just ask the Ukrainians, who have used missiles and naval drones to force Russia’s once-vaunted Black Sea Fleet to cower in a fortified refuge. But Trump doesn’t want to give up his fantasies.

And he’s especially unwilling to learn from Ukraine. After all, he cut off aid to Ukraine in a hissy fit over Zelenskyy’s well-deserved reputation for heroism, only to he humiliated by Ukraine’s refusal to lose its war. Admitting that he needs Ukrainian help would be a further humiliation.

As I said earlier, there is no mystery about why Trump refuses to make a drone deal with Ukraine. Never mind the national interest. In military strategy as in energy policy, Trump is betraying America in the service of money and machismo.

sexta-feira, 10 de abril de 2026

Ensaio - O mundo com IA e As Mãos


"Ouvi umas quantas conferências do Y. Harari e, pese embora o brilho, comecei a vê-lo como um comerciante de ideias, como alguns dos seus antepassados terão sido de peles, de dinheiro ou de prata. A obsessão com a Inteligência Artificial parecia-me mais uma oportunidade de negócio no grande mercado da fitness do intelecto do que uma preocupação genuína de um académico.
Mudei de opinião.
A penetração da IA é cada vez mais profunda e omnipresente; vejo-a por todo o lado. Não me sinto competente para analisar e antecipar, ao detalhe, o impacto deste tandem “IA + dependência de dopamina via redes sociais” no funcionamento das sociedades atuais. Porém, uma conversa noturna, ontem, deixou-me a pensar. Dizia-me a minha interlocutora que, na empresa X, os informáticos já não escrevem código; esse trabalho ficou para o Claude.
Posso estar errado, mas suspeito que estes senhores que agora observo pela janela da pastelaria, de aparafusadora em punho, têm mais futuro nas sociedades pós-IA do que os jovens que penam nos gabinetes de contabilidade, no largo mais adiante.
Identifico uma gigantesca dissonância entre aquilo que o sistema de ensino ensina e aquilo de que esta sociedade estruturalmente complexa e em radical mudança necessita: manutenção permanente (porque a 2.ª lei não perdoa). As famílias, com o beneplácito dos governos e da classe dos professores, apostam em formações liberais e de colarinho branco, no papel e no lápis, hoje evoluídos para Word, Excel e Photoshop, áreas que serão em breve devastadas pela IA.
Assim como um pianista com futuro tem de exercitar, desde tenra idade, a conexão mão-cérebro — esse poderoso instrumento de ação sobre a matéria herdado dos ancestrais caçadores-recolectores —, o mesmo exigem os trabalhos com futuro. As sociedades vão remanualizar-se e ninguém, nem pessoas nem instituições, está preparado para isso.
Em resumo: prometeram-nos que as máquinas fariam o trabalho sujo para para nos dedicarmos ao lazer. Ironicamente, o Claude e o ChatGPT escrevem música, poesia e o código informático, desenham a publicidade e as artes gráficas, e, no final, fazem a contabilidade e responsabilizam-se pelas interações com a máquina do estado —, mas continuamos a precisar desesperadamente de quem nos desentupa os canos, conserte a máquina de lavar e cuide dos mais velhos.
Talvez as escolas do futuro devessem trocar metade das aulas de literacia digital e mais teorias por oficinas de carpintaria, mecânica, eletricidade e agricultura. Ensinar as nossas crianças a reaprender o peso e a textura da matéria, o desconforto e a cor do sangue, antes que se tornem obsoletas num mundo de ecrãs e memórias virtuais.
P.S. Fosse eu novo e com jeito para o negócio e investiria numa empresa de tempos livres que se poderia chamar, sei lá, “Academia do Eletricista e do Canalizador”, ou algo do género. Mais proveitoso do que o futebol, a natação, o ballet, o teatro …, parece-me." - Carlos Aguiar

Nota Pessoal
Paul Krugman no início dos anos 90 escreveu por diversão uma especulação sobre o que seria a economia daí a 100 anos. A IA ainda não era a palavra de ordem, mas a automação em geral já constava das suas projeções. Ele afirmava que tal como a era industrial tinha tornado menos valiosos os produtos da indústria, a era da informação que se desenhava iria tornar menos valioso tudo o que tivesse que ver com informação, desde jornalismo a ciência, ou a informática. Assim, no futuro deste modo projetado as fontes de riqueza seriam a posse de recursos naturais, para as nações, e a capacidade de trabalhar com as mãos, para as pessoas.
Embora não seja líquido que tudo isto esteja a salvo da IA, coisas como cuidar de idosos, fabricar móveis em madeira, ou instalar/reparar canalizações seriam o tipo de atividades ainda valorizadas depois de automatizarmos tudo o que pode ser automatizado.
O problema é que hoje em dia há pessoas em posição de ditar o que deve ser automatizado, mesmo que com prejuízo para a humanidade em geral. A IA está a transformar-se rapidamente num sistema endogâmico, em que se alimenta de si mesma, já que uma cada vez maior proporção da informação disponível é gerada por IA.

Por outro lado nunca antes o biorregionalismo está ser posto em causa como agora, bem como aceleramos cegamente no Business to Business em que há muitas reticências, como bem referes Back to Basics. O impacto ambiental da IA é, atualmente, muito superior e mais preocupante do que o das práticas artesanais e biológicas. O Back to Basics não é apenas uma escolha estética; é, talvez, a única estratégia de sobrevivência ecológica a longo prazo.

A questão agora é: a sociedade estará disposta a "pagar o preço" (em tempo e esforço) para manter essas práticas manuais vivas, ou a conveniência da IA acabará por atropelar até mesmo esses redutos artesanais?

terça-feira, 31 de março de 2026

O pior país do mundo


Por Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr *
Preparem-se para um artigo violento. A nossa paciência esgota-se e, com ela, desaparece também a capacidade de medir palavras e fazer as devidas ressalvas. Para determinados assuntos, pelo menos. Qual é o pior país do mundo? A concorrência é forte. Temos, por exemplo, a Inglaterra e a Holanda. Ao longo da vida, tive a oportunidade de conhecer vários ingleses e holandeses. E devo dizer: poucos se salvam. Os ingleses, nem se fala, estão na origem de grande parte dos males que enfrentamos no mundo. Os holandeses, menores, menos conhecidos nas suas abjeções, destacam-se pela antipatia e preconceitos contra estrangeiros. Deram bastante liberdade aos judeus em tempos remotos, é verdade, mas figuraram entre os principais e entusiásticos colaboradores dos nazis na perseguição aos judeus durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial. Em contraste com os dinamarqueses, que resistiram obstinadamente, como relatou Hannah Arendt no seu célebre livro Eichmann em Jerusalém. Cerca de ¾ dos judeus que viviam na Holanda foram assassinados! Já a história dos judeus dinamarqueses é sui generis, conta Arendt. A resistência dos dinamarqueses à perseguição dos judeus foi única entre todos os países da Europa, fossem países ocupados, aliados de Hitler ou verdadeiramente neutros e independentes. Ninguém se igualou à Dinamarca.

Estou a desviar-me um pouco do assunto, porém. Não era da Holanda ou da Dinamarca que queria falar, países pequenos e irrelevantes para o quadro mundial. Retomo o tema principal. Seriam os Estados Unidos o pior país do mundo? Há muitos motivos para pensar assim; eu próprio morei oito longos anos em Washington e sei como os americanos podem ser desagradáveis e até detestáveis. Muito mais importante: o Império americano tem uma longa lista de crimes e agressões contra outros países. Os seus últimos feitos foram o ataque à Venezuela e a intensificação do embargo criminoso contra Cuba, além da agressão ao Irão.

Mas ninguém consegue superar o estado genocida e terrorista de Israel. Um alerta meio óbvio: vou falar aqui do estado de Israel (que nunca deveria ter sido criado) e do projeto sionista que levou à sua criação – e não propriamente do povo judeu ou dos judeus em geral. Note-se, entretanto, que as políticas do governo de Israel são apoiadas pela maioria dos judeus israelitas, em especial a agressão ao Irão e a oposição à criação de um Estado palestiniano. Essas políticas são apoiadas também pela maioria das comunidades sionistas em outros países, inclusive aqui no Brasil e – mais importante – nos Estados Unidos.

O lobby sionista nos Estados Unidos
O cientista político americano John Mearsheimer, em coautoria com Stephen Walt, escreveu um importante livro, publicado em 2007, sobre o que ele denomina de “Israel lobby”, cuja influência decisiva nos Estados Unidos, notadamente em Nova Iorque e Washington, acaba por subordinar a política externa dos Estados Unidos – um caso clássico do rabo a abanar o cão. Um país pequeno, com 10 milhões de habitantes, dita as regras à superpotência, os Estados Unidos, contribuindo para acentuar a sua delinquência. A mais recente demonstração da força desse lobby foi precisamente o ataque ao Irão. Os Estados Unidos acabaram por se envolver numa guerra para servir não os próprios interesses, mas os de um país estrangeiro, como denunciou Joseph Kent ao renunciar ao cargo de diretor do Centro Nacional de Contraterrorismo, para o qual foi nomeado pelo próprio Donald Trump.

Os judeus sionistas financiam campanhas sórdidas, corrompem, elegem e controlam políticos para a Presidência e o Congresso, controlam grande parte da comunicação social, são donos de bancos e outras instituições financeiras privadas e têm forte influência em Hollywood e na indústria da pornografia. Mandam e desmandam. Beneficiam os seus serviçais e ameaçam, chantageiam e punem os seus críticos. Jeffrey Epstein, não por acaso, era judeu. Esses sionistas são todos eles criminosos, apoiantes de assassinos de crianças palestinianas, iranianas e de outros países. E assassinar crianças é o crime mais grave que se pode cometer. Nos Estilhaços, o meu livro mais recente, cheguei a escrever que o sofrimento das crianças não só desmente a existência de Deus, como prova a do Diabo. E quem representa o Diabo na Terra hoje? Quem melhor que Israel e os seus apoiantes no resto do mundo?

O lobby israelita faz parte, na verdade, de algo maior e mais desastroso para os Estados Unidos – a subordinação das políticas públicas a bilionários e lobbies privados – entre os quais figuram também as big techs (gigantes da tecnologia), o complexo industrial-militar (que ganha com todas as guerras), o lobby cubano (focado em boicotar Cuba), o lobby pró-armas, o lobby financeiro (que se sobrepõe em grande parte ao israelita), entre outros. Não há democracia, mas plutocracia – o governo dos ricos. E cleptocracia – o governo dos ladrões. E, também, kakistocracia – o governo dos piores. Não é o que se vê, diga-se de passagem, na Rússia e na China.

Génios e mediocridades judaicas
Os judeus têm, desde tempos remotos, forte presença nos meios financeiros privados – em bancos e demais instituições financeiras. Sabem ganhar dinheiro. Mas isso não quer dizer grande coisa. Muitos ditos “génios financeiros” não passam em geral de figuras bizarras. A dedicação a assuntos financeiros parece levar inexoravelmente a uma perda continuada de massa cerebral e criatividade, além de solapar valores éticos.

Bem. Uma das singularidades do povo judeu é a mistura de génios, verdadeiros génios, com uma massa criminosa e/ou medíocre. Entre os génios, podemos recordar Karl Marx, Gustav Mahler, Sigmund Freud, Franz Kafka e Albert Einstein. A própria Hannah Arendt foi, não diria genial, mas certamente uma intelectual de enorme destaque. E entre economistas judeus americanos de projeção hoje em dia podemos mencionar Joseph Stiglitz, Paul Krugman e Jeffrey Sachs (nenhum deles sionista). Para mim, entretanto, o judeu mais importante de todos foi Heinrich Heine, um poeta alemão da primeira metade do século XIX, que figura com destaque nos Estilhaços e por quem tenho verdadeira paixão desde os meus 22 anos.

Por outro lado, a galeria de mediocridades judaicas é extensa. Dou alguns exemplos ao acaso. Aqui no Brasil temos Celso Lafer, discípulo fervoroso e acrítico de Hannah Arendt, e ministro das Relações Exteriores no governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso, o mais limitado que já comandou o Itamaraty (superado apenas por Ernesto Araújo, nomeado por Bolsonaro). Outro exemplo, este da área financeira brasileira: Luís Stuhlberger. Até recentemente, eu nunca ouvira falar dele. Sinal alarmante de ignorância financeira, pois ele é um destacado e respeitado judeu, que integra as hostes da Faria Lima. Não merece respeito, porém. Vejam a entrevista que ele deu ao jornal Valor (publicada a 30 de maio de 2025, p. C3), um verdadeiro festival de asneiras políticas, económicas e culturais, inclusive na linguagem salpicada de termos ingleses para os quais há palavras rigorosamente equivalentes na nossa língua.

Mas vamos voltar aos Estados Unidos. Como mencionei, os judeus têm, historicamente, forte presença no setor financeiro privado – em bancos, fundos de investimento e outras instituições financeiras. Menos conhecida é a presença desse lobby no setor financeiro público, especialmente nos Estados Unidos. No FMI, por exemplo, onde trabalhei durante oito anos, todos ou quase todos os representantes do governo americano na Administração e na Direção eram judeus americanos (alguns bem inteligentes). Mais importante: o lobby domina também o Tesouro dos EUA (o ministério das finanças deles). Nas décadas recentes, a maioria dos Secretários do Tesouro dos EUA foram também judeus americanos. A “comunidade” marca presença. É o Tesouro quem dita as regras no FMI, no Banco Mundial e no Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento (BID), entidades financeiras sediadas em Washington. Não é por acaso, por exemplo, que uma mediocridade brasileira, o judeu Ilan Goldfayn, foi alçado à presidência do BID. Ele está lá para cumprir as ordens do Tesouro americano, leia-se, do lobby sionista.

A reação do Irão
Não vale a pena, entretanto, gastar pólvora com fracos. O que importa são as barbaridades que o estado terrorista de Israel está a cometer em Gaza, na Cisjordânia, no Líbano e, agora, com o ataque ao Irão. Não se deve perder de vista que a guerra foi iniciada por Israel. Os Estados Unidos acompanharam a agressão. O Irão já provou que não é nenhum país indefeso. Pelo contrário, está a castigar Israel com uma chuva de mísseis balísticos e drones, que atingem Telavive e Haifa, entre outros locais. As indicações são de que a economia israelita está a ser arruinada. E os israelitas estão a provar do próprio veneno. Israel desencadeou uma guerra regional, com consequências económicas, sociais e políticas para o mundo inteiro. Esse país criminoso precisa de ser travado. Vida longa ao Irão e ao grande povo iraniano! Que não lhes falte munição, mísseis e drones para deter Israel e outros inimigos da humanidade!

*Economista. Foi vice-presidente do Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento, estabelecido pelos BRICS em Xangai, de 2015 a 2017, e diretor executivo no FMI pelo Brasil e mais dez países em Washington, de 2007 a 2015. Lançou no final de 2019, pela editora LeYa, o livro O Brasil não cabe no quintal de ninguém: bastidores da vida de um economista brasileiro no FMI e nos BRICS e outros textos sobre nacionalismo e nosso complexo de vira-lata. A segunda edição, atualizada e ampliada, foi publicada em 2021.

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quarta-feira, 17 de maio de 2023

Uma moda com pouco impacto e destinada a uma morte catastrófica - As previsões falhadas sobre a Internet


Entrámos na máquina do tempo e viajámos até aos “primórdios” da World Wide Web e da Internet como a conhecemos para recordar algumas das previsões tecnológicas que acabaram por não se cumprir.
O nascimento da World Wide Web fez correr muita tinta, entre manifestações efusivas acerca do potencial da tecnologia, visões mais moderadas e críticas, mas também muitas previsões acerca do seu futuro.

É verdade que ainda não existem bolas de cristal ou outros artifícios mágicos que permitam prever o futuro com exatidão, mas algumas previsões acabaram mesmo por não vingar. Aliás, como relembrou recentemente Tim Berners-Lee, quando a World Wide Web surgiu, muitos acreditavam que seria apenas uma moda.

Na data em que se assinala o Dia das Telecomunicações e da Sociedade da Informação, aproveitamos para fazer uma viagem no tempo e recordar algumas das previsões falhadas sobre a Internet.

Em fevereiro de 1995, um artigo de opinião publicado na revista norte-americana Newsweek, assinado pelo astrónomo, autor e professor Clifford Stoll, chamou a atenção com o cabeçalho “A Internet? Bah!” (numa tradução para português), frisando os motivos pelos quais considerava que nunca seria possível atingir um estado de “nirvana” através do ciberespaço.

Apesar da sua experiência com a tecnologia que esteve na base da Internet, Clifford Stoll admitia sentir desconforto em relação ao futuro que os visionários da época preconizavam: do trabalho remoto às bibliotecas interativas e salas de aula multimédia, passando pelas comunidades virtuais, negócios e comércio online e até pela possibilidade de a liberdade das redes digitais tornar os governos mais democráticos. Para o autor, tudo não passava de “tretas”.
“a verdade é que nenhuma base de dados online vai substituir os jornais diários, nenhum cd-rom vai tomar o lugar de um professor competente e nenhuma rede de computadores vai mudar a forma como o governo funciona”.
Muitos anos mais tarde após a sua publicação, a peça passou a constar de múltiplas listas online de previsões falhadas sobre a Internet. Em 2017, a propósito do 28º aniversário da World Wide Web, a Newsweek publicou uma versão “corrigida” do artigo.

No entanto há ainda quem defenda que uma leitura mais aprofundada permite ver que alguns das questões mencionadas por Clifford Stoll acabaram por se tornar desafios com os quais lidamos atualmente, sobretudo, no que toca à desinformação, ou até no impacto da Internet na forma como nos relacionamos socialmente.

Uma “morte” catastrófica?
Também em 1995, num artigo de opinião publicado na revista InfoWorld, Robert Metcalfe, co-inventor da Ethernet, deu a conhecer que acreditava que a Internet iria explodir tal como uma supernova e depois colapsar de forma catastrófica em 1996, deixando para trás um rasto de websites “fantasma”.

Curiosamente, Robert Metcalfe prometeu comer as suas palavras caso a sua previsão não se concretizasse, numa promessa feita nesse mesmo ano, na quarta edição da World Wide Web Conference.

O que é certo é que em abril de 1997, durante uma edição da World Wide Web Conference, o autor cumpriu à letra o que prometeu, não sem antes passar uma cópia impressa do seu artigo por uma liquidificadora, como reconta um artigo da InfoWorld.


Mas Robert Metcalfe não foi o único a dar um prazo de validade curto ao mundo online. Em 1998, o economista Paul Krugman, que foi laureado com o prémio Nobel da Economia em 2008, previa num artigo na revista Red Herring que o crescimento da Internet iria desacelerar drasticamente.

O motivo? Tal aconteceria “à medida que a falha na Lei de Metcalfe, que indica que o número de potenciais ligações numa rede é proporcional ao quadrado do número de participantes, se torna aparente: a maioria das pessoas não tem nada para dizer às outras”.
“por volta de 2005 ficará claro que o impacto da internet na economia não terá sido maior do que o da máquina de fax”.
Em janeiro de 1997, numa edição da revista Popular Mechanics, Brian C.Fenton, editor da secção de eletrónica, alertava para a possibilidade da Internet sucumbir ao “peso” do seu sucesso, ficando tão lenta que acabaria por se tornar inútil.

Nas palavras do autor, recordadas num artigo mais recente, onde a revista aponta várias das suas previsões tecnológicas que não se concretizaram, tendo em conta a procura, com um número de utilizadores que estava a crescer a um ritmo anual de 200%, o facto de a Internet não ter colapsado era “impressionante”.
Nem a Microsoft se "escapou"

No final dos anos 90, até mesmo Bill Gates, que co-fundou e durante anos dirigiu a Microsoft, mostrava algumas incertezas quanto à Internet. Num artigo de 1997, o jornal The New York Times, apontava o responsável da gigante tecnológica como um dos “céticos” da época.

Segundo o artigo, no livro “The Road Ahead”, publicado em 1995, Bill Gates detalhava que a tecnologia para as “killer apps”, isto é, aplicações não era a mais adequada para atrair os consumidores para a Internet. Mais tarde, a obra foi revista, passando a incluir um capítulo sobre a Internet.

Já em 2020, por ocasião do 25º aniversário do lançamento do livro, Bill Gates aproveitou para rever as suas previsões com novos olhos. “Fui muito otimista em relação a algumas coisas, mas outras aconteceram mais depressa ou mais dramaticamente do que eu imaginava”, admitiu numa publicação no seu blog.

Esta não foi a única previsão falhada do antigo responsável da Microsoft. Alegadamente, Bill Gates terá dito, num evento da feira de tecnologia Comdex em 1994, que não via grande potencial para a Internet para os próximos 10 anos. Já em 2004, durante a edição desse ano do Fórum Económico Mundial em Davos, onde garantiu que o problema do spam seria resolvido em dois anos.

A verdade é que, hoje, o spam continua a ser um problema, tendo assumido contornos ainda mais preocupantes, com o crescimento do phishing e outros esquemas fraudulentos, indo muito além das caixas de correio eletrónico.

O sucesso do motor de busca da Google foi um dos aspectos subvalorizados pelo responsável durante o seu discurso em Davos. Mas Bill Gates não seria o único responsável da Microsoft a partilhar uma opinião semelhante sobre a empresa que, mais tarde, se tornaria numa gigante tecnológica.

Quatro anos depois, numa entrevista ao Financial Times, Steve Ballmer, antigo presidente executivo da Microsoft, não previa o melhor futuro para a Google. “Eles têm apenas um produto”, afirmou, referindo-se ao motor de busca da tecnológica. “Eles têm o Gmail agora, mas têm um produto que lhes traz todo o dinheiro e ele não mudou em cinco anos”.

Voltando aos anos 90, se alguma vez teve curiosidade em descobrir que previsões de futuro marcavam o panorama das comunicações e dos "primórdios" da Internet no início da década, a Universidade de Elon tem uma "cápsula do tempo" com mais de 4.200 citações de mais de 1.000 personalidades da época.

terça-feira, 10 de abril de 2012

Michael Marmot e Saúde Pública: a relação entre a geografia e o nível de instrução do cidadão (actualizado)



Michael Marmot é uma referência mundial sobre saúde pública e contesta fortemente os cortes nos esquemas de protecção social que estão a verificar-se na União Europeia, devido à crise. Além de ser injustos, acabarão por sair caros, porque piorarão a saúde da população. Durante a sua presença em Lisboa, afirmou que além da geografia, o estado de saúde melhora com o nível de instrução. De facto as estatísticas do Institute of Health Equity que M. Marmot preside não deixa margens para dúvidas.
(adaptado Visão, 1de Março 2012)

Actualizações demonstrando as preocupações de M. Marmot:
1. O NY Times de hoje recolheu estudos de peritos norte-americanos demonstrando que nos States aumentou para o dobro o fosso de sucesso escolar entre ricos e pobres, em menos de duas décadas.

2. Efeitos dos baixos salários dos professores e más políticas de educação em todo o mundo, em particular nos EUA (estudo de caso no Texas- via blogue do Paul Krugman).

3.Finalmente, outro estudo mostra porque é que o destino dos lucros não é visível nas descidas dos preços dos combustíveis, no alívio da carga fiscal dos cidadãos, sobretudo os contribuintes e na melhoria da qualidade vida generalizada. Esta ditadura do capitalismo, cobardia dos governantes e mentiras são denunciadas nesta notícia, em que as plataformas  Citizens for Tax Justice (CTJ) and the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy denunciam aqui que existem 26 corporações que nada pagam ao estado, apesar de obterem lucros bilionários!

sexta-feira, 16 de abril de 2010

Crónica Building a Green Economy, por Paul Krugman


Photograph by Yoshikazu Nema; Artwork by Yuken Teruya


From: NY Times Published: April 5, 2010

If you listen to climate scientists — and despite the relentless campaign to discredit their work, you should — it is long past time to do something about emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. If we continue with business as usual, they say, we are facing a rise in global temperatures that will be little short of apocalyptic. And to avoid that apocalypse, we have to wean our economy from the use of fossil fuels, coal above

But is it possible to make drastic cuts in greenhouse-gas emissions without destroying our economy?

Like the debate over climate change itself, the debate over climate economics looks very different from the inside than it often does in popular media. The casual reader might have the impression that there are real doubts about whether emissions can be reduced without inflicting severe damage on the economy. In fact, once you filter out the noise generated by special-interest groups, you discover that there is widespread agreement among environmental economists that a market-based program to deal with the threat of climate change — one that limits carbon emissions by putting a price on them — can achieve large results at modest, though not trivial, cost. There is, however, much less agreement on how fast we should move, whether major conservation efforts should start almost immediately or be gradually increased over the course of many decades.
In what follows, I will offer a brief survey of the economics of climate change or, more precisely, the economics of lessening climate change. I’ll try to lay out the areas of broad agreement as well as those that remain in major dispute. First, though, a primer in the basic economics of environmental protection.

Environmental Econ 101
If there’s a single central insight in economics, it’s this: There are mutual gains from transactions between consenting adults. If the going price of widgets is $10 and I buy a widget, it must be because that widget is worth more than $10 to me. If you sell a widget at that price, it must be because it costs you less than $10 to make it. So buying and selling in the widget market works to the benefit of both buyers and sellers. More than that, some careful analysis shows that if there is effective competition in the widget market, so that the price ends up matching the number of widgets people want to buy to the number of widgets other people want to sell, the outcome is to maximize the total gains to producers and consumers. Free markets are “efficient” — which, in economics-speak as opposed to plain English, means that nobody can be made better off without making someone else worse off.
Now, efficiency isn’t everything. In particular, there is no reason to assume that free markets will deliver an outcome that we consider fair or just. So the case for market efficiency says nothing about whether we should have, say, some form of guaranteed health insurance, aid to the poor and so forth. But the logic of basic economics says that we should try to achieve social goals through “aftermarket” interventions. That is, we should let markets do their job, making efficient use of the nation’s resources, then utilize taxes and transfers to help those whom the market passes by.
But what if a deal between consenting adults imposes costs on people who are not part of the exchange? What if you manufacture a widget and I buy it, to our mutual benefit, but the process of producing that widget involves dumping toxic sludge into other people’s drinking water? When there are “negative externalities” — costs that economic actors impose on others without paying a price for their actions — any presumption that the market economy, left to its own devices, will do the right thing goes out the window. So what should we do? Environmental economics is all about answering that question.

One way to deal with negative externalities is to make rules that prohibit or at least limit behavior that imposes especially high costs on others. That’s what we did in the first major wave of environmental legislation in the early 1970s: cars were required to meet emission standards for the chemicals that cause smog, factories were required to limit the volume of effluent they dumped into waterways and so on. And this approach yielded results; America’s air and water became a lot cleaner in the decades that followed.

But while the direct regulation of activities that cause pollution makes sense in some cases, it is seriously defective in others, because it does not offer any scope for flexibility and creativity. Consider the biggest environmental issue of the 1980s — acid rain. Emissions of sulfur dioxide from power plants, it turned out, tend to combine with water downwind and produce flora- and wildlife-destroying sulfuric acid. In 1977, the government made its first stab at confronting the issue, recommending that all new coal-fired plants have scrubbers to remove sulfur dioxide from their emissions. Imposing a tough standard on all plants was problematic, because retrofitting some older plants would have been extremely expensive. By regulating only new plants, however, the government passed up the opportunity to achieve fairly cheap pollution control at plants that were, in fact, easy to retrofit. Short of a de facto federal takeover of the power industry, with federal officials issuing specific instructions to each plant, how was this conundrum to be resolved?

Enter Arthur Cecil Pigou, an early-20th-century British don, whose 1920 book, “The Economics of Welfare,” is generally regarded as the ur-text of environmental economics.
Somewhat surprisingly, given his current status as a godfather of economically sophisticated environmentalism, Pigou didn’t actually stress the problem of pollution. Rather than focusing on, say, London’s famous fog (actually acrid smog, caused by millions of coal fires), he opened his discussion with an example that must have seemed twee even in 1920, a hypothetical case in which “the game-preserving activities of one occupier involve the overrunning of a neighboring occupier’s land by rabbits.” But never mind. What Pigou enunciated was a principle: economic activities that impose unrequited costs on other people should not always be banned, but they should be discouraged. And the right way to curb an activity, in most cases, is to put a price on it. So Pigou proposed that people who generate negative externalities should have to pay a fee reflecting the costs they impose on others — what has come to be known as a Pigovian tax. The simplest version of a Pigovian tax is an effluent fee: anyone who dumps pollutants into a river, or emits them into the air, must pay a sum proportional to the amount dumped.

Pigou’s analysis lay mostly fallow for almost half a century, as economists spent their time grappling with issues that seemed more pressing, like the Great Depression. But with the rise of environmental regulation, economists dusted off Pigou and began pressing for a “market-based” approach that gives the private sector an incentive, via prices, to limit pollution, as opposed to a “command and control” fix that issues specific instructions in the form of regulations.

The initial reaction by many environmental activists to this idea was hostile, largely on moral grounds. Pollution, they felt, should be treated like a crime rather than something you have the right to do as long as you pay enough money. Moral concerns aside, there was also considerable skepticism about whether market incentives would actually be successful in reducing pollution. Even today, Pigovian taxes as originally envisaged are relatively rare. The most successful example I’ve been able to find is a Dutch tax on discharges of water containing organic materials.

What has caught on instead is a variant that most economists consider more or less equivalent: a system of tradable emissions permits, a k a cap and trade. In this model, a limited number of licenses to emit a specified pollutant, like sulfur dioxide, are issued. A business that wants to create more pollution than it is licensed for can go out and buy additional licenses from other parties; a firm that has more licenses than it intends to use can sell its surplus. This gives everyone an incentive to reduce pollution, because buyers would not have to acquire as many licenses if they can cut back on their emissions, and sellers can unload more licenses if they do the same. In fact, economically, a cap-and-trade system produces the same incentives to reduce pollution as a Pigovian tax, with the price of licenses effectively serving as a tax on pollution.

In practice there are a couple of important differences between cap and trade and a pollution tax. One is that the two systems produce different types of uncertainty. If the government imposes a pollution tax, polluters know what price they will have to pay, but the government does not know how much pollution they will generate. If the government imposes a cap, it knows the amount of pollution, but polluters do not know what the price of emissions will be. Another important difference has to do with government revenue. A pollution tax is, well, a tax, which imposes costs on the private sector while generating revenue for the government. Cap and trade is a bit more complicated. If the government simply auctions off licenses and collects the revenue, then it is just like a tax. Cap and trade, however, often involves handing out licenses to existing players, so the potential revenue goes to industry instead of the government.

Politically speaking, doling out licenses to industry isn’t entirely bad, because it offers a way to partly compensate some of the groups whose interests would suffer if a serious climate-change policy were adopted. This can make passing legislation more feasible.

These political considerations probably explain why the solution to the acid-rain predicament took the form of cap and trade and why licenses to pollute were distributed free to power companies. It’s also worth noting that the Waxman-Markey bill, a cap-and-trade setup for greenhouse gases that starts by giving out many licenses to industry but puts up a growing number for auction in later years, was actually passed by the House of Representatives last year; it’s hard to imagine a broad-based emissions tax doing the same for many years.

That’s not to say that emission taxes are a complete nonstarter. Some senators have recently floated a proposal for a sort of hybrid solution, with cap and trade for some parts of the economy and carbon taxes for others — mainly oil and gas. The political logic seems to be that the oil industry thinks consumers won’t blame it for higher gas prices if those prices reflect an explicit tax.

In any case, experience suggests that market-based emission controls work. Our recent history with acid rain shows as much. The Clean Air Act of 1990 introduced a cap-and-trade system in which power plants could buy and sell the right to emit sulfur dioxide, leaving it up to individual companies to manage their own business within the new limits. Sure enough, over time sulfur-dioxide emissions from power plants were cut almost in half, at a much lower cost than even optimists expected; electricity prices fell instead of rising. Acid rain did not disappear as a problem, but it was significantly mitigated. The results, it would seem, demonstrated that we can deal with environmental problems when we have to.

So there we have it, right? The emission of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases is a classic negative externality — the “biggest market failure the world has ever seen,” in the words of Nicholas Stern, the author of a report on the subject for the British government. Textbook economics and real-world experience tell us that we should have policies to discourage activities that generate negative externalities and that it is generally best to rely on a market-based approach.

Climate of Doubt?
This is an article on climate economics, not climate science. But before we get to the economics, it’s worth establishing three things about the state of the scientific debate.
The first is that the planet is indeed warming. Weather fluctuates, and as a consequence it’s easy enough to point to an unusually warm year in the recent past, note that it’s cooler now and claim, “See, the planet is getting cooler, not warmer!” But if you look at the evidence the right way ­— taking averages over periods long enough to smooth out the fluctuations — the upward trend is unmistakable: each successive decade since the 1970s has been warmer than the one before.

Second, climate models predicted this well in advance, even getting the magnitude of the temperature rise roughly right. While it’s relatively easy to cook up an analysis that matches known data, it is much harder to create a model that accurately forecasts the future. So the fact that climate modelers more than 20 years ago successfully predicted the subsequent global warming gives them enormous credibility.

Yet that’s not the conclusion you might draw from the many media reports that have focused on matters like hacked e-mail and climate scientists’ talking about a “trick” to “hide” an anomalous decline in one data series or expressing their wish to see papers by climate skeptics kept out of research reviews. The truth, however, is that the supposed scandals evaporate on closer examination, revealing only that climate researchers are human beings, too. Yes, scientists try to make their results stand out, but no data were suppressed. Yes, scientists dislike it when work that they think deliberately obfuscates the issues gets published. What else is new? Nothing suggests that there should not continue to be strong support for climate research.
And this brings me to my third point: models based on this research indicate that if we continue adding greenhouse gases to the atmosphere as we have, we will eventually face drastic changes in the climate. Let’s be clear. We’re not talking about a few more hot days in the summer and a bit less snow in the winter; we’re talking about massively disruptive events, like the transformation of the Southwestern United States into a permanent dust bowl over the next few decades.
Now, despite the high credibility of climate modelers, there is still tremendous uncertainty in their long-term forecasts. But as we will see shortly, uncertainty makes the case for action stronger, not weaker. So climate change demands action. Is a cap-and-trade program along the lines of the model used to reduce sulfur dioxide the right way to go?

Serious opposition to cap and trade generally comes in two forms: an argument that more direct action — in particular, a ban on coal-fired power plants — would be more effective and an argument that an emissions tax would be better than emissions trading. (Let’s leave aside those who dismiss climate science altogether and oppose any limits on greenhouse-gas emissions, as well as those who oppose the use of any kind of market-based remedy.) There’s something to each of these positions, just not as much as their proponents think.

When it comes to direct action, you can make the case that economists love markets not wisely but too well, that they are too ready to assume that changing people’s financial incentives fixes every problem. In particular, you can’t put a price on something unless you can measure it accurately, and that can be both difficult and expensive. So sometimes it’s better simply to lay down some basic rules about what people can and cannot do.

Consider auto emissions, for example. Could we or should we charge each car owner a fee proportional to the emissions from his or her tailpipe? Surely not. You would have to install expensive monitoring equipment on every car, and you would also have to worry about fraud. It’s almost certainly better to do what we actually do, which is impose emissions standards on all cars.

Is there a comparable argument to be made for greenhouse-gas emissions? My initial reaction, which I suspect most economists would share, is that the very scale and complexity of the situation requires a market-based solution, whether cap and trade or an emissions tax. After all, greenhouse gases are a direct or indirect byproduct of almost everything produced in a modern economy, from the houses we live in to the cars we drive. Reducing emissions of those gases will require getting people to change their behavior in many different ways, some of them impossible to identify until we have a much better grasp of green technology. So can we really make meaningful progress by telling people specifically what will or will not be permitted? Econ 101 tells us — probably correctly — that the only way to get people to change their behavior appropriately is to put a price on emissions so this cost in turn gets incorporated into everything else in a way that reflects ultimate environmental impacts.

When shoppers go to the grocery store, for example, they will find that fruits and vegetables from farther away have higher prices than local produce, reflecting in part the cost of emission licenses or taxes paid to ship that produce. When businesses decide how much to spend on insulation, they will take into account the costs of heating and air-conditioning that include the price of emissions licenses or taxes for electricity generation. When electric utilities have to choose among energy sources, they will have to take into account the higher license fees or taxes associated with fossil-fuel consumption. And so on down the line. A market-based system would create decentralized incentives to do the right thing, and that’s the only way it can be done.

That said, some specific rules may be required. James Hansen, the renowned climate scientist who deserves much of the credit for making global warming an issue in the first place, has argued forcefully that most of the climate-change problem comes down to just one thing, burning coal, and that whatever else we do, we have to shut down coal burning over the next couple decades. My economist’s reaction is that a stiff license fee would strongly discourage coal use anyway. But a market-based system might turn out to have loopholes — and their consequences could be dire. So I would advocate supplementing market-based disincentives with direct controls on coal burning.

What about the case for an emissions tax rather than cap and trade? There’s no question that a straightforward tax would have many advantages over legislation like Waxman-Markey, which is full of exceptions and special situations. But that’s not really a useful comparison: of course an idealized emissions tax looks better than a cap-and-trade system that has already passed the House with all its attendant compromises. The question is whether the emissions tax that could actually be put in place is better than cap and trade. There is no reason to believe that it would be — indeed, there is no reason to believe that a broad-based emissions tax would make it through Congress.

To be fair, Hansen has made an interesting moral argument against cap and trade, one that’s much more sophisticated than the old view that it’s wrong to let polluters buy the right to pollute. What Hansen draws attention to is the fact that in a cap-and-trade world, acts of individual virtue do not contribute to social goals. If you choose to drive a hybrid car or buy a house with a small carbon footprint, all you are doing is freeing up emissions permits for someone else, which means that you have done nothing to reduce the threat of climate change. He has a point. But altruism cannot effectively deal with climate change. Any serious solution must rely mainly on creating a system that gives everyone a self-interested reason to produce fewer emissions. It’s a shame, but climate altruism must take a back seat to the task of getting such a system in place.

The bottom line, then, is that while climate change may be a vastly bigger problem than acid rain, the logic of how to respond to it is much the same. What we need are market incentives for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions — along with some direct controls over coal use — and cap and trade is a reasonable way to create those incentives.
But can we afford to do that? Equally important, can we afford not to?

The Cost of Action
Just as there is a rough consensus among climate modelers about the likely trajectory of temperatures if we do not act to cut the emissions of greenhouse gases, there is a rough consensus among economic modelers about the costs of action. That general opinion may be summed up as follows: Restricting emissions would slow economic growth — but not by much. The Congressional Budget Office, relying on a survey of models, has concluded that Waxman-Markey “would reduce the projected average annual rate of growth of gross domestic product between 2010 and 2050 by 0.03 to 0.09 percentage points.” That is, it would trim average annual growth to 2.31 percent, at worst, from 2.4 percent. Over all, the Budget Office concludes, strong climate-change policy would leave the American economy between 1.1 percent and 3.4 percent smaller in 2050 than it would be otherwise.
And what about the world economy? In general, modelers tend to find that climate-change policies would lower global output by a somewhat smaller percentage than the comparable figures for the United States. The main reason is that emerging economies like China currently use energy fairly inefficiently, partly as a result of national policies that have kept the prices of fossil fuels very low, and could thus achieve large energy savings at a modest cost. One recent review of the available estimates put the costs of a very strong climate policy — substantially more aggressive than contemplated in current legislative proposals — at between 1 and 3 percent of gross world product.

Such figures typically come from a model that combines all sorts of engineering and marketplace estimates. These will include, for instance, engineers’ best calculations of how much it costs to generate electricity in various ways, from coal, gas and nuclear and solar power at given resource prices. Then estimates will be made, based on historical experience, of how much consumers would cut back their electricity consumption if its price rises. The same process is followed for other kinds of energy, like motor fuel. And the model assumes that everyone makes the best choice given the economic environment — that power generators choose the least expensive means of producing electricity, while consumers conserve energy as long as the money saved by buying less electricity exceeds the cost of using less power in the form either of other spending or loss of convenience. After all this analysis, it’s possible to predict how producers and consumers of energy will react to policies that put a price on emissions and how much those reactions will end up costing the economy as a whole.
There are, of course, a number of ways this kind of modeling could be wrong. Many of the underlying estimates are necessarily somewhat speculative; nobody really knows, for instance, what solar power will cost once it finally becomes a large-scale proposition. There is also reason to doubt the assumption that people actually make the right choices: many studies have found that consumers fail to take measures to conserve energy, like improving insulation, even when they could save money by doing so.

But while it’s unlikely that these models get everything right, it’s a good bet that they overstate rather than understate the economic costs of climate-change action. That is what the experience from the cap-and-trade program for acid rain suggests: costs came in well below initial predictions. And in general, what the models do not and cannot take into account is creativity; surely, faced with an economy in which there are big monetary payoffs for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions, the private sector will come up with ways to limit emissions that are not yet in any model.
What you hear from conservative opponents of a climate-change policy, however, is that any attempt to limit emissions would be economically devastating. The Heritage Foundation, for one, responded to Budget Office estimates on Waxman-Markey with a broadside titled, “C.B.O. Grossly Underestimates Costs of Cap and Trade.” The real effects, the foundation said, would be ruinous for families and job creation.
This reaction — this extreme pessimism about the economy’s ability to live with cap and trade — is very much at odds with typical conservative rhetoric. After all, modern conservatives express a deep, almost mystical confidence in the effectiveness of market incentives — Ronald Reagan liked to talk about the “magic of the marketplace.” They believe that the capitalist system can deal with all kinds of limitations, that technology, say, can easily overcome any constraints on growth posed by limited reserves of oil or other natural resources. And yet now they submit that this same private sector is utterly incapable of coping with a limit on overall emissions, even though such a cap would, from the private sector’s point of view, operate very much like a limited supply of a resource, like land. Why don’t they believe that the dynamism of capitalism will spur it to find ways to make do in a world of reduced carbon emissions? Why do they think the marketplace loses its magic as soon as market incentives are invoked in favor of conservation?

Clearly, conservatives abandon all faith in the ability of markets to cope with climate-change policy because they don’t want government intervention. Their stated pessimism about the cost of climate policy is essentially a political ploy rather than a reasoned economic judgment. The giveaway is the strong tendency of conservative opponents of cap and trade to argue in bad faith. That Heritage Foundation broadside accuses the Congressional Budget Office of making elementary logical errors, but if you actually read the office’s report, it’s clear that the foundation is willfully misreading it. Conservative politicians have been even more shameless. The National Republican Congressional Committee, for example, issued multiple press releases specifically citing a study from M.I.T. as the basis for a claim that cap and trade would cost $3,100 per household, despite repeated attempts by the study’s authors to get out the word that the actual number was only about a quarter as much.
The truth is that there is no credible research suggesting that taking strong action on climate change is beyond the economy’s capacity. Even if you do not fully trust the models — and you shouldn’t — history and logic both suggest that the models are overestimating, not underestimating, the costs of climate action. We can afford to do something about climate change.

But that’s not the same as saying we should. Action will have costs, and these must be compared with the costs of not acting. Before I get to that, however, let me touch on an issue that will become central if we actually do get moving on climate policy: how to get the rest of the world to go along with us.

The China Syndrome
The United States is still the world’s largest economy, which makes the country one of the world’s largest sources of greenhouse gases. But it’s not the largest. China, which burns much more coal per dollar of gross domestic product than the United States does, overtook us by that measure around three years ago. Over all, the advanced countries — the rich man’s club comprising Europe, North America and Japan — account for only about half of greenhouse emissions, and that’s a fraction that will fall over time. In short, there can’t be a solution to climate change unless the rest of the world, emerging economies in particular, participates in a major way.
Inevitably those who resist tackling climate change point to the global nature of emissions as a reason not to act. Emissions limits in America won’t accomplish much, they argue, if China and others don’t match our effort. And they highlight China’s obduracy in the Copenhagen negotiations as evidence that other countries will not cooperate. Indeed, emerging economies feel that they have a right to emit freely without worrying about the consequences — that’s what today’s rich countries got to do for two centuries. It’s just not possible to get global cooperation on climate change, goes the argument, and that means there is no point in taking any action at all.
For those who think that taking action is essential, the right question is how to persuade China and other emerging nations to participate in emissions limits. Carrots, or positive inducements, are one answer. Imagine setting up cap-and-trade systems in China and the United States — but allow international trading in permits, so Chinese and American companies can trade emission rights. By setting overall caps at levels designed to ensure that China sells us a substantial number of permits, we would in effect be paying China to cut its emissions. Since the evidence suggests that the cost of cutting emissions would be lower in China than in the United States, this could be a good deal for everyone.
But what if the Chinese (or the Indians or the Brazilians, etc.) do not want to participate in such a system? Then you need sticks as well as carrots. In particular, you need carbon tariffs.

A carbon tariff would be a tax levied on imported goods proportional to the carbon emitted in the manufacture of those goods. Suppose that China refuses to reduce emissions, while the United States adopts policies that set a price of $100 per ton of carbon emissions. If the United States were to impose such a carbon tariff, any shipment to America of Chinese goods whose production involved emitting a ton of carbon would result in a $100 tax over and above any other duties. Such tariffs, if levied by major players — probably the United States and the European Union — would give noncooperating countries a strong incentive to reconsider their positions.
To the objection that such a policy would be protectionist, a violation of the principles of free trade, one reply is, So? Keeping world markets open is important, but avoiding planetary catastrophe is a lot more important. In any case, however, you can argue that carbon tariffs are well within the rules of normal trade relations. As long as the tariff imposed on the carbon content of imports is comparable to the cost of domestic carbon licenses, the effect is to charge your own consumers a price that reflects the carbon emitted in what they buy, no matter where it is produced. That should be legal under international-trading rules. In fact, even the World Trade Organization, which is charged with policing trade policies, has published a study suggesting that carbon tariffs would pass muster.

Needless to say, the actual business of getting cooperative, worldwide action on climate change would be much more complicated and tendentious than this discussion suggests. Yet the problem is not as intractable as you often hear. If the United States and Europe decide to move on climate policy, they almost certainly would be able to cajole and chivvy the rest of the world into joining the effort. We can do this.

The Costs of Inaction
In public discussion, the climate-change skeptics have clearly been gaining ground over the past couple of years, even though the odds have been looking good lately that 2010 could be the warmest year on record. But climate modelers themselves have grown increasingly pessimistic. What were previously worst-case scenarios have become base-line projections, with a number of organizations doubling their predictions for temperature rise over the course of the 21st century. Underlying this new pessimism is increased concern about feedback effects — for example, the release of methane, a significant greenhouse gas, from seabeds and tundra as the planet warms.

At this point, the projections of climate change, assuming we continue business as usual, cluster around an estimate that average temperatures will be about 9 degrees Fahrenheit higher in 2100 than they were in 2000. That’s a lot — equivalent to the difference in average temperatures between New York and central Mississippi. Such a huge change would have to be highly disruptive. And the troubles would not stop there: temperatures would continue to rise.

Furthermore, changes in average temperature will by no means be the whole story. Precipitation patterns will change, with some regions getting much wetter and others much drier. Many modelers also predict more intense storms. Sea levels would rise, with the impact intensified by those storms: coastal flooding, already a major source of natural disasters, would become much more frequent and severe. And there might be drastic changes in the climate of some regions as ocean currents shift. It’s always worth bearing in mind that London is at the same latitude as Labrador; without the Gulf Stream, Western Europe would be barely habitable.
While there may be some benefits from a warmer climate, it seems almost certain that upheaval on this scale would make the United States, and the world as a whole, poorer than it would be otherwise. How much poorer? If ours were a preindustrial, primarily agricultural society, extreme climate change would be obviously catastrophic. But we have an advanced economy, the kind that has historically shown great ability to adapt to changed circumstances. If this sounds similar to my argument that the costs of emissions limits would be tolerable, it ought to: the same flexibility that should enable us to deal with a much higher carbon prices should also help us cope with a somewhat higher average temperature.

But there are at least two reasons to take sanguine assessments of the consequences of climate change with a grain of salt. One is that, as I have just pointed out, it’s not just a matter of having warmer weather — many of the costs of climate change are likely to result from droughts, flooding and severe storms. The other is that while modern economies may be highly adaptable, the same may not be true of ecosystems.

The last time the earth experienced warming at anything like the pace we now expect was during the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, about 55 million years ago, when temperatures rose by about 11 degrees Fahrenheit over the course of around 20,000 years (which is a much slower rate than the current pace of warming). That increase was associated with mass extinctions, which, to put it mildly, probably would not be good for living standards.

So how can we put a price tag on the effects of global warming? The most widely quoted estimates, like those in the Dynamic Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy, known as DICE, used by Yale’s William Nordhaus and colleagues, depend upon educated guesswork to place a value on the negative effects of global warming in a number of crucial areas, especially agriculture and coastal protection, then try to make some allowance for other possible repercussions. Nordhaus has argued that a global temperature rise of 4.5 degrees Fahrenheit — which used to be the consensus projection for 2100 — would reduce gross world product by a bit less than 2 percent.

But what would happen if, as a growing number of models suggest, the actual temperature rise is twice as great? Nobody really knows how to make that extrapolation. For what it’s worth, Nordhaus’s model puts losses from a rise of 9 degrees at about 5 percent of gross world product. Many critics have argued, however, that the cost might be much higher.
Despite the uncertainty, it’s tempting to make a direct comparison between the estimated losses and the estimates of what the mitigation policies will cost: climate change will lower gross world product by 5 percent, stopping it will cost 2 percent, so let’s go ahead. Unfortunately the reckoning is not that simple for at least four reasons.

First, substantial global warming is already “baked in,” as a result of past emissions and because even with a strong climate-change policy the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is most likely to continue rising for many years. So even if the nations of the world do manage to take on climate change, we will still have to pay for earlier inaction. As a result, Nordhaus’s loss estimates may overstate the gains from action.

Second, the economic costs from emissions limits would start as soon as the policy went into effect and under most proposals would become substantial within around 20 years. If we don’t act, meanwhile, the big costs would probably come late this century (although some things, like the transformation of the American Southwest into a dust bowl, might come much sooner). So how you compare those costs depends on how much you value costs in the distant future relative to costs that materialize much sooner.

Third, and cutting in the opposite direction, if we don’t take action, global warming won’t stop in 2100: temperatures, and losses, will continue to rise. So if you place a significant weight on the really, really distant future, the case for action is stronger than even the 2100 estimates suggest.

Finally and most important is the matter of uncertainty. We’re uncertain about the magnitude of climate change, which is inevitable, because we’re talking about reaching levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere not seen in millions of years. The recent doubling of many modelers’ predictions for 2100 is itself an illustration of the scope of that uncertainty; who knows what revisions may occur in the years ahead. Beyond that, nobody really knows how much damage would result from temperature rises of the kind now considered likely.

You might think that this uncertainty weakens the case for action, but it actually strengthens it. As Harvard’s Martin Weitzman has argued in several influential papers, if there is a significant chance of utter catastrophe, that chance — rather than what is most likely to happen — should dominate cost-benefit calculations. And utter catastrophe does look like a realistic possibility, even if it is not the most likely outcome.

Weitzman argues — and I agree — that this risk of catastrophe, rather than the details of cost-benefit calculations, makes the most powerful case for strong climate policy. Current projections of global warming in the absence of action are just too close to the kinds of numbers associated with doomsday scenarios. It would be irresponsible — it’s tempting to say criminally irresponsible — not to step back from what could all too easily turn out to be the edge of a cliff.
Still that leaves a big debate about the pace of action.

The Ramp Versus the Big Bang
Economists who analyze climate policies agree on some key issues. There is a broad consensus that we need to put a price on carbon emissions, that this price must eventually be very high but that the negative economic effects from this policy will be of manageable size. In other words, we can and should act to limit climate change. But there is a ferocious debate among knowledgeable analysts about timing, about how fast carbon prices should rise to significant levels.
On one side are economists who have been working for many years on so-called integrated-assessment models, which combine models of climate change with models of both the damage from global warming and the costs of cutting emissions. For the most part, the message from these economists is a sort of climate version of St. Augustine’s famous prayer, “Give me chastity and continence, but not just now.” Thus Nordhaus’s DICE model says that the price of carbon emissions should eventually rise to more than $200 a ton, effectively more than quadrupling the cost of coal, but that most of that increase should come late this century, with a much more modest initial fee of around $30 a ton. Nordhaus calls this recommendation for a policy that builds gradually over a long period the “climate-policy ramp.”
On the other side are some more recent entrants to the field, who work with similar models but come to different conclusions. Most famously, Nicholas Stern, an economist at the London School of Economics, argued in 2006 for quick, aggressive action to limit emissions, which would most likely imply much higher carbon prices. This alternative position doesn’t appear to have a standard name, so let me call it the “climate-policy big bang.”

I find it easiest to make sense of the arguments by thinking of policies to reduce carbon emissions as a sort of public investment project: you pay a price now and derive benefits in the form of a less-damaged planet later. And by later, I mean much later; today’s emissions will affect the amount of carbon in the atmosphere decades, and possibly centuries, into the future. So if you want to assess whether a given investment in emissions reduction is worth making, you have to estimate the damage that an additional ton of carbon in the atmosphere will do, not just this year but for a century or more to come; and you also have to decide how much weight to place on harm that will take a very long time to materialize.

The policy-ramp advocates argue that the damage done by an additional ton of carbon in the atmosphere is fairly low at current concentrations; the cost will not get really large until there is a lot more carbon dioxide in the air, and that won’t happen until late this century. And they argue that costs that far in the future should not have a large influence on policy today. They point to market rates of return, which indicate that investors place only a small weight on the gains or losses they expect in the distant future, and argue that public policies, including climate policies, should do the same.

The big-bang advocates argue that government should take a much longer view than private investors. Stern, in particular, argues that policy makers should give the same weight to future generations’ welfare as we give to those now living. Moreover, the proponents of fast action hold that the damage from emissions may be much larger than the policy-ramp analyses suggest, either because global temperatures are more sensitive to greenhouse-gas emissions than previously thought or because the economic damage from a large rise in temperatures is much greater than the guesstimates in the climate-ramp models.

As a professional economist, I find this debate painful. There are smart, well-intentioned people on both sides — some of them, as it happens, old friends and mentors of mine — and each side has scored some major points. Unfortunately, we can’t just declare it an honorable draw, because there’s a decision to be made.
Personally, I lean toward the big-bang view. Stern’s moral argument for loving unborn generations as we love ourselves may be too strong, but there’s a compelling case to be made that public policy should take a much longer view than private markets. Even more important, the policy-ramp prescriptions seem far too much like conducting a very risky experiment with the whole planet. Nordhaus’s preferred policy, for example, would stabilize the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at a level about twice its preindustrial average. In his model, this would have only modest effects on global welfare; but how confident can we be of that? How sure are we that this kind of change in the environment would not lead to catastrophe? Not sure enough, I’d say, particularly because, as noted above, climate modelers have sharply raised their estimates of future warming in just the last couple of years.
So what I end up with is basically Martin Weitzman’s argument: it’s the nonnegligible probability of utter disaster that should dominate our policy analysis. And that argues for aggressive moves to curb emissions, soon.

The Political Atmosphere
As I’ve mentioned, the House has already passed Waxman-Markey, a fairly strong bill aimed at reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. It’s not as strong as what the big-bang advocates propose, but it appears to move faster than the policy-ramp proposals. But the vote on Waxman-Markey, which was taken last June, revealed a starkly divided Congress. Only 8 Republicans voted in favor of it, while 44 Democrats voted against. And the odds are that it would not pass if it were brought up for a vote today.
Prospects in the Senate, where it takes 60 votes to get most legislation through, are even worse. A number of Democratic senators, representing energy-producing and agricultural states, have come out against cap and trade (modern American agriculture is strongly energy-intensive). In the past, some Republican senators have supported cap and trade. But with partisanship on the rise, most of them have been changing their tune. The most striking about-face has come from John McCain, who played a leading role in promoting cap and trade, introducing a bill broadly similar to Waxman-Markey in 2003. Today McCain lambastes the whole idea as “cap and tax,” to the dismay of former aides.

Oh, and a snowy winter on the East Coast of the U.S. has given climate skeptics a field day, even though globally this has been one of the warmest winters on record.
So the immediate prospects for climate action do not look promising, despite an ongoing effort by three senators — John Kerry, Joseph Lieberman and Lindsey Graham — to come up with a compromise proposal. (They plan to introduce legislation later this month.) Yet the issue isn’t going away. There’s a pretty good chance that the record temperatures the world outside Washington has seen so far this year will continue, depriving climate skeptics of one of their main talking points. And in a more general sense, given the twists and turns of American politics in recent years — since 2005 the conventional wisdom has gone from permanent Republican domination to permanent Democratic domination to God knows what — there has to be a real chance that political support for action on climate change will revive.
If it does, the economic analysis will be ready. We know how to limit greenhouse-gas emissions. We have a good sense of the costs — and they’re manageable. All we need now is the political will.

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