Quem tem medo da transição verde? O que diz o novo estudo sobre o apoio ao Pacto Ecológico Europeu

Fonte: aqui

Um relatório do  Instituto Sindical Europeu designado por Who supports a (just) green transition? chegou às seguintes conclusões:

1. O Medo do Desemprego Verde é Real: existe uma perceção generalizada de "risco socioecológico". A preocupação com a perda de postos de trabalho devido às políticas climáticas é muito forte em todos os países analisados. Este receio afeta sobretudo as pessoas com menores rendimentos, menor nível de escolaridade e trabalhadores em situações de maior precariedade laboral.
2. Os Impostos Verdes são os mais impopulares: o estudo divide as preferências por tipo de política e conclui que as taxas e impostos ecológicos são a medida que colhe menos simpatia junto do público. Em contrapartida, as políticas de proteção social têm um apoio massivo entre os grupos mais vulneráveis.
3. Pontes entre o Social e o Ecológico: nem tudo é divisão. O relatório descobriu que certos grupos profissionais — e não apenas os mais privilegiados ou bem posicionados no mercado de trabalho - apoiam simultaneamente tanto as políticas ambientais como as sociais.
4. A "Fórmula Mágica" para o apoio público: o apoio à transição verde aumenta significativamente quando o ambiente é associado a medidas de compensação social. O estudo demonstra que combinar políticas ambientais com o apoio direto aos trabalhadores e a criação de impostos sobre as grandes fortunas (wealth taxes) ajuda a reduzir os conflitos distributivos e a conquistar a opinião pública.

Conclusões Detalhadas do Relatório

O estudo baseia-se num inquérito internacional realizado em sete países europeus: Alemanha, Espanha, França, Itália, Polónia, Suécia e Reino Unido.

1. O Medo do Desemprego Afeta 1 em cada 5 Europeus: Mais de 20% dos inquiridos temem perder o emprego devido às políticas de transição ecológica. Este medo (chamado no estudo de "risco socioecológico indireto") é o grande motor da resistência política (green backlash) e afeta sobretudo os trabalhadores fabris/de produção (production workers), pessoas com menor escolaridade e baixos rendimentos.

2.O Duplo Risco: Curiosamente, o estudo descobriu uma ligação direta: as pessoas que vivem em regiões mais expostas às alterações climáticas (risco direto) são frequentemente as mesmas que mais temem perder o emprego devido às leis ambientais (risco indireto).

3. Radiografia dos Grupos Profissionais e Apoios:

• Trabalhadores de Produção (Fábricas): Apoiam fortemente a proteção social tradicional, mas rejeitam os impostos verdes por medo do desemprego.
• Profissionais de Escritório, Serviços de Baixa Qualificação e Setor Socio-Cultural: Apoiam tanto as políticas sociais como as ambientais. O relatório identifica-os como a base eleitoral chave para avançar com uma transição justa.
• Gestores e Quadros Superiores (Managers): Revelaram-se o grupo mais oposto à estratégia de transição justa, rejeitando tanto a intervenção pública na área social (como impostos sobre a riqueza) como a regulação ambiental.

4. Atitude Perante as Políticas: Os subsídios verdes são as medidas mais populares em geral. Os impostos e as regulações são fortemente rejeitados pelas classes mais vulneráveis e pelos gestores, encontrando apoio quase exclusivo nos cidadãos com ensino superior.

Jornalismo Florestal - Prémios PINUS distinguem reportagens da RTP e da Antena 1

O prémio pretende distinguir o trabalho jornalístico que, pela qualidade e originalidade, contribua para um maior conhecimento sobre a importância ambiental, económica e social das florestas.

Assim, o Primeiro Prémio de Reportagem Diária foi para um trabalho de Daniela Santiago, Manuel dos Santos, Fábio Siquenique e Joana Melo, sobre o valor da Floresta e o Circuito do Carbono

O Primeiro Prémio de Grande Reportagem foi para um investigação do programa A Prova dos Factos, de Emanuel Boavista, com Paulo Maio Gomes e Guilherme Terra, sobre o facto de as verbas europeias para a floresta não chegarem ao terreno.

A RTP recebeu ainda uma Menção Honrosa para outra peça do programa A Prova dos Factos sobre o abandono do Pinhal de Leiria, também de Daniela Santiago.

A reportagem da Antena 1 sobre as Florestas Miyawaki recebeu igualmente uma Menção Honrosa. Esta distinção foi atribuída à jornalista Arlinda Brandão.

Esta é considerada "uma oportunidade para reforçar o reconhecimento do jornalismo como serviço público e celebrar a importância da floresta", segundo o promotor da iniciativa.A cerimónia da 7ª edição do Prémio Centro PINUS - Jornalismo Florestal teve lugar no Clube de Jornalistas, em Lisboa.

O Prémio Centro PINUS de Jornalismo Florestal é atribuído bianualmente e, segundo a organização, "pretende homenagear os jornalistas e as peças que aproximem a floresta do cidadão através do rigor e da informação.

Paralelamente, reconhece o papel do jornalista na sua missão de serviço público e valoriza o jornalismo livre, independente e de qualidade".

Ver as reportagens aqui

Revelados os vencedores da 7.ª edição do Prémio Centro PINUS de Jornalismo Florestal

Jornais do Reino Unido publicam mais anúncios de produtos poluentes do que cobertura sobre o clima

Segundo um novo estudo , os jornais nacionais britânicos dedicaram mais do que o triplo do espaço dedicado à publicidade de indústrias poluentes, como petróleo, companhias aéreas e veículos utilitários desportivos , do que à cobertura das negociações climáticas das Nações Unidas no ano passado .

O total de publicidade com altas emissões de carbono — incluindo publicidade de empresas de combustíveis fósseis, cruzeiros e bancos que financiam petróleo e gás — totalizou 5.086 polegadas de coluna em duas datas importantes durante a COP29, a conferência climática de 2024 em Baku, Azerbaijão, em comparação com 1.745 polegadas de coluna para as próprias negociações.

Com a próxima rodada de negociações, conhecida como COP30 , tendo início em Belém, no Brasil, os jornais provavelmente repetirão o padrão, alertou Andrew Simms, codiretor do think tank New Weather Institute, que conduziu a pesquisa .

“O que as pessoas no Reino Unido verão quando abrirem seus jornais? Algumas poucas matérias alertando-as sobre um desafio urgente que precisa ser enfrentado, mas isso provavelmente será ofuscado por pelo menos três vezes mais anúncios que normalizam a poluição”, disse Simms. “Precisamos de controles semelhantes aos da indústria do tabaco para anúncios que promovem produtos poluentes.”

A pesquisa analisou a cobertura em dez jornais nacionais britânicos, incluindo o Times, o Sun e o Daily Mail, em 11 de novembro, dia da abertura das negociações em Baku, e em 25 de novembro, na manhã seguinte ao término da conferência, quando a cobertura atingiu o pico. Os dez jornais dedicaram, em média, 2,1% de seu espaço editorial à conferência.

Alguns jornais quase não mencionaram os grandes impactos climáticos da época, como as inundações em Valência, na Espanha, ou a tempestade Bert no Reino Unido.

Cruzeiros e pacotes turísticos dominaram a publicidade de viagens durante o mesmo período, representando 50% das promoções de viagens.

O Financial Times foi o único jornal que não publicou anúncios de viagens durante o período, representando 55,7% da cobertura da COP29 em todos os jornais. O Guardian, que não aceita anúncios de empresas de combustíveis fósseis desde 2020, publicou um anúncio de página inteira da Turkish Airlines em uma das datas principais da conferência, segundo o estudo.

O secretário-geral da ONU, António Guterres, pediu aos países que proíbam a publicidade de combustíveis fósseis e instou os meios de comunicação e as empresas de tecnologia a pararem de veicular esses anúncios.

“Os jornalistas estão dizendo ao público que os cientistas climáticos estão alertando para a necessidade de pararmos de queimar combustíveis fósseis, mas aqueles que ainda compram jornais impressos são bombardeados com anúncios sugerindo que todos os outros estão aproveitando voos de longa distância e cruzeiros de luxo”, disse Brendan Montague, autor do estudo e editor da revista The Ecologist.

Os jornais The Times, The Sun, Daily Mail e The Guardian não responderam aos pedidos de comentários.

Novo relatório: o mundo precisa de cortar 60% de desflorestação até 2030 - ou meta global pode fracassar

O alerta é do novo relatório da Forest Declaration Assessment, lançado nas vésperas da COP30, em Belém (PA). O relatório mostra que, só em 2024, o planeta perdeu 8,1 milhões de hectares de florestas — uma área equivalente à Áustria —, o que representa um nível 63% acima do necessário para zerar o desmatamento até o fim da década.

Além do corte raso, a degradação florestal também preocupa: atingiu 8,8 milhões de hectares, impulsionada por incêndios e eventos climáticos extremos. O impacto climático é gigantesco — as emissões associadas à destruição de florestas tropicais somaram 3,1 biliões de toneladas de CO₂ em 2024, o mesmo que 700 milhões de carros a gasolina rodando por um ano. 

As florestas tropicais úmidas, como a Amazônia, seguem como epicentros da perda florestal global. O relatório cita Brasil, Colômbia e Indonésia como países-chave tanto pelo risco quanto pelo potencial de liderar uma viragem na proteção florestal. No caso brasileiro, o desmatamento na Amazônia caiu 11% entre 2024 e 2025, alcançando o menor nível em 11 anos — mas a degradação por incêndios, secas e extração seletiva continua em alta.

Agropecuária segue como o principal motor da destruição, respondendo por nove em cada dez hectares desmatados na última década. Já a restauração de florestas, embora positiva, ainda é tímida: projetos em curso cobrem 11 milhões de hectares, número insuficiente diante da escala das perdas.

O relatório também denuncia o desequilíbrio financeiro: enquanto US$ 5,7 biliões foram investidos anualmente na proteção florestal entre 2022 e 2024, o valor representa apenas 1,4% dos US$ 409 biliões em subsídios agrícolas que favorecem o desmate. E apenas 3% das empresas analisadas têm compromissos sólidos e verificáveis contra o desmatamento.

A Forest Declaration Assessment conclui que o sistema financeiro global ainda ignora os riscos florestais e que, sem rastreabilidade, segurança fundiária e eliminação de subsídios perversos, o mundo dificilmente cumprirá a promessa de zerar o desmate até 2030.

Duas Leis, Um Planeta e um Tribunal Silencioso

Será possível proteger o planeta com leis que não podem ser aplicadas?
Este episódio explora o frágil equilíbrio entre o Direito Vinculativo — como a Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre o Direito do Mar (CNUDM) — e o Direito Não Vinculativo, as estruturas voluntárias que moldam a governação climática global.
Enquanto os oceanos são regidos por tratados vinculativos, a terra e a atmosfera permanecem sob discricionariedade nacional — e o planeta paga o preço.
Da desflorestação à perfuração em águas profundas, vemos repetir-se o mesmo paradoxo: leis vinculativas sem aplicação e acordos voluntários sem resultados.
Nesta perspetiva, o vídeo apresenta a ideia de uma Autoridade Global para o Clima (AGC) — uma ponte entre o que é vinculativo e o que é meramente prometido, capaz de transformar os compromissos globais em leis planetárias aplicáveis.
Porque a nossa crise não é a ausência de leis — é a ausência de autoridade.
Para aprofundar esta temática nada como ver os vídeos e webseminários do Center for Earth Jurisprudence

Política ecológica vs Ecologia política: entender para agir

Nos discursos sobre ambiente e sustentabilidade, termos como política ecológica e ecologia política aparecem com frequência — por vezes usados como sinónimos. Mas há diferenças importantes que convêm conhecer para pensar e agir de forma crítica e eficaz.

O que é política ecológica

A política ecológica é prática: refere-se às decisões, leis, regulamentos, políticas públicas ou privadas que visam incorporar preocupações ecológicas. Por exemplo:

• Legislação para conservação de espécies ou de habitats;

• Políticas de energias renováveis ou de eficiência energética;

• Programas de redução de emissões de gases com efeito de estufa;

• Políticas de gestão de resíduos e economia circular.

Ou seja, política ecológica lida com o que se faz para proteger ou restaurar o ambiente, com metas, instrumentos regulatórios, incentivos ou penalizações, e com a implementação prática.

O que é ecologia política

Ecologia política é reflexão e análise crítica: estuda como fatores como poder, desigualdade, economia ou cultura moldam as interações entre sociedade e natureza. Envolve perguntas como:

• Quem decide sobre o uso da terra ou dos recursos naturais?

• Quem lucra e quem sofre com os impactos ambientais?

• Como formas de conhecimento e cultura (saberes locais, indígenas, campesinos) são valorizadas ou rejeitadas?

• Que narrativas legitimam certas políticas ecológicas, enquanto marginalizam outras?

• Como as estruturas globais (capitalismo, colonialismo, sistema internacional) influenciam crises ecológicas? 

A ecologia política procura revelar as relações de poder que estão por baixo das políticas ecológicas, ajudar a diagnosticar injustiças ambientais e indicar caminhos para transformações mais radicais e justas.

Por que a distinção importa

• Políticas ecológicas bem-intencionadas podem falhar ou gerar injustiças se ignorarem quem é afetado: por exemplo projetos de conservação que deslocam populações locais, ou medidas climáticas que penalizam os mais pobres sem alternativas de adaptação.

• Entender ecologia política ajuda a construir políticas que não só cuidam da natureza, mas promovem justiça ambiental e equidade social.

• Serve também de base para a participação democrática, valorização de saberes diversos, e para que os agentes menos poderosos (comunidades, movimentos sociais) sejam parte da mudança — não apenas objeto dela.

Principais eixos de diferença

Aspecto	Política ecológica	Ecologia política
Objetivo principal	regulação, proteção, mitigação, implementação prática	análise crítica, compreensão das estruturas de poder, justiça ambiental
Atores focados	governos, organismos internacionais, ONG, políticas públicas	comunidades locais, movimentos sociais, académicos, grupos marginalizados, etc.
Questões centrais	legislação ambiental, conservação, emissões, energia limpa, biodiversidade	desigualdade no acesso aos recursos, quem decide o uso da terra, imperialismo ecológico, narrativas dominantes, justiça ambiental, conflitos ecológicos

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Autores e pensadores importantes da Ecologia Política

Autor	Contributo principal
Piers Blaikie	Um dos fundadores da ecologia política. No livro The Political Economy of Soil Erosion in Developing Countries (1985), argumenta que a erosão do solo não é só resultado da má gestão ou população, mas está ligada a desigualdades sociais, estruturas políticas, poder. Wikipedia
Harold Brookfield	Trabalhou com Blaikie em Land Degradation and Society; focou nas interações entre uso da terra, práticas agrícolas, colonialismo e desenvolvimento; acrescentou dimensão histórica e de escala nas análises. Wikipedia
James C. Scott	Não se define como ecólogo político, mas suas obras influenciam fortemente o campo: Seeing Like a State, The Art of Not Being Governed, etc. Ele analisa como o Estado, burocracias e práticas de poder simplificam e moldam a natureza e sociedades; sua atenção à resistência local, ao conhecimento prático (metis) é muito relevante para ecologia política. read.dukeupress.edu
Murray Bookchin	Criou a “ecologia social” (social ecology), uma filosofia política que vê os problemas ecológicos como inseparáveis dos problemas sociais: hierarquias, dominação, desigualdade. Propõe uma reestruturação social para uma democracia direta, comunitária, descentralizada. Wikipedia
Enrique Leff	Trabalha com ecologia política, epistemologia ambiental, e conflituosidade socioambiental; por exemplo no livro Political Ecology: Deconstructing Capital and Territorializing Life. Ele aprofunda como saberes, poder e território se entrecruzam. SpringerLink
Tor A. Benjaminsen & Hanne Svarstad	No livro Political Ecology: A Critical Engagement with Global Environmental Issues (2021). Trabalham com estudos de caso, poder, justiça ambiental, conflitos em uso da terra, mitigação climática, Norte‐Sul. SpringerLink

	Raymond L. Bryant Um geógrafo-chave no campo, autor de Third World Political Ecology com Sinéad Bailey, entre outros, mostrando como mudanças ambientais distribuem benefícios e custos desigualmente. Wikipedia Giorgos Kallis Embora mais ligado à economia ecológica, é importante para debates de degrowth, crítica do crescimento infinito, alternativas de desenvolvimento mais sustentáveis. Wikipedia

Outros autores relevantes: Nancy Lee Peluso, Michael Watts, Arturo Escobar, Richard Peet, , que tratam de colonialismo, direito à terra, práticas de resistência, justiça ambiental.

Artigos de revista como Journal of Political Ecology Wikipedia

 

Exemplos de articulação

Para tornar concreto, alguns casos ou estudos-que-se podem usar:

• Em Portugal, artigos comparativos que relacionam ecologia política e justiça ambiental, p.ex. o artigo “Justiça Ambiental e Ecologia Política: Entre sinergias e Benefícios Mútuos…” da UTAD que examina como os debates de justiça ambiental se interligam com ecologia política. periodicos.unievangelica.edu.br

• Na América Latina, Enrique Leff escreveu sobre “Political Ecology in Latin America: A field in construction”, apontando que a ecologia política emergiu como uma resposta aos conflitos pelo uso da natureza, à desigualdade territorial, e à necessidade de repensar as relações entre natureza, cultura e política. revistaschilenas.uchile.cl

CSDDD Datahub reveals law covers fewer than 3,400 EU-based corporate groups

Like the European Commission, SOMO has identified approximately 7,000 companies that currently meet the threshold criteria of the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD). However, many of these companies are part of a corporate group containing several subsidiaries or holding companies that operate under the same umbrella. Data analysis by SOMO – based on companies’ most recent reported revenues and employee figures – shows that in practice, the CSDDD will cover only 4,280 corporate groups, of which just under 3,400 are based in the EU. For example, within these 7,000 companies, there are several corporate groups, of which over ten subsidiary companies meet the threshold criteria individually (e.g. several car manufacturers and supermarkets).

This means that the actual number of corporations that will have to implement the CSDDD is substantially lower than the European Commission’s simple count of companies would suggest. While standardised statistics on the number of corporate groups in the EU do not appear to be available, previous SOMO research showed that the CSDDD would only cover less than 0.1 per cent of all companies in the EU.

SOMO’s analysis shows that the actual coverage of the CSDDD is, in practice, even smaller. It also shows that claims about the CSDDD having an enormous impact on the EU economy simply do not match the reality of the extremely small number of companies that will be within the scope of the law. In February 2025, the European Commission is set to publish an omnibus legislative proposal to amend three key pillars of the European Green Deal: the CSDDD, the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD), and the Taxonomy Regulation. It is crucial that the Commission refrain from reinforcing false narratives about the supposed burdensome impact of the CSDDD on the EU economy as a disguise for deregulatory policies that boost corporate profits at the expense of people and the planet

Ample preparation time for companies

The CSDDD will enter into force in three phases. 31 per cent of the corporate groups SOMO has identified will have to comply with the CSDDD in 2027, followed by 18 per cent in 2028. Over 50 per cent of the corporate groups will only meet the threshold criteria in 2029, leaving them with no less than 4.5 years to prepare for compliance with the law.

CSDDD coverage: key sectors

The companies covered by the CSDDD mainly operate in the manufacturing (24.6%), services (19.1%), and wholesale and retail (16.2%) sectors. Notably, one out of every five companies that will have to comply with the CSDDD is a provider of financial services, though the holding companies of many corporate groups are included in this category. The CSDDD largely exempts financial institutions such as banks and insurers from the obligation to conduct due diligence on adverse impacts associated with their investments and financial services, which makes the total number of corporate groups directly affected by the CSDDD’s obligations even smaller in practice.

Breaking down barriers: access to information and corporate accountability

In countries that already have corporate accountability legislation in place, not knowing which companies fall within the scope of the law has been a crippling obstacle for civil society and workers to effectively hold companies to account for their impacts on human rights, the environment, and the climate. The purpose of SOMO’s CSDDD Datahub is to break down this barrier and make it possible to identify whether companies, suppliers, or buyers can be held accountable under the CSDDD.

About SOMO’s CSDDD Datahub

SOMO has compiled the Datahub based on data from Moody’s Orbis, supplemented with data from the LSEG Workspace and Company.info databases, national business registries, and the annual accounts and websites of companies. The Orbis database was also used by the European Commission and Wageningen University & Research to map companies covered by the CSDDD. While SOMO has aimed to ensure the Datahub is as complete and accurate as possible, these data sources have their limitations. In particular with regard to non-EU companies, the list is incomplete. SOMO is planning to update the CSDDD Datahub on a regular basis.

SOMO also provides pro bono research to activists, communities, trade unions, journalists, and others on corporate structures and supply chains through The Counter.

Transição ecológica e transição verde

1. Transição Verde (Green Transition)Este termo é mais comum no mundo corporativo, financeiro e nas políticas institucionais (como o Green Deal da União Europeia).
Foco Económico: Concentra-se na adaptação do modelo econômico atual para reduzir o impacto ambiental sem necessariamente romper com a lógica de crescimento.
Tecnologia e Eficiência: Prioriza a descarbonização, o uso de energias renováveis, a eficiência energética e a criação de "empregos verdes".
Instrumentos: Utiliza ferramentas como taxas de carbono, créditos de emissão e investimentos em tecnologias limpas para tornar as empresas e indústrias mais sustentáveis.
2. Transição EcológicaEste conceito tende a ser mais amplo e profundo, sendo muito utilizado em movimentos sociais e debates académicos.
Mudança Sistémica: Envolve não apenas a tecnologia, mas uma mudança radical nos hábitos de vida, produção e consumo. Questiona a base do nosso funcionamento social e a relação do ser humano com a biosfera.
Multidimensional: Vai além da energia e do carbono para incluir a regeneração da biodiversidade, o manejo da água, a soberania alimentar e a economia circular integral.
Justiça Social: Frequentemente está ligada ao conceito de Transição Justa, defendendo que a mudança não pode ser feita às custas das populações mais vulneráveis ou apenas para manter o lucro das grandes corporações.
Para aprofundar o seu estudo sobre as diferenças entre os conceitos, aqui estão as principais referências bibliográficas divididas por eixos temáticos. Elas cobrem desde a visão institucional (verde) até a visão crítica e sistémica (ecológica).
1. Transição Verde e Economia Verde (Foco Institucional e Económico)Estas obras tratam da adaptação do capitalismo e da eficiência de recursos.
UNEP (PNUMA). Rumo a uma Economia Verde: Caminhos para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável e a Erradicação da Pobreza. (2011). É o documento base que popularizou o termo "Economia Verde" globalmente.
SANTOS, Sofia. Introdução à Economia Verde: No contexto da Política Europeia. (2016). Foca na implementação prática, finanças sustentáveis e no papel das empresas.
NEWTON, A. C. & CANTARELLO, E. An Introduction to the Green Economy: Science, Systems and Sustainability. (2014). Uma introdução académica aos sistemas de sustentabilidade dentro da lógica de mercado.
2. Transição Ecológica e Ecologia Política (Foco Sistémico e Crítico)Estes autores discutem a mudança estrutural na relação sociedade-natureza.
LÖWY, Michael. O que é Ecossocialismo?. (2014). Uma das principais referências para entender a transição ecológica como uma ruptura com o modelo de crescimento infinito.
FOSTER, John Bellamy. A Ecologia de Marx: Materialismo e Natureza. (2000). Fundamental para entender a "falha metabólica" entre a sociedade humana e o meio ambiente.
ALVES, Fátima et al. Nature at the Heart of Ecological Transition. (2024). Obra recente que discute a cidadania ecológica e a necessidade de uma transição plural e intercultural.
GORZ, André. Ecology as Politics (Ecologia e Política). (1980). Um clássico que argumenta que a ecologia não é compatível com a lógica do lucro.
3. Transição Justa (O Elo entre o Social e o Ambiental)Foca em como garantir que a mudança não prejudique as classes trabalhadoras.
OIT (Organização Internacional do Trabalho). Políticas setoriais da OIT para uma transição justa rumo a economias e sociedades sustentáveis. (2022). Documento técnico sobre empregos e justiça social.
FERDINAND, Malcolm. Uma Ecologia Decolonial: Pensar a partir do mundo caribenho. (2022). Uma referência essencial para entender como a transição ecológica deve considerar o histórico colonial e as desigualdades raciais.

How to minimize Greenlash

A backlash over the EU’s green policies is not inevitable. Policy-makers should focus on designing green policies that make decarbonisation affordable, and highlight its social benefits.

Since the summer, a new word has entered the EU political lexicon: ‘greenlash’. Popularised by Italian political scientist Nathalie Tocci, the term refers to the political and societal backlash against ‘green’ policies. This can materialise at a local level, with citizens pushing back against clean mobility policies such as congestion charges; at national level, exemplified by the yellow vest movement triggered by the French attempt to increase its carbon tax; and at EU level, as shown by the attempts of centre-right parties in the European Parliament to kill Green Deal policies such as the phase-out of internal combustion engine vehicles or the nature restoration law.

The EU has made the Green Deal – a wide set of policies to address climate change and environmental degradation – a political priority. It aims to reach net-zero carbon emissions by 2050. Inevitably, to reach this goal, decarbonisation now needs to accelerate in sectors that have been lagging behind in emissions cuts. Decarbonising sectors such as road transport and buildings directly affects households, while cutting emissions from agriculture and heavy industry touches specific business interests. Governments are requiring households and these businesses to change their behaviour and to make important investments, which is why we see backlash in the first place.

Therefore, we need to understand the breadth of the ‘greenlash’ and what types of policies are at stake. A slowdown of the European environmental and climate agenda is not inevitable. Contrary to what those opposing the Green Deal allege, an ambitious green agenda is essential for Europeans’ welfare and the competitiveness of European firms.

The varying degrees of ‘greenlash’

There is a difference between critical statements by heads of government about the EU Green Deal and large-scale societal push-back against – or scepticism about – certain environmental and climate policies.

Among EU leaders, over the summer both French President Emmanuel Macron and Belgian Prime Minister Alexander De Croo called for a pause in new European green policy initiatives. This came after a ‘wave’ of new EU policies were introduced to meet 2030 climate goals: they argued governments and businesses need time to implement these new rules and adjust to them. Additionally, they argued the EU should further increase regulatory pressures, not to risk losing industries to jurisdictions with laxer green policies. Later, De Croo nuanced his call by saying that while carbon emission reduction is an absolute imperative, adding further constraints related to biodiversity preservation or chemical regulation could be too ambitious and counterproductive. This shows that some political leaders are wary of targeting specific interest groups like farmers, whose economic interests could be adversely affected by certain Green Deal policies.

Right-wing populist leaders, like outgoing Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki and Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, have long been attacking European policies for the energy transition. Morawiecki demanded that the carbon prices determined by the EU emissions trading system be capped – a crusade he lost. Orbán tried to blame the energy price spike on EU climate policy, as opposed to Vladimir Putin’s gas flow manoeuvres.

Among European citizens, climate action still ranks high as a political priority: 29 per cent of EU citizens surveyed by Eurobarometer in autumn 2023 believed climate action should be one of the main priorities for the European Parliament to address – after poverty, social exclusion and public health but on a par with support for the economy and job creation. While this was 10 percentage points lower than in November 2021, the ranking of these priorities has not changed.

Yet, in climate-focused polling in summer 2022, Eurobarometer found that, while most Europeans were optimistic about the energy transition creating more jobs than it would destroy, only 46 per cent were convinced that sustainable energy, products and services would be affordable for all. The cost of climate action and its fair distribution worries Europeans. This fear also emerges in a more recent survey carried out by Project Tempo in November 2023: voters who already feel economically insecure and alienated from politics have been driving the recent backlash against green policies. These are so-called ‘forgotten voters’, representing 20 to 30 per cent of the EU’s active electorate. These figures suggest that ‘fatigue’ about green policies, broadly speaking, will be an important theme in the run-up to the 2024 European elections.

‘Triggering’ green policies

To understand and deal with the greenlash, we need to be more specific in identifying the policies that trigger it when poorly designed and implemented.

First, policies that directly affect the cost of living, such as carbon taxes or carbon prices arising from emission trading systems such as the one in place in the EU, are particularly likely to lead to backlash. In 2018, Macron’s planned increase in the carbon tax from €44.6 to €86.2 per tonne of CO2 led to protests of the gilets jaunes (yellow vests) all over France, out of concern it would raise fuel prices. The French government decided to freeze the tax increase.

This type of policy, from fuel taxes to carbon taxes, makes the cost of carbon emissions explicit and inevitably increases the cost of using carbon-intensive goods, such as gasoline-fuelled cars. The aim of these types of policies is to incentivise a shift away from polluting technologies. But higher transport or heating fuel costs can be particularly burdensome for lower-income households which tend to rely on less energy-efficient cars or heaters, and may not have the financial capacity to switch to greener ones. Due to this, these policies can be perceived as socially unjust if not accompanied by measures that help poorer households make greener choices.

Second, banning carbon-intensive technologies can also trigger backlash, as they directly limit the choices of consumers and businesses, as opposed to suggesting or incentivising change. Backlash can be particularly strong if these phase-out mandates are implemented without measures that help households and businesses replace banned technologies with cleaner and more affordable options. For example, over the summer, the German coalition government, pressed by the Green Party, had tabled a proposal to ban the installation of oil and gas heating systems by 2024, requiring households to install new ‘green’ systems instead, such as heat pumps. Backlash came from the political opposition, businesses and large swathes of voters. The government eventually revised the law by continuing to allow new installations of gas and oil heating systems under certain conditions (for example if they can be converted to hydrogen), and by shifting the burden from households to municipalities, which will have to put forward plans outlining how they plan to decarbonise heating.

Another example is the phase-out of the sale of vehicles with internal combustion engines (ICEs) by 2035, which the EU approved earlier this year in an effort to encourage sales of electric vehicles (EVs). Last minute opposition by Germany resulted in the introduction of an exemption: ICE cars will still be allowed on the market provided they run exclusively on carbon-neutral synthetic fuels, a niche technology which is not expected to reach the mass market. Italy’s attempt to obtain a similar exemption for biofuels failed to gain traction. These backlashes were clearly driven by lobbying efforts by the car industry, indicating how organised interests can slow efforts for green reform.

Third, the mirror image of bans on ‘brown’ technologies is legislation that forces the greening of existing assets. Like bans, mandates reflect the policy approach that in environmental economics is labelled ‘command and control’: they require individuals to change their behaviour or green their assets within a precise timeline. Mandates to renovate buildings to make them more energy efficient and reduce energy consumption are a good example of this approach. This type of mandate was one of the cornerstones of the EU’s energy performance of buildings directive, but law-makers toned down this requirement following strong backlash from some member-states led by right-wing governments. Italy, for example, vocally criticised the policy’s attempt to require change in people’s homes. In the end, the obligation to renovate residential buildings to improve their energy efficiency by 2035 will only apply to the “worst performing” ones – less than half of the European housing stock.

A fourth type of policy potentially triggering backlash is the sort that directly touches special interest groups – for example, farmers. These groups are powerful enough to have avoided strong decarbonisation targets so far, but now necessarily need to contribute to climate action. The provincial elections in the Netherlands in spring saw the unexpected rise of the FarmerCitizenMovement. The new movement channelled farmers’ outrage at the government’s plan to reduce livestock numbers so as to curb nitrogen pollution. This electoral outcome had repercussions at EU level: to avoid the ire of farmers, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) tried but failed to kill the nature restoration law in the European Parliament. This law would set targets to improve and restore biodiverse habitats such as wetlands and forests. Farmers remain a powerful electoral constituency. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made sure to laud the role of farmers in ensuring food security in her September 2023 State of the Union speech – while at the same time not budging on the need for “agriculture and protection of the natural world [to] go hand in hand”.

But greenlash is not inevitable. Survey results cited above, from Eurobarometer to Project Tempo, indicate that most citizens care about climate change, but are afraid of changing their own habits and are unable or unwilling to sustain cost increases. Climate deniers are not the main reason for greenlash. So what can be done to prevent or at least control the backlash against green policy?

Managing the greenlash

To prevent or at least manage backlashes, it is critical to provide support to those households and businesses who cannot afford the technology changes that decarbonisation calls for. Last winter, Europe experienced an energy price spike which governments tried to mitigate with generous subsidies and energy price caps. Most of these income support measures were unconditional, meaning all households benefited regardless of their income. This made them easy to roll out, but it has taken a toll on public finances.

Income support should in future be focused on those who need it the most, such as poor consumers who struggle to pay energy bills. Investment support measures should be targeted, income-based and conditional on replacing or renovating older assets with the most efficient ones. Think subsidies for poorer households to efficiently insulate their home or to upgrade their heating system. For example, France offers varying levels of renovation subsidies according to households’ incomes and to the energy savings the renovation would warrant. Conversely, Italy used to offer extremely generous subsidies for home renovations – but these were not capped according to income, not limited to primary residences and not conditional on achieving ambitious energy efficiency improvements.

Investment support should particularly focus on facilitating those upgrades that require large upfront costs and have slow payback. For example, purchasing an electric vehicle is a smaller investment compared to a full-scale house renovation, and it has a shorter payback period, as operating costs are already lower for electric vehicles than for traditional cars. In the wake of its budgetary problems, Germany is freezing investment support for housing renovations and heating decarbonisation while continuing with EV subsidies – a poor decision.

When implementing carbon prices, either via taxes or emissions trading, their regressive impact can be more than offset by appropriately using revenues raised. This could be done using those revenues to fund cash transfers for the entire population. Because the transfers are all for the same amount but the full carbon price burden will depend on how much each person pollutes, those polluting less may gain a net benefit in the end, and bigger polluters instead will bear a larger burden.

The EU has opted for a very targeted approach. As of 2027, it will introduce an EU-wide carbon price on transport and heating fuel through a new emissions trading system, the so-called ETS2. But to reduce the policy’s burden on the poorest, revenues from the auctions of pollution permits under the ETS2 will be in part used to support vulnerable households and businesses in shifting away from carbon-intensive transport and heating (for example replacing gasoline cars with electric ones and gas heating with heat pumps). The main vehicle for this effort is the new Social Climate Fund (SCF), but as its budget allocation has been reduced relative to the Commission’s initial proposal, it may not suffice in supporting all consumers who need it so it will necessarily need to be topped up or complemented with national-level efforts.

But cash, in the form of transfers or subsidies, may not stop greenlash on its own. The Project Tempo survey indicates that voters also want to see broader social benefits from the energy transition, to see how it can positively change both their personal situation and their community’s economic prospects. Arguing that Europe has the duty to cut its emissions, and fast, because of its international commitment to do so may speak to some voters, but definitely not to all.

It is therefore important for lawmakers to communicate the benefits of climate action better, both financially and otherwise. For example, for households, investments in energy efficiency improvements come with renovation hassles, but can deliver improved comfort and lower energy bills. Building renovation is also an activity in which local jobs are created, which can be a positive selling point. It is important for governments to showcase the business case for climate investments: decarbonising operations can bring Europe to the forefront of nascent industries such as clean steel, all while reducing the industry’s dependence on imported fossil fuels which have high and volatile prices. Politicians should not hide the costs of climate action, but they should also showcase its multiple direct and indirect benefits, which go beyond emissions reductions.

Finally, it is important politicians are frank about the social costs of climate inaction: Europe has experienced several extreme weather events in the past years, from floods to wildfires, whose likelihood has been increased by climate change. Their frequency will increase in the future, and so will the damage they cause and the costs of fixing them. This means that Europe cannot fully shield itself from climate change, but it can do its best to mitigate its emissions and adapt to unavoidable climate damage.

Slowing down decarbonisation to appease the leaders of the greenlash would do no favours to Europe. It would not offer respite on the cost-of-living front, because relying on fossil fuels is both expensive and risky, as the energy crunch of the past two years has shown. Similarly, slowing or freezing climate action at a time when both the United States and China are pouring important subsidies into green technology industries would not make Europe more competitive. Business as usual, be it walking back on approved energy and climate laws or hitting ‘pause’ on necessary future changes, is not an option.

Fonte

The Cobalt Rush: the Future of Going Green

Cobalt Rush: O Futuro da SustentabilidadeRealização: Arnaud Zajtman, Quentin NoirfalisseProdução: Les Films du Tambour de Soie, Dancing Dog Productions, Esprit Libre Production, RTBF, France 24Vendas internacionais: TerranoaPaís: Bélgica
A electrificação é apresentada por políticos ansiosos por aderir à onda ambientalista em todo o mundo como uma solução fundamental para atingir as metas globais de neutralidade carbónica nos próximos anos.
Os carros elétricos e outros veículos prometem viagens tranquilas, sem poluição e sem culpa, que também manterão as indústrias automóveis nacionais em funcionamento.
A União Europeia aderiu a um futuro que promete ser «verde e digital», com benefícios para todos os seus quase 500 milhões de cidadãos nos 27 Estados-Membros.
Mas e se combater as alterações climáticas não fosse assim tão simples? E se não houvesse uma resposta fácil para viver em harmonia com o mundo natural enquanto tentamos baixar a temperatura da era do Antropoceno?
Os realizadores e produtores franceses Quentin Noirfalisse e Arnaud Zajtman abordam esta questão no seu envolvente documentário Cobalt Rush – The Future of Going Green.
Uma nova corrida ao ouroEm francês, o título, «Cobalt, L’envers due Rêve Electrique’, traduz-se por – Cobalt, L’envers due Rêve Electrique – que, na verdade, seria um título internacional mais adequado. Talvez os produtores quisessem injetar alguma ideia de uma nova corrida ao ouro e do impacto mais abrangente do termo "sustentabilidade"? Deixando isso de lado, este documentário fascinante condensa muita informação nos seus 85 minutos.
O cobalto é um mineral raro, um ingrediente essencial nas baterias, na sua maioria à base de níquel, que serão o principal componente energético de todos os automóveis novos vendidos na Europa a partir de 2030. Garantir um fornecimento fiável – e verificar as condições ambientais e de trabalho em que é produzido – será uma parte fundamental das estratégias políticas e ambientais nos próximos anos. A procura de políticas industriais que apoiem o crescimento económico e combatam as alterações climáticas está agora entre as principais prioridades da agenda política na Europa e em muitas outras partes do mundo. Tudo parece óptimo, mas há um problema: 70% do cobalto mundial é extraído na República Democrática do Congo em condições que estão longe de ser democráticas.
Os chineses são grandes investidores em enormes minas a céu aberto na República Democrática do Congo, que têm sido responsabilizadas pela poluição ambiental maciça, envenenamento de rios e terras agrícolas e quase certamente associadas a um aumento drástico de defeitos congénitos entre as pessoas que trabalham ou vivem perto das minas.
A escassa observância das leis ambientais e laborais – e a presença de um sector mineiro privado dito “artesanal” muito grande, que emprega até dois milhões de pessoas a trabalhar em poços profundos e extremamente perigosos para extrair o precioso mineral – complicam as leis de due diligence impostas aos compradores ocidentais de cobalto.
Noirfalisse traz para o projeto a sua vasta experiência como jornalista de importantes jornais belgas, garantindo que o filme explora o tema de forma profunda e abrangente. Combinada com a experiência de Zajtman como produtor de documentários, a obra sobre o cobalto oferece uma visão completa dos desafios da transição para uma indústria automóvel mais sustentável. Muitos documentários sobre o tema centram-se exclusivamente nas questões da extracção em regiões remotas da África Central. Noirfalisse e Zajtman alargam a perspectiva para incluir entrevistas com fabricantes de automóveis europeus, empresas mineiras na Finlândia, onde existem depósitos europeus de cobalto, e a nova geração de fabricantes de baterias para automóveis eléctricos que está a emergir.
Maroš Šefčovič, Comissário Europeu para as Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight – um título tão fácil de pronunciar como um automóvel eléctrico – entusiasma-se com o sonho da electricidade que ajudará a combater as alterações climáticas e a manter os empregos na Europa. Mas os activistas na República Democrática do Congo e a nível internacional apontam os perigos da extracção de cobalto e a poluição provocada pelas minas.
Nenhum detalhe é deixado de ladoOs mineiros que trabalham nas minas artesanais queixam-se de quanto pouco os compradores chineses pagam pelo minério e de como mal conseguem ganhar o suficiente para pôr o pão na mesa. Na Finlândia, onde o governo concede licenças a minas consideradas economicamente viáveis ​​mesmo com minério contendo apenas um por cento de cobalto, estão a surgir grupos ambientalistas com preocupações semelhantes às levantadas na República Democrática do Congo, embora num contexto de protecção ambiental substancialmente melhor.
Nenhuma destas preocupações parece incomodar o representante de lábia fácil.

Relatório : “O clima sob fogo cruzado. Como a meta de 2% de gastos militares da NATO contribui para o colapso climático”

As medidas de mitigação e adaptação às alterações climáticas sofrem de um défice crónico de financiamento de milhares de milhões de dólares, exacerbando a crise climática e os seus efeitos sobre os cidadãos de todo o mundo. Esta situação tornou a questão do financiamento climático numa das mais controversas nas cimeiras anuais das Nações Unidas sobre o clima, uma vez que os países mais ricos, principais responsáveis ​​pelo colapso ambiental, não foram capazes de cumprir nem mesmo as suas promessas limitadas de financiamento. para os países que enfrentam as consequências mais difíceis. Ao mesmo tempo, as nações mais ricas que geram mais poluição por carbono também estão a aumentar os seus gastos militares. A nível mundial, os gastos militares atingiram um máximo histórico de 2,24 biliões de dólares, mais de metade dos quais provém dos 31 Estados-membros da Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN), e os seus orçamentos crescerão enormemente nos próximos anos.

Este relatório examina as consequências de um dos principais impulsionadores deste aumento nas despesas militares globais: o objectivo da OTAN de que todos os seus estados membros gastem pelo menos 2% do seu Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) nas forças armadas, e o objectivo relacionado de alocar pelo menos 20% desses gastos com equipamentos. Examina a história deste objectivo, a forma como impulsiona os gastos militares, os seus efeitos nas emissões de gases com efeito de estufa (GEE) e as prováveis ​​consequências financeiras e ambientais globais ao longo da próxima década, bem como a indústria de armamento que dele beneficiará.

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Descarregue os documentos

• Climate crossfire: How NATO’s 2% military spending targets contribute to climate breakdown (Full report) 
• Executive summary: Climate crossfire (English)
• Resumen ejecutivo: El clima bajo fuego cruzado
• Résumé exécutif: Le climat dans le champ de tir (Français)
• Resum executiu: El clima sofa foc creuat (Català)

Revealed: Meetings Blitz Between Big Ag and Anti-Green Lawmakers in Europe

Agriculture lobby groups have been in constant contact with a small group of influential European politicians, holding an average of over two meetings a week while the bloc negotiated flagship reforms to protect nature and climate, DeSmog can reveal. 

Between January 2020 and July 2023, over 400 meetings took place between industry and key members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who have been at the forefront of efforts to stall reforms since the Farm to Fork strategy launched in 2020. 

DeSmog documented meetings held by six MEPs from the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), the largest group in parliament.

The analysis found that in the period the lawmakers – Alexander Bernhuber, Herbert Dorfmann, Norbert Lins, Christine Schneider, Franc Bogovič and Anne Sander – met industry-linked groups eight times as often as non-governmental groups representing public interests.

Groups that were granted an audience included the world’s four largest pesticide firms Bayer, BASF, Corteva and Syngenta along with fertiliser firms Yara and OCP Group, trade groups that represent the meat and dairy industry and farming unions allied with industrial interests, such as Copa Cogeca. 

The analysis also showed that five out of six representatives appeared to flout EU transparency guidelines. Around 20 percent of the MEPs’ meetings were with unregistered groups, and at least one in six meetings documented by DeSmog was not declared on the parliamentary website.

The EPP is vociferously opposing two major pieces of legislation from the EU’s Green Deal, a historic package by the bloc to reduce its emissions in line with global climate targets. It includes key reforms that are currently making their passage through Europe’s lawmaking bodies. If passed, both could have a significant impact on agribusiness’ commercial interests.

The first, the Nature Restoration Law, includes plans to restore 20 percent of degraded ecosystems in the EU. The second, known as the Sustainable Use Regulation, or SUR, would see pesticide use halved by 2030. 

The findings come at a crucial time for nature-friendly laws in Europe, which scientists say are critical to securing the bloc’s food supply and tackling both climate breakdown and biodiversity collapse. Agriculture accounts for around 11 percent of carbon emissions in the EU, and farming has been linked to drastic declines in bumble bees and other wild pollinators.

Parliament’s Agriculture and Environment committees will vote on the pesticide reduction plan on the 9 and 24 of October respectively. Final negotiations are ongoing for the Nature Restoration Law – parliament voted to exclude farmland in July but the final iteration has yet to be negotiated with the Council. 

DeSmog’s findings follow a sustained lobbying effort by industry to derail both laws. The EPP also stands accused of “blackmailing” its MEPs into opposing the Nature Restoration Law, and promoting “fake news”, allegations that party leader Manfred Weber denies. 

DeSmog’s analysis also found that cumulatively since 2020 between them the six selected politicians had taken part in the equivalent of more than one event a month that was organised, or sponsored by, agribusiness lobby groups – some of which were hosted in parliament. 

“These statistics raise huge concerns but are hardly surprising,” said Vicky Cann from transparency watchdog Corporate Europe Observatory. “The big farming lobby, the agrochemical industry and Conservative politicians closely work together in order to keep the untenable and unfair status quo in EU farming as long as possible – to the detriment of all.”

Slovenian MEP Franc Bogovič said he does not take orders from industry groups. “I’m a farmer and … I’m an agricultural engineer and I have my own opinion,” he told Politico Europe, which contributed reporting to this story. “I really don’t need their opinion on this. I have my own clear view of what is possible and what is not possible in agriculture.”

None of the other MEPs included in the study responded to DeSmog’s request for comment.

High Volume of Meetings

DeSmog analysed official meeting records for six EPP representatives since 2020, when the EU first unveiled its Farm to Fork Strategy, an ambitious plan to overhaul farming practices as part of the Green Deal. 

The MEPs all sit on key decision-making committees for the green agricultural policies such as AGRI, the European Parliament’s committee on agriculture issues, and ENVI, its counterpart for the environment.

Overall, more than 70 percent of the meetings declared by the six MEPs during the period were with industry groups, including pesticide manufacturers, food companies and farm lobbies.

The meetings were held during key negotiating moments. A plot of the meetings (see graphic below) shows that they spiked in the months before the European Council demanded a controversial re-assessment of the impact of the pesticide reduction plan, which had the effect of delaying the proposal by several months.

The analysis found that German politician Norbert Lins, who is chair of AGRI, held 169 meetings with corporate groups relating to food and farming, compared to just 19 with non-governmental organisations. 

The meetings held by Lins with NGOs did not cover the legislative proposals to reduce pesticide use and restore nature, both of which he has vocally opposed. But he met with industry 16 times on these topics.

Graph of meetings hold between selected EPP representatives and industry bodies, plotted against key policy moments. The graph shows spikes in line with policy dates, such as 'ENVI discusses SUR'. The largest spike in meetings on SUR is two months before "Council calls for re-assessment of SUR".

Official meetings held by industry interest representatives and six EPP MEPs (Alexander Bernhuber, Herbert Dorfmann, Norbert Lins, Christine Schneider, Anne Sander and Franc Bogovič) between January 2020 and July 2023, on Farm to Fork, Nature Restoration Law and the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Regulation. / Credit: Ian Nixon and Brigitte Wear.

Italian politician Herbert Dorfmann, the EPP coordinator on the AGRI committee, has the highest mismatch – 91 percent of all his declared meetings were with industry groups.

The six politicians also held 40 meetings with farming union Copa-Cogeca and its influential French and German members FNSEA and Deutscher Bauernverband, which have warned that Farm to Fork would be “untenable” for the agricultural sector.

Copa-Cogeca calls itself “the united voice of farmers and agri-cooperatives in the EU”. However, in June it admitted to overstating its membership numbers after being accused in an investigation by Lighthouse Reports and Politico of promoting industrial farming interests over those of smaller operations and young farmers. 

Around 75 percent of the meetings held with farming unions on Farm to Fork, the Nature Restoration Law and the Sustainable Use of Pesticides Regulation were with Copa-Cogeca, its national members or their regional branches.

Although two-thirds of European farms are less than five hectares in size, the politicians did not hold any meetings on the proposals with unions representing smallholders. They held just two with representatives of the organic sector, which farms around 10 percent of European farmland. 

“Science shows that farmers are a very diverse group of people,” said Guy Pe’er, an ecologist at the Department of Ecosystem Services in the German Center for Integrative Biodiversity Research and at the Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research. But despite the fact Copa Cogeca primarily represents large-scale operations, he said, they have “demonstrated that when it comes to agriculture, they are the bosses”. 

He added: “If politicians choose to give only one voice, meeting and inviting just a few organisations, then they give them power. You’re wiping off this heterogeneity, knowingly and willingly.”

“If politicians choose to give only one voice, meeting and inviting just a few organisations, then they give them power. You’re wiping off this heterogeneity, knowingly and willingly.”

In the period, the selected politicians held a total of 29 official meetings with the world’s four largest pesticide firms – Bayer, BASF, Corteva and Syngenta – and their trade group CropLife Europe, which have lobbied fiercely against the SUR regulation.

Kristine De Schamphelaere from campaign group Pesticide Action Network said these groups’ opposition to the ambitious pesticide regulation posed a threat to health and biodiversity. “Europeans are deeply concerned about the impacts of pesticides on their health and environment. Yet, many MEPs from the ranks of EPP ignore these concerns and scientific evidence,” she said.

DeSmog’s analysis found that the MEP Bogovič, who used to sell pesticides for a living, held 13 meetings with industry on the pesticide reduction law, compared with three meetings with only two NGOs.

Bogovič said NGOs don’t approach him. “I never avoid discussions with people who have different opinions – I like that,” he told Politico. 

CropLife Europe said in a statement to Politico that it sought meetings with lawmakers relevant to its industry, regardless of their political affiliation. “Mr Bogovic is a key MEP to discuss the SUR [pesticide regulation]. We continue to discuss the proposal with all stakeholders.”

Adopting Industry Rhetoric

Industrial farming organisations say the EU’s green reforms could drastically reduce yields and endanger farmer incomes – warnings that are closely echoed by the EPP on their social media feed (for example, in November 2022 and March 2023). 

The same claims have been contested by over 6,000 scientists, who point to major risks for the food supply if action is not taken to curb pesticide use and restore habitats.

“Science has been ignored and put aside,” said ecologist Guy Pe’er. “Politicians systematically adopt the language of those unions and pseudo farmers organisations that spread misinformation.”

“It is the responsibility of politicians to take the inputs of different sectors and different sources, weigh them and look at evidence. It is their responsibility to serve their voters’ interests,” he said.

Four X posts from the EPP opposing the Nature Restoration Law and Sustainable Use of Pesticides Industry. The Tweets contain bright coloured images of tractors, bees and empty supermarket shelves, and include messages like "When many companies struggle with the current crisis, we must not create new bueaucracy for them" and "Green proposal will decrease food production in Europe."

X posts from the EPP opposing green farming plans closely echo industry claims.

Scientists who support the nature-friendly plans requested meetings with multiple MEPs ahead of parliament’s vote on the Nature Restoration Law, DeSmog understands. 

Pe’er told DeSmog that only two EPP representatives – Christine Schneider and Peter Liese – had agreed to meet with the academics. The chair of the agriculture committee Norbert Lins and EPP leader Manfred Weber were among multiple lawmakers from both EPP and Renew who refused or ignored their requests.

DeSmog’s findings come at a time of growing criticism of the EPP’s approach to Farm to Fork. 

In July, MEPs accused the party of spreading “fake news” in its online campaign against the plans to restore nature in the bloc. 

The month before, the head of rival party Renew, Pascal Canfin, alleged that the EPP had threatened to exclude MEPs who did not oppose the Nature Restoration Law. Party leader Manfred Weber denies the claim, and asked for evidence, arguing that Canfin was “nervous and panicked” ahead of the vote, according to Politico. 

Canfin, who chairs ENVI, also told Politico that the EPP had substituted around of third of its regular members in the committee for the crucial vote on the Nature Restoration Law in June, to ensure the party line was followed.

“As a group Renew has been very careful to hear all sides of the debate on the nature restoration law. Indeed, it was our group that pushed for the compromise that eventually found a majority in plenary,” Renew told DeSmog in a statement. “It is not, however, our group’s role to tell MEPs who they should or shouldn’t meet in the lead-up to a vote nor where they get their information.”

EPP did not respond to multiple requests to comment. But the party levelled similar accusations at its critics in a post on X, writing in June: “Those who accuse us of being against nature and the fight against climate change are simply spreading fake news. Our votes were crucial in adopting 29 laws to make the #GreenDeal successful”.

Laws Drafted by Industry 

Campaigners say that industrial farming lobbies have major political clout. As of 2023, the pesticide industry alone employed 50 full time lobbyists in Brussels while public records show that the four largest pesticide firms and their trade association CropLife Europe spent over €35 million (£30 million) lobbying the EU since 2020. In the same period, the farmers’ union Copa-Cogeca spent somewhere between €4.3 and 4.8 million (£3.7 and 3.2 million) on EU lobbying.

Greens MEP Sarah Wiener says the industry ties of conservative politicians have been “reflected in votes and amendments tabled”. 

For its part, farming union Copa-Cogeca has publicly admitted that it drafts laws on behalf of politicians. In June, Pekka Pesonen, General Secretary of the union, told media outlet Politico that at least a third of amendments tabled by politicians originated with industry lobby groups or with NGOs. 

This account is confirmed by Wiener, who is chief negotiator on the pesticide regulation SUR and was the Greens negotiator on Farm to Fork. “Copa-Cogeca proposed amendments to weaken Farm to Fork, some of which were simply copied and tabled by conservative and right-wing groups,” she said. 

DeSmog requested access to minutes of meetings with Copa-Cogeca and the pesticides firms in a Freedom of Information Request to the European Parliament. However, parliament said records of the meetings are held in the private offices of MEPs and therefore not subject to freedom of information laws.

MEPs Speaking on Industry Panels 

Campaigners have also criticised the six politicians in DeSmog’s sample for the high volume of industry-events they have attended.  

In the period, the EPP politicians took part in 50 events (networking, panels or protests), including some in parliament itself that were organised or sponsored by the agribusiness industry. These included 20 events by major pesticide firms or their lobby group CropLife Europe. 

“It’s clear that the EU Farm to Fork strategy has been constantly under attack by an unholy alliance between Big Agri and a fixed group of right-wing MEPs.“

Norbert Lins and Italy’s Herbert Dorfmann were the most active. Both joined over 15 events, while Schneider attended just three. 

Alexander Bernhuber, Franc Bogovič and Anne Sander between them held at least four events in parliament, which were either co-hosted with or platformed speakers from agrochemical or industrial farming groups which have opposed Farm to Fork. 

For example, in April 2023, Bernhuber – the Austrian politician who is EPP’s chief negotiator on the proposed pesticide reduction laws – hosted an event on SUR, which was moderated by the powerful sugar and beet producers’ lobbies (CEFS and CIBE), both major users of bee-harming pesticides in the EU. 

“It’s clear that the EU Farm to Fork strategy has been constantly under attack by an unholy alliance between Big Agri and a fixed group of right-wing MEPs,“ said Vicky Cann from Corporate Europe Observatory. “Parliamentary events are just one manifestation of this.”

She added: “EU food and agriculture policy has been dominated by the demands of Big Agri rather than the interests of most farmers and sustainability for too long.”

CEFS told DeSmog that it “supports sustainable European agriculture” and “further reducing application of plant protection products where possible.” It also said it was concerned by “arbitrary reduction targets” in the pesticide proposal that “would make the cultivation of sugar beet impossible in many areas and cause a significant drop in yields in others”.

It added: “We believe that CEFS’ engagement with policymakers can improve the quality of EU legislation due to the technical expertise, data, and experience CEFS and members can provide”.

Transparency Concerns

DeSmog’s analysis has raised concerns about a lack of transparency in EU decision-making. 

The research found around a fifth of all meetings held by the six MEPs were with organisations not registered as lobby groups. With the exception of Franc Bogovič, all the MEPs analysed held multiple meetings with unregistered groups.

Under EU transparency guidelines, all organisations seeking to influence policy must register as a lobby group, providing details of their affiliations, funding, lobbyists and lobby spends. 

The guidelines state that MEPs “should adopt the systematic practice of only meeting interest representatives that have registered in the Transparency Register”.

But because transparency rules are not legally binding, groups are able to “circumvent” them, Cann from CEO explained. 

Of 15 meetings with industry-linked groups on the pesticide reduction proposal held by Norbert Lins, who is chair of AGRI, the European Parliament’s Agriculture Committee, five were with unregistered groups.

They included Moroccan state-owned fertiliser company OCP Group, which Lins met in March 2022 to discuss ‘EU food security’ in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Lins has repeatedly cited fears about food security in opposition to proposed reforms, a claim critics say has been weaponised by both the pesticide and fertiliser lobby.

“I think citizens have a right to know who exactly their representatives are meeting with and who are behind these organisations,” Sarah Wiener said.

Undeclared Meetings

Analysis of social media posts also showed that five out of six MEPs held meetings with industry members without declaring them, a practice that also flouts EU transparency guidance.

For the purposes of this study DeSmog defines meetings as any pre-scheduled or sit-down discussion between MEPs and interest representatives. Examples included hikes, breakfasts in the European Parliament and private, closed-door discussions at conferences and trade events. 

Guidelines state that MEPs should publish details of all scheduled meetings with groups which seek to influence policy, in particular when legislation is discussed. However, the guidance is only binding for lawmakers who act as chief negotiators on proposed laws. 

Between them Alexander Bernhuber, Herbert Dorfmann, Norbert Lins, Christine Schneider were found to have held some 15 meetings that were not declared. French MEP Anne Sander had almost 45 undeclared meetings.

Undeclared meetings took place with major farming association Copa-Cogeca, and pesticide firm Corteva. In at least a half of those meetings, the content of the social post revealed that policy was under discussion.

In recognition of the need for greater transparency, the EU approved new laws in September that will require all lobbying meetings to be published going forward – measures that the EPP has opposed. 

Greens MEP and transparency expert Daniel Freund thinks voters need to be able to see who their politicians are speaking to. Transparency is crucial to ensure there isn’t “undue influence” over policy decisions, he said.

Tipping Point

With European Elections due in June 2024, experts say that decisions made now will set the tone for parties across Europe. Officials have warned that the failure of biodiversity-focused lawmaking could leave Europe’s wider Green Deal plan to become carbon neutral by 2050 in jeopardy. 

Sarah Wiener said she was “confident” that an agreement on the pesticide reduction laws could yet be reached. However, with conservative politicians pushing to strip out legally binding targets, “the influence of the agricultural lobby is clearly felt,” she said.

Parliament, Commission and Council are now also involved in final negotiations on the Nature Restoration Law, with parliament currently recommending that farming be removed from the plans. 

“We know that ecosystems are collapsing, with major risks to us as well,” the scientist Guy Pe’er said. “The question is: why is there such a glaring gap between the knowledge about what needs to be done and action by politicians?”