Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Pegada Ecológica. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Pegada Ecológica. Mostrar todas as mensagens

quarta-feira, 11 de novembro de 2026

O impacto ambiental das COPs: entre a pegada de carbono, o desperdício dos pavilhões e os fracos resultados

Antalya e local da COP 31
A contradição intrínseca das Conferências das Partes (COPs) da ONU manifesta-se em dois planos paralelos: a pegada ecológico-infraestrutural gerada pela realização destes megaeventos e o desfasamento crónico entre a urgência da crise climática e a escassez dos seus resultados práticos.

1. A pegada ecológica directa: transportes e logística
Estudos científicos e relatórios de avaliação ambiental mostram que o maior impacto direto de cada COP reside na logística transcontinental. O transporte aéreo de dezenas de milhares de diplomatas, cientistas, jornalistas e representantes governamentais gera uma pegada de carbono gigantesca. A isto soma-se o consumo energético massivo dos centros de convenções e até o impacto digital associado à infraestrutura de comunicações do evento.

Embora os organizadores recorram frequentemente a esquemas de compensação de emissões, a eficácia real e a contabilidade rigorosa dessas medidas continuam a ser fortemente questionadas por peritos independentes.

2. O desperdício dos pavilhões e o impacto urbano
No plano infraestrutural, a crítica à construção de pavilhões temporários e ao surgimento de "elefantes brancos" é recorrente. Historicamente, muitas edições basearam-se na erupção e rápido desmantelamento de verdadeiras "cidades efémeras". Terminado o evento de duas semanas, grandes quantidades de materiais de construção, divisórias modulares, carpetes descartáveis e sistemas de climatização acabam frequentemente incinerados ou em aterros sanitários.

Quando os países anfitriões optam por erguer estruturas permanentes, a ausência de um plano de reutilização sólido faz com que esses espaços fiquem abandonados ou subaproveitados. Apesar da introdução de diretrizes internacionais de sustentabilidade (como a certificação ISO 20121) para encorajar a reutilização e a doação de materiais, a aplicação prática varia significativamente consoante o país acolhedor.

3. O balanço dos resultados políticos: poucos avanços e muita frustração
Se o custo ambiental e financeiro da organização é elevado, o rendimento diplomático tem ficado, segundo a comunidade científica e organizações ambientalistas, muito aquém do necessário:
  • conquistas multilaterais: os defensores do modelo salientam que as COPs constituem o único fórum global inclusivo onde quase 200 nações negociam em igualdade jurídica, tendo produzido avanços históricos como o Acordo de Paris [versão Portuguesa aqui] e a criação do Fundo de Perdas e Danos.
  • insuficiências crónicas: em contrapartida, as resoluções finais sofrem habitualmente da falta de metas vinculativas com prazos rígidos para a eliminação progressiva dos combustíveis fósseis. A forte presença de lobbies industriais, o incumprimento das promessas de financiamento pelos países desenvolvidos e o hiato entre as promessas voluntárias e as políticas reais nacionais mantêm a perceção de um saldo manifestamente insuficiente.
O caso atual da COP31 em Antália
A atual discussão em torno da COP31 em Antália sintetiza precisamente esta paralisia diplomática. Agravada pela ausência dos Estados Unidos  o que deixa um vazio financeiro e político substancial nas negociações -, a cimeira começou com disputas imediatas em redor da aprovação da agenda oficial. Enquanto países em desenvolvimento tentam garantir compromissos urgentes para o financiamento da adaptação, os blocos negociais voltaram a adiar os debates financeiros de fundo.   
Mesmo com os esforços da organização turca para reduzir a pegada física reutilizando o espaço da antiga EXPO 2016, a COP31 arrisca-se a repetir o padrão de edições anteriores: um elevado consumo de recursos e logística para adiar, mais uma vez, as decisões financeiras essenciais para combater a crise climática global.

Referências bibliográficas
1. Pegada de carbono e logística transcontinental
2. Desperdício infraestrutural, impacto urbano e gestão de eventos

3. Eficácia política, financiamento e governança climática

sábado, 11 de julho de 2026

No Mundial da População - Os Custos Horríveis da Negação Populacional



Neste Podcast  intitulado "The Ghastly Costs of Population Denial by Corey Bradshaw", aborda as crises ecológicas e sociais profundamente interligadas que a humanidade enfrenta devido ao crescimento populacional e ao consumo excessivo, com um foco central na forma como a negação da superpopulação foi assimilada pela academia e pela política.

Ao longo da entrevista, o ecologista Corey Bradshaw faz uma análise detalhada da saúde dos ecossistemas planetários, explicando que a degradação ambiental se manifesta pela perda generalizada de habitats, pela desflorestação agressiva - exemplificada pela perda de vegetação na Austrália e o impacto direto nos coalas - e pela proliferação de espécies invasoras trazidas pela atividade humana. No que respeita à discussão sobre a Sexta Extinção em Massa, Bradshaw esclarece que, embora as taxas atuais de extinção sejam centenas de vezes superiores às taxas de fundo naturais, a confirmação empírica do limiar formal de 75% de perda de espécies poderá demorar milhares de anos a computar, em grande parte porque a ciência ainda nem sequer catalogou a maioria dos organismos da Terra.

No tocante aos limites biológicos do planeta, Bradshaw e os seus colaboradores concluem que a capacidade de carga sustentável da Terra a longo prazo ronda os 2,5 mil milhões de pessoas. Este valor permitiria garantir um nível de vida saudável e com equidade sem esgotar os recursos regenerativos globais. Para reforçar esta tese, o ecologista desmistifica a narrativa económica dominante - partilhada tanto por setores conservadores como progressistas - de que a queda na taxa de fertilidade e o envelhecimento populacional conduzem inevitavelmente a um colapso financeiro. Acompanhado por economistas, Bradshaw analisou séries temporais e indicadores de riqueza em mais de uma centena de países, demonstrando que não existe qualquer evidência empírica de que populações em declínio ou mais velhas percam produtividade ou qualidade de vida; pelo contrário, os países com crescimento populacional mais lento e estruturas etárias mais maduras registam índices superiores de bem-estar e desenvolvimento.

Esta resistência em aceitar os limites populacionais é atribuída por Bradshaw a uma captura ideológica promovida pelo mundo corporativo, que depende do aumento contínuo de consumidores para sustentar margens de lucro no mercado de ações. Em vez de prever um cenário de apocalipse violento e instantâneo ao estilo cinematográfico, o ecologista define o "Futuro Horrível" (Ghastly Future) como um declínio gradual, contínuo e doloroso da qualidade de vida, marcado por maiores choques climáticos, escassez de recursos e crises de refugiados. Posicionando-se como um "pessimista otimista", assume abertamente o desgaste emocional e a depressão decorrentes da sua investigação, encarando o seu trabalho não com a ambição irrealista de salvar o mundo, mas com a missão diária de tornar o futuro menos penoso para as próximas gerações. Bradshaw sublinha ainda que recusar debater a superpopulação sob o pretexto da justiça social constitui um ato de profunda arrogância: essa omissão prejudica prioritariamente as populações mais vulneráveis dos países em desenvolvimento e acaba, na prática, por perpetuar estruturas patriarcais que limitam a autonomia reprodutiva e o poder de decisão das mulheres à escala global.

Artigos mencionados neste podcast

domingo, 5 de julho de 2026

Europe to redefine oil as “sustainable”


The Council's Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) revision drops the exclusion that kept fossil fuel expansion out of Europe's transition funds. The decision landed in the middle of the continent's most severe heatwave on record.

In the same week that France logged its hottest day since national records began in 1947, the European Union moved to loosen what the word “sustainable” is allowed to mean on a fund label.

The two events were not connected by design. They were connected by date. On June 24, as a heatwave that the World Weather Attribution group of scientists described as the most severe ever recorded in the region gripped Western Europe, the Council of the European Union adopted its negotiating position on a revision of the SFDR, the EU's rulebook for sustainable financial products. The same group of scientists concluded that June heat of this intensity would have been virtually impossible fifty years ago without human-caused warming. By the end of that week, the World Health Organization's director-general said more than 1,300 excess deaths had been recorded across Europe since June 21.

That was the backdrop against which Europe decided to make room for oil in its sustainable investment rules.
The Council removed the one line that kept oil expansion out of sustainable funds


SFDR was built in 2021 to do two things: steer capital toward the low-carbon transition, and make greenwashing harder. The current revision, often called SFDR 2.0, sorts products into three new categories: sustainable, transition, and ESG basics.

The European Commission's own proposal would have excluded companies expanding their fossil fuel activities from the transition category altogether. The Council deleted that exclusion. In its place, a company opening new oil and gas fields can still qualify for a transition label, provided that around 20% of its capital expenditure is aligned with the EU taxonomy of green activities, and that it adopts a time-bound plan to reduce its operational emissions.

Consider a company that pours the bulk of its capital into expanding oil production and a fifth into wind and solar. Under the Council's proposal, it could still carry a transition label. That label is not cosmetic. Transition and sustainable funds shape how pension funds, insurers, and asset managers allocate trillions of euros, so what the word certifies is not a technicality.

A 20% test on the wrong emissions cannot capture an oil company's real footprint
Here is the detail the headline number hides. The requirement to cut emissions covers a company's Scope 1 and Scope 2, the pollution from running its own operations. It does not touch Scope 3, the emissions released when customers burn the oil and gas the company sells. For a fossil fuel producer, Scope 3 is the overwhelming majority of the harm, by many estimates 80% to 95% of the total. The rule scores the small share and ignores the rest.

The scale of the mismatch is easy to miss. Global clean energy investment is on track to reach around $2.2 trillion in 2026, close to double the money flowing into fossil fuels, according to the International Energy Agency. Yet oil and gas companies account for less than 5% of that clean energy spending. A rule that rewards a 20% capex slice, while ignoring the product itself, measures the smallest part of the story.

A few billion invested in renewables does not cancel out billions spent locking in new fossil production for decades. One reduces future emissions; the other commits them. They are not equivalent, financially or scientifically.

The new definition mirrors the position of a company a court has already faulted
The Council did not invent these criteria in a vacuum. They closely resemble arguments long advanced by parts of the oil industry, which has pressed for a transition category broad enough to take in continued fossil production. TotalEnergies is the most visible example. Between January and June 2026, according to European Parliament transparency records, the company held around 35 meetings with members of the Parliament, several referencing SFDR directly, and its own strategy targets putting 20% of its portfolio into power and low-carbon energy by 2030, the same one-fifth threshold the Council settled on. That is not proof that one produced the other. It is a striking convergence between what an oil major asked for and what member states agreed.

There is a sharper irony in the timing. In October 2025, the Paris Judicial Tribunal found that TotalEnergies had misled consumers with claims about its ambition to reach carbon neutrality by 2050, made while it continued to expand oil and gas production, and ordered the offending statements removed. The company said it would not appeal, and the judgment became final. Less than a year later, the Council is proposing a definition of transition that would let a company doing what the court described, expanding fossil fuels while investing a minority share in cleaner energy, carry a transition label across Europe.

The court's reasoning lands on the same point the fund rule misses. What made the claim misleading was the gap between a transition image and continued fossil expansion. The Council's 20% test widens that gap and stamps it as compliant.

I put these questions to TotalEnergies before publication of this article. In response, a company spokesperson said:
“TotalEnergies' position on the SFDR is well known and has been publicly expressed by the Company in its response to the European Commission's consultation dated 6 April 2026. It is available on the European Commission's website.”
On the court ruling, the spokesperson referred me to a company clarification.

In that clarification, TotalEnergies stresses that the tribunal dismissed most of the claims against it, that the decision concerned three paragraphs about its carbon-neutrality ambition on a French affiliate's customer website rather than its advertising, and that no advertising by its French affiliates was condemned. The company rejects the charge of greenwashing and sets out its record at length: more than €20 billion invested in low-carbon energy worldwide since 2020, €4 billion of it in France; 32 gigawatts of installed renewable capacity producing 50 terawatt-hours of electricity in 2025, up from close to zero in 2020; selection to build France's largest ever renewables project, a €4.5 billion offshore wind farm; and cuts of 36% in emissions from its operated oil and gas facilities between 2015 and 2024, and 55% in methane between 2020 and 2024.

Those last figures, though, are reductions on the company's own operations, the Scope 1 and 2 the fund rule already counts, not on the far larger emissions released when the oil and gas it sells are burned.
The Council says fossil fuel companies still have a role to play

Asked about the greenwashing criticism, a Council spokesperson said companies active in the fossil fuel sector can still contribute to the transition, for example by developing low-carbon fuels or building electric vehicle charging infrastructure.

Campaigners see it differently. Reclaim Finance argued that governments had given in to lobbying from oil majors and opened the door to greenwashing of fossil fuel investment, framing the coming parliamentary vote as a choice between a fossil future and the wellbeing of European citizens.
A weaker label still has to point in the right direction

The Council's defenders make a real argument, and it deserves a fair hearing. The transition category was never meant to be the strictest tier. It exists to finance messy, real-world decarbonization rather than a handful of already-clean companies, and drawing the line too hard, they warn, would only push capital out of Europe into markets with weaker disclosure, or starve the hard-to-abate sectors that most need it.

The argument holds until you look at what the test actually rewards. A transition label, however lenient, has to certify one thing, that a company is moving away from fossil fuels. The Council's version does not require even that. A company can raise its oil output year after year and still qualify, as long as a fifth of its spending points elsewhere. That is not a permissive standard for transition. It is the absence of one, on the single variable that decides whether a transition is happening at all.

There is also a cleaner way to do the thing the rule claims to enable. An oil company that wants to raise money for a wind farm can already issue a green bond, where the proceeds are ring-fenced to that named project and reported on. The capital reaches the clean asset without the parent company's oil expansion borrowing the "sustainable" label. That is the honest instrument, and it exists. What the Council's change adds is not access to green finance but permission to badge the whole enterprise, oil growth included, as transition.

And the fear of capital fleeing Europe cuts the other way. A label that certifies expansion in order to keep money onshore has not kept the money honest. It has moved the greenwashing inside the rulebook.
The decision is not final, and that is where the leverage sits

The Council has agreed only its negotiating position. The European Parliament's economic affairs committee is due to vote on its amendments on July 15, with the full Parliament expected to adopt its position after the summer, before trilogue negotiations with the Council and the Commission later in the year. The direction can still change.

The exclusion the Council stripped out was the Commission’s own. Under the Commission’s proposal, companies expanding their fossil fuel activities are barred from the transition category outright. But the Commission is not a bystander here. It opened the SFDR up in the name of simplification, a drive to cut reporting burdens on the financial industry, and the Council followed that logic a step further. A revision the Commission sold as a remedy for greenwashing is turning into a license for it.

I asked the European Commission directly whether it stands by that exclusion and will defend it in the negotiations. Its full, on-the-record reply was this:

“The Commission remains fully committed to engaging constructively with the co-legislators to achieve a balanced and timely agreement on the proposal.”
A spokesperson also referred me to the Commission's published reasoning, which sets out the exclusion in its own text.

The response leaves the Commission's position open to interpretation. While it does not say the Commission has abandoned its original proposal, it also does not explicitly reaffirm that it will defend this particular safeguard during the negotiations. The stronger rule still exists on paper. Whether it survives the legislative process will depend on the negotiations ahead, and particularly on the outcome in the European Parliament.

The problem was never the oil. It is the label.
Here the argument is easily misread, so it is worth stating plainly. The world will keep burning oil for years while it builds the alternatives. Reasonable people can debate whether Europe is better off pumping some of its own rather than importing every barrel, and amid a run of Middle East supply shocks, that energy-security case is not frivolous. But it is a different question from the one the Council has answered.

Nobody has to call a new oil field clean in order to keep the lights on. Oil can be produced, taxed, regulated, and wound down on a schedule, without being sold to a saver as a contribution to the energy transition. The decision in front of Europe is not whether the oil comes out of the ground. It is whether pulling it out counts as sustainable investment. That is the smaller question, and the far more dangerous one.

If oil is green, nothing is
A sustainable label is not a badge of virtue. It is a piece of information. Markets run on information. A pension fund, an insurer, or a saver moving money into a green product cannot audit a company's drilling plans. They trust the label to tell them what their capital is doing. Europe's sustainably labeled fund market, worth around €10 trillion, exists because that one word is assumed to mean something specific.

Stretch the word to cover a company opening new oil fields, and it stops carrying information. If the same label sits on a wind developer and on an oil major with a 20% side project, it no longer tells them apart. The investor who wanted the real thing can no longer find it. And the company doing the genuine, expensive work of transition loses the one advantage the label was meant to confer, cheaper capital and patient shareholders who believe the plan. Economists have a plain description for markets where buyers cannot separate quality from imitation. The honest product gets crowded out, and in time nobody pays a premium for the label at all.

The damage does not stop at oil. Once extraction qualifies as transition on a one-fifth capex test, every hard-to-abate sector arrives with the same claim, coal with a capture pilot, an airline with a fuel pledge, until the category describes almost everyone, which is another way of saying it describes no one. If oil extraction is green, the honest answer to what is not green becomes very little.

The timing sharpens the risk. Sustainable investing is already on the back foot, worn down by years of greenwashing scandals, funds quietly stripped of their green labels, and a political backlash that treats ESG as an insult. The SFDR move is not an isolated event. In the same days, under pressure from the Trump administration, the World Bank retired its headline target to steer 45% of lending toward projects with climate benefits, and the International Monetary Fund’s own watchdog reported a fading focus on climate, even as the underlying programs survived. That survival was not a gift: at the World Bank, a coalition of nearly 100 countries held the line and forced the plan to continue over Washington's objection, a reminder that the pressure runs both ways. Trust in the category is the scarce resource, and the SFDR revision was written to rebuild it with clearer and stricter definitions. On this one provision, it would do the reverse. It would take the reform meant to restore the meaning of sustainable finance and spend it dissolving the meaning of the word at its center.

Europe does not have to choose between energy security and climate credibility. It can pursue both. What it cannot do is tell investors that new oil production is sustainable without changing the meaning of the word itself. The July vote decides more than the fate of one regulation. It decides whether a green label still carries information an investor can trust, and with it the integrity of the market built on that single word.

terça-feira, 23 de junho de 2026

António Guterres exige "toda a verdade" sobre o custo climático da IA

O secretário-geral da ONU avisou que o mundo precisa de agir com "muito mais urgência" para limitar o aquecimento global. O secretário-geral da ONU, António Guterres, instou os líderes do setor da Inteligência Artificial a “dizerem toda a verdade” sobre o impacto ambiental dos centros de dados, apontando o dedo aos combustíveis fósseis.

“Chega de custos escondidos. Chega de impor este fardo aos mais vulneráveis. É tempo de dizer toda a verdade. Se a IA quer contribuir para a construção de um futuro melhor, precisa de ser honesta sobre o seu custo atual”, disse António Guterres esta terça-feira, durante o seu discurso na Semana de Ação Climática de Londres, um evento anual realizado na capital britânica.

O secretário-geral da ONU anunciou o lançamento da Iniciativa de Transparência Ambiental da IA, que exigirá que os gigantes globais da inteligência artificial calculem e divulguem a pegada ambiental das suas atividades — em termos de carbono, água e uso da terra, por exemplo. As empresas ficam comprometidas, então, a abastecer essas atividades com energia renovável até ao final da década.

“As comunidades desconhecem muitas vezes o impacto ambiental da infraestrutura que está a ser desenvolvida à sua volta”, sublinhou Guterres, reconhecendo que a IA é “exigente em termos de terra, água e energia”, embora possa contribuir para “acelerar as soluções climáticas”.

Os centros de dados - os repositórios de servidores que alimentam a IA e outros serviços digitais - consomem energia de forma extremamente intensiva e atingiram a marca dos 448 terawatts/hora (TWh) de eletricidade em 2025. A consultoria Gartner estima um aumento de 26%, elevando o consumo para 565 TWh e a potência para 132 GW em 2026. As projeções da Agência Internacional da Energia (AIE) apontam para um consumo que pode variar entre 945 TWh e 1.050 TWh até 20230.

Guterres pede “mais urgência”
Numa altura em que a Europa enfrenta uma vaga de calor e vários países, como o Reino Unido, França e Itália, batem recordes de calor, o secretário-geral da ONU alerta que é preciso agir “com muito mais urgência”.

“Devemos agir com muito mais urgência para limitar rigorosamente a extensão e a duração de qualquer ultrapassagem de 1,5°C”, disse Guterres, referindo-se ao limite de aquecimento estabelecido pelo Acordo de Paris de 2015, em comparação com os níveis pré-industriais.

Para além da proposta relativa ao setor tecnológico, o secretário-geral da ONU lançou também um “apelo global à ação sobre o metano”, o segundo maior contribuinte para as alterações climáticas a seguir ao dióxido de carbono (CO2), com o objetivo de alcançar “emissões próximas de zero em toda a cadeia de valor”.

Para isso, Guterres propõe uma série de metas relacionadas com as fugas de metano na indústria do petróleo e gás e com a queima, que consiste na queima do gás natural emitido durante a extração de petróleo sem o seu aproveitamento.

Guterres defende também a redução das emissões do setor agrícola e dos aterros sanitários.
"Exorto a indústria dos combustíveis fósseis a assumir a responsabilidade e a fazer o que já deveria ter sido feito há muito tempo", disse António Guterres, sublinhando que "só em 2025, foram queimados cerca de 167 mil milhões de metros cúbicos de gás, o equivalente ao consumo anual de África".

"Não podemos continuar a depender de um sistema baseado em combustíveis fósseis que alimenta tanto a crise climática como a crise energética", declarou o secretário no discurso durante a conferência em Londres.

terça-feira, 2 de junho de 2026

Microsoft unveils seven homegrown AI models in new bid for ‘long term self-sufficiency’


Microsoft has based much of its AI business on models from OpenAI, before expanding more recently to Anthropic. On Tuesday, the company showed how it plans to rely less on both.

At the Build developer conference, the Microsoft AI Superintelligence Team unveiled a family of seven models built from scratch. It’s part of an ongoing effort by the company to build credible in-house alternatives to models from partners and rivals with competing allegiances.

“This is all about long term self-sufficiency for Microsoft and our partners. It’s about models you can trust,” wrote Mustafa Suleyman, CEO of Microsoft AI, in a post announcing the models.

Microsoft is OpenAI’s largest backer, having invested a cumulative total of $13 billion in the ChatGPT maker over multiple funding rounds. The company last year announced an investment of up to $5 billion in Anthropic, and later integrated its technology into a Copilot Cowork AI assistant.

However, Anthropic is also backed by Microsoft rivals Google and Amazon, and OpenAI is increasingly cozy with Amazon — showing the need for Microsoft to control its own AI destiny.

The flagship of the seven newly announced MAI models is MAI-Thinking-1, a reasoning model that Microsoft says draws even with Anthropic’s Claude Sonnet 4.6 in blind human testing, and matches the more capable Claude Opus 4.6 on a widely used coding benchmark.

Suleyman stressed that MAI-Thinking-1 was trained from the ground up with no distillation from other companies’ models, looking to appeal to enterprises that care about clean data lineage.

It’s available in private preview on Microsoft Foundry, where the company also hosts the latest models from OpenAI and Anthropic, including the recently released Claude Opus 4.8.

Microsoft AI also released MAI-Code-1-Flash, a 5-billion-parameter coding model now rolling out in Visual Studio Code and GitHub Copilot, and MAI-Image-2.5, which Microsoft says ranks second on a leading image-editing leaderboard, ahead of Google’s Nano Banana Pro.

The full set of models spans image, voice, transcription, coding and reasoning.

Saber mais:

Inside Microsoft’s Project Solara: A new platform for devices that run AI agents instead of apps

quinta-feira, 7 de maio de 2026

Portugal esgotou hoje recursos que natureza lhe destinava para o ano inteiro, dois dias mais tarde do que no ano passado


Portugal esgota hoje os recursos naturais que tinha disponíveis para este ano, dois dias mais tarde do que no ano passado, passando a consumir "a crédito", indicam dados da organização internacional "Global Footprint Network".

O dia da sobrecarga, explica a organização, indica que de 01 de janeiro a 07 de maio os portugueses consumiram tantos recursos naturais quantos os diversos ecossistemas da Terra conseguem regenerar ao longo de um ano. A partir de agora os portugueses continuam naturalmente a consumir, mas usam mais recursos, em terra ou no mar, do que teoricamente estariam disponíveis, e emitem mais dióxido de carbono do que a natureza pode absorver.

No ano passado o dia em que o país esgotou os recursos foi a 5 de maio, o que quer dizer que melhorou ligeiramente em sustentabilidade.

A estabilização no consumo de recursos do planeta é notada pela associação ambientalista Zero, que, num comunicado no qual comenta a pegada ecológica do país, refere a ligeira melhoria, comparando com o ano anterior.

Mas ainda assim o país começa a exceder os recursos disponíveis para alimentar o estilo de vida dos portugueses decorridos menos de cinco meses do ano. Tal quer dizer que se cada pessoa na Terra vivesse como uma pessoa média portuguesa, a humanidade exigiria cerca de 2,9 planetas para sustentar as suas necessidades de recursos.

O resultado coloca Portugal na média da União Europeia (UE), que este ano teve o dia de sobrecarga em 03 de maio, uma ligeira melhoria também em relação ao ano passado.

Na UE há países que esgotaram há muito os recursos que tinham para o ano todo. Nas contas da "Global Footprint Network" o consumo do Luxemburgo esgotou os recursos logo no dia 17 de fevereiro.

A nível mundial o pior classificado é o Catar, que esgotou a sua parte a 04 de fevereiro. Do outro lado da tabela estão as Honduras, que só têm o dia de sobrecarga a 27 de novembro.

A pegada ecológica avalia as necessidades humanas de recursos renováveis e serviços essenciais e compara-as com a capacidade da Terra para fornecer tais recursos e serviços (biocapacidade).

A 05 de junho, Dia Mundial do Ambiente, a "Global Footprint Network" anuncia o "Earth Overshoot Day" de 2026, o momento em que a necessidade de recursos e serviços ambientais por parte da Humanidade excede a capacidade da Terra para regenerar esses mesmos recursos.

Em 2025 a humanidade esgotou os recursos desse ano no dia 24 de julho, uma semana mais cedo do que em 2024, 01 de agosto.

quinta-feira, 16 de abril de 2026

Measuring Ecological Limits: The United States and the World


The science is clear: Our rate of economic activity is having disastrous impacts on the environment, starting with the climate so crucial to our survival. Economic activities require the use of natural resources and systematically entail pollution. Resources eventually get used up, as does the capacity of the planet to assimilate waste. We are reminded of Herman Daly’s long-running emphasis that the economy is a subsystem of the environment, not the other way around.

Expanding on this, steady-state economists and other post-growth advocates argue that economic growth cannot be decoupled from material throughput. This can be explained with the trophic theory of money, which follows from the trophic structure of the economy of nature. Agriculture and extraction comprise the trophic foundation of the economy, and all other sectors rely on that trophic base. Therefore, we cannot rely on “dematerialized” sectors to grow the economy while decreasing its disastrous impacts on the environment.

Therefore, consumption must be reduced, particularly in high-income countries that consume more natural resources and release more waste. But just how much do high-income countries need to reduce their economic activity to be sustainable? Two metrics help us understand sustainable limits by quantifying the relationship between the environment and the economy: ecological footprint and biocapacity.

The Conceptual Framing of Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity
The ecological footprint is a measure of the area needed to support the demands of economic activity. Biocapacity is a measure of the area available to supply natural resources and absorb waste at a sustainable rate. When the ecological footprint exceeds biocapacity, that indicates ecological overshoot. The Ecological Footprint Initiative has been measuring global ecological footprint and biocapacity since 1961. We have been in overshoot since 1971.

The ecological footprint and biocapacity are made up of comparable components, including cropland, grazing land, forest land, fishing grounds, and built-up land. In addition, ecological footprint includes a carbon component.

Scientists measure ecological footprint and biocapacity with a unit called the global hectare. They convert the productivity of different ecosystems to global hectares based on the world average productivity of a hectare. This enables comparisons between different land types, places, and years.
Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity of the United States

The United States has a high ecological footprint that is larger than its biocapacity. In 2022, there were roughly one billion hectares across the United States. When categorized into the biocapacity components and compared to global average productivity, this equates to 1.25 billion global hectares (gha) of biocapacity.

In other words, U.S. land, most notably cropland and forest land, was more productive than the global average. The average biocapacity of one hectare of U.S. cropland was 3.7 gha. One hectare of forest land provided an average of 1.6 gha of forest land biocapacity. However, this above-average biocapacity of cropland and forest land does not indicate sustainability. The country’s total ecological footprint is far higher than its total biocapacity.

In 2022, the U.S. ecological footprint of production was over 2.5 billion gha. This was similar to the ecological footprint of consumption, because the footprints of imports and exports were nearly equal. However, there were differences among the footprint components of imports and exports. The carbon component was more prominent in the ecological footprint of imports, whereas the cropland component was more prominent in exports. This means the United States imported more carbon-intensive goods and services than it exported, and exported more cropland-intensive harvests than it imported.
U.S. Trends: Better or Worse?

One good sign is that total U.S. biocapacity has been increasing over time. In 1961, total biocapacity was just over 1 billion gha, and by 2024, biocapacity had grown to 1.3 billion gha (2023 and 2024 data were forecasted).1 This is because of increases in agricultural productivity. Biocapacity is a measure of what the environment can provide for human use, not of biodiversity or ecosystem health. In fact, it has a negative correlation with biodiversity indicators. Cropland illustrates this tension well, as using fertilizers and chemicals can increase agricultural productivity at the expense of ecosystem health.

The U.S. population has also been increasing over time, which has decreased biocapacity per person. In 1961 biocapacity was 5.7 gha/person, and in 2022 was 3.8 gha/person.

Meanwhile, the U.S. ecological footprint of consumption has been increasing. In 1961 it was 1.6 billion gha, and by 2024 it reached 2.5 billion gha. Counteracting that increase to some degree is the per-person ecological footprint of consumption, which has decreased in recent years. In 1961, it was 8.9 gha/person, and in 2022, it was 7.9 gha/person. Although this is not a huge reduction, it provides a glimmer of hope that the country can reduce its footprint per person to offset population growth. However, it would need a very sizeable reduction to retreat to the safe operating space of its biocapacity.

In summary, the best available ecological footprint and biocapacity science reveals that the United States is exceeding a sustainable level of resource use for the production and consumption of goods and services. In 2022, the ecological footprint of consumption was 7.9 gha/person, and biocapacity was 3.8 gha/person. Ecological footprint is more than double biocapacity, meaning that economic activity is (over) two times the amount the United States can sustain. And with its outsized carbon footprint, the American economy is impacting the biocapacity of ecosystems on Earth.
Diving Into the Footprint Details

The carbon component makes up 64 percent of the ecological footprint embodied in the consumption of goods and services in the United States. Almost all of this carbon component (95 percent) comes from fossil fuel emissions. The largest share of these emissions (37 percent) comes from transport, of which road transport constitutes the majority. The next-largest share of U.S. carbon emissions (34 percent) comes from public and private utility companies producing electricity and heat for sale to third parties.

For many people, these details highlight the importance of decarbonizing electricity and heat generation and shifting transportation to less emissions-intensive modalities, such as rail. However, the emissions reductions needed to bring the United States back within its biocapacity are so immense that “green” alternatives aren’t sufficient. Americans must also reduce consumption of electricity and heat, as well as the distance they travel, because “green growth” is not possible.

In 2022, cropland made up 18 percent of the U.S. ecological footprint of consumption. Of the cropland ecological footprint, 84 percent was used for crops consumed by people and pets, 15 percent was used to feed livestock, and less than 0.5 percent was used to feed fish. Almost 700 million metric tons of crops were harvested, and just over half was maize. The second most harvested crop was soybeans at 17 percent of total harvests.

Yet the proportion of ecological impact does not equal the proportion of total harvests. For instance, maize made up 52 percent of crop harvests (metric tons) and 43 percent of the cropland ecological footprint of production (gha) in 2022. On the other hand, soybeans accounted for 17 percent of harvests (metric tons) and 32 percent of cropland ecological footprint of production (gha). Therefore, soybeans had almost double the ecological impact per metric ton of harvest in the United States.
The United States in the Global Context

The United States consumes far more than its share of the Earth’s natural resources. The global average ecological footprint of consumption was 2.7 gha/person in 2022. The United States crushed that benchmark at 7.9 gha/person. The average U.S. citizen consumed resources at almost three times the rate of the average global citizen.

Here’s another way of thinking about this: The United States is responsible for twelve percent of the world’s ecological footprint of consumption. Yet the U.S. population only amounts to four percent of the world population. This represents a highly disproportionate environmental impact.

The U.S. ecological footprint per person is even higher than that of most other high-income countries. The average ecological footprint of consumption in high-income countries is 6.1 gha/person.

There are important debates about best practices for presenting ecological footprint and biocapacity data. Often, the ecological footprint of a territory is compared to the biocapacity of that territory. For example, U.S. ecological footprint is compared to U.S. biocapacity. This implies that a country achieves sustainability if its ecological footprint is lower than its biocapacity.

Many criticize this approach as an unfair representation of sustainability, because some countries are blessed with exceptionally high biocapacity. For instance, in 2022, the ecological footprint in Canada was 8.4 gha/person, and the biocapacity was 14.4 gha/person. Canada’s biocapacity was clearly higher than its ecological footprint. However, its ecological footprint per person was in the top ten highest in the world. Therefore, perhaps it is also important to compare a country’s ecological footprint to world average biocapacity (global ecological balance) in addition to the country’s biocapacity (local ecological balance).

In 2022, global biocapacity was 1.5 gha/person, significantly lower than the U.S. ecological footprint of 7.9 gha/person. In other words, U.S. citizens consume resources and emit carbon at five times the global average sustainable rate.

Ecological footprint and biocapacity data illustrate that we are using natural resources and releasing waste at unsustainable rates, in the United States and around the world. It shows that this has been happening for decades. The United States and other high-income countries are disproportionately responsible for this state of overshoot. They must pump the brakes on resource consumption and waste emissions if we are to exist within local and global sustainable limits. They must pump the brakes, in other words, on the economy.


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Vídeomensagem de Brian Czech explicando o conceito Trophic Theory of Money

quinta-feira, 2 de abril de 2026

Jason Hickel: “Os ricos estão a conduzir-nos para a destruição e não se importam”


Learn more about Jason Hickel and his work.
Check out Global Inequality to view Jason’s recent project (created in collaboration with a team of fellow researchers) which visualizes data and research on global inequality.

O Colapso Anunciado e a Ilusão do Crescimento
Na sua intervenção, Jason Hickel apresenta uma crítica mordaz à estrutura do capitalismo contemporâneo. O argumento central é que vivemos num sistema que exige o crescimento infinito do PIB para manter a estabilidade social e financeira. No entanto, Hickel recorda que vivemos num planeta com limites biofísicos finitos. Para o antropólogo, a ideia de que podemos continuar a crescer economicamente enquanto "desligamos" esse crescimento do impacto ambiental — o chamado "Crescimento Verde" — não passa de uma fantasia perigosa.

A Responsabilidade da Classe Alta
O título da entrevista, que refere que "os ricos não se importam", prende-se com a análise da pegada ecológica das elites. Hickel argumenta que a classe ultra-rica e as grandes corporações são os principais motores da destruição, não apenas pelo seu consumo ostensivo (como jatos privados), mas sobretudo pelo controlo que exercem sobre os investimentos e a política. Ele defende que este grupo continua a investir na expansão de combustíveis fósseis e na extração de recursos porque o lucro imediato sobrepõe-se à sobrevivência civilizacional a longo prazo.

O Decrescimento como Solução
A alternativa proposta por Hickel é o Decrescimento. Ao contrário do senso comum, ele esclarece que o decrescimento não é uma recessão (que é um colapso caótico de uma economia dependente de crescimento). O decrescimento é uma redução planeada do uso de energia e de recursos no Norte Global, com o objetivo de alinhar a economia com os limites do planeta e, simultaneamente, melhorar a vida das pessoas.

As medidas sugeridas passam por:
1. Abolir indústrias inúteis: reduzir setores que não contribuem para o bem-estar humano, como o marketing agressivo, o armamento ou a obsolescência programada.

2.Redistribuição radical: Tributar as grandes fortunas para financiar serviços públicos universais (saúde, educação, transportes).

3.Garantia de Emprego: assegurar que a transição para uma economia menor não gera desemprego, mas sim uma redução da carga horária de trabalho, permitindo mais tempo livre e partilha de tarefas.

A Urgência Política
Hickel conclui que a tecnologia, por si só, não nos salvará. Embora as energias renováveis sejam fundamentais, elas não conseguem substituir a escala atual de consumo material do Norte Global. A solução é, portanto, política e de classe: é necessário retirar o poder de decisão das mãos de uma elite que beneficia com a destruição e democratizar a economia para garantir a sobrevivência da biosfera.
Fonte

segunda-feira, 30 de março de 2026

Earth's Population Has Surpassed The Planet's Capacity



The Earth has already exceeded its ability to support the global population sustainably, with new research warning of increasing pressure on food security, climate stability, and human wellbeing. However, slowing population growth and raising global awareness could still offer humanity some hope.

Published in Environmental Research Letters, the study shows that humans have pushed well beyond the planet’s long-term capacity and that continued growth under current patterns of consumption will intensify environmental and social challenges for communities worldwide.

The research examined more than two centuries of global population data and uncovered a major shift in human population dynamics that began in the mid-twentieth century.

Lead author, Matthew Flinders Professor of Global Ecology Corey Bradshaw, from Flinders University says the trend reveals a clear biological signal that humanity is living far beyond what the Earth can support.

“Earth cannot keep up with the way in which we are using resources. It cannot support even today’s demand without major changes, with our findings showing that we are pushing the planet harder than it can possibly cope,” says Professor Bradshaw from the Global Ecology Laboratory in the College of Science and Engineering.

The researchers, including distinguished Professor Paul Ehrlich who recently passed away, analysed more than two hundred years of global population records and used ecological growth models to track how population size and growth rates have changed over time.

They tested the direction of these trends and compared results across world regions. They also measured how population size has historically aligned with changes in climate, emissions, and the ecological footprint to understand how human numbers cause environmental stress.

The study found that before the 1950s, global population growth actually sped up as human abundance increased. More people meant more innovation, more energy use, and more rapid technological development that supported further expansion.

However, this pattern broke down in the early 1960s when the global growth rate began to fall even as the population continued to rise.

“This shift marked the beginning of what we call ‘a negative demographic phase,” says Professor Bradshaw.

“It means that adding more people no longer translates into faster growth. When we examined this phase, we found the global population is likely to peak somewhere between 11.7 and 12.4 billion people by the late 2060s or 2070s if current trends hold.”

Professor Bradshaw says this upper limit is dangerous and has only been possible to date because human societies have relied on fossil fuels and drained natural resources faster than nature can replace them.

“The truly sustainable population is much lower and closer to what the world supported in the mid-twentieth century. Our calculations show a sustainable global population closer to about 2.5 billion people if everyone were to live within ecological limits and comfortable, economically secure living standards,” he says.

The researchers say the enormous gap between that sustainable number and today’s population of now 8.3 billion highlights the scale of global overconsumption. They argue that this overshoot has been hidden for decades by heavy reliance on fossil fuels, which boosted food production, energy supply, and industry, but also accelerated climate change and pollution.

The study shows a strong link between increasing population size and rising global temperatures, larger ecological footprints, and higher carbon emissions during the negative phase. Total population size explained more variation in these environmental indicators than per-capita consumption.

Professor Bradshaw says this highlights how both human numbers and consumption patterns jointly intensify environmental stress. “Humanity’s current path will push societies into deeper crises unless we make major changes,” he says.

“The planet’s life support systems are already under strain and without rapid shifts in how we use energy, land, and food, billions of people will face increasing instability. Our study shows these limits are not theoretical but unfolding right now.”

The researchers stress that the study does not predict sudden collapse, but instead offers a realistic assessment of the long-term pressures shaping humanity’s future. The consequences of overshooting Earth’s ‘biocapacity’ include stronger climate impacts, declining biodiversity, reduced food and water security, and widening inequality.

Professor Bradshaw says society must rethink how it uses land, water, energy, and materials if future generations are to live safe and stable lives.

“Smaller populations with lower consumption create better outcomes for both people and the planet,” he says. “The window to act is narrowing, but meaningful change is still achievable if nations work together.”

The team hopes the findings encourage governments, organisations, and communities to plan for the long term, recognise Earth’s environmental limits, and focus on strategies that reduce consumption, stabilise population, and protect natural systems.

“The choices we make over the coming decades will determine the wellbeing of future generations and the resilience of the natural world that supports all life,” concludes Professor Bradshaw.

Acknowledgements:

The Kids Research Institute Australia and Population Matters supported various aspects of the project.

The paper, ‘‘Global human population has surpassed Earth’s sustainable carrying capacity’ by Corey J.A. Bradshaw, Melinda A. Judge (University of Western Australia), Daniel T. Blumstein (University of California, USA), Paul R. Ehrlich (Stanford University, USA), Aisha N. Dasgupta (University of Cambridge, UK), Mathis Wackernagel (University of California, USA), Lewis J.Z. Weeda (University of Western Australia) and Peter N. Le Souëf (University of Western Australia) was published in Environmental Research Letters. DOI: 10.1088/1748-9326/ae51aa

terça-feira, 10 de março de 2026

Data centers — a contradição energética da transição digital

Portugal tornou-se, nos últimos anos, um destino apetecível para a instalação de data centers. A localização geográfica, a ligação a cabos submarinos transatlânticos, o clima temperado e os custos energéticos competitivos colocaram o país no mapa dos grandes operadores tecnológicos. Os números são expressivos: estima-se que o setor passe de um contributo de 160 milhões de euros para o PIB em 2024 para mais de 3,7 mil milhões em 2031, com um consumo energético previsto de 8,5 TWh por ano, segundo o estudo Market Outlook Data Centers Portugal 2025, da Portugal DC. Esta semana, a Digital Realty, empresa norte-americana com um valor de mercado superior a 62 mil milhões de dólares, anunciou a sua entrada em Portugal com entrada em operação prevista para 2027. O sinal de que esta vaga está a chegar é inequívoco.

O discurso que acompanha esta expansão é, regra geral, o mesmo: compromissos de carbono zero, garantias de origem renovável, PPAs de energia limpa assinados e relatórios de sustentabilidade elaborados com detalhe. A imagem projetada é a de uma indústria verde, digital e consciente. E essa imagem não é totalmente falsa grandes operadores tecnológicos investem genuinamente em energia renovável. No entanto, o problema é que esse investimento tem um ponto cego de dimensão considerável, e esse ponto cego chama-se continuidade de fornecimento.

Um data center de grande escala consome entre 50 e 500 MW de forma ininterrupta, 24 horas por dia, 365 dias por ano, maioritariamente para refrigeração dos equipamentos. Esta exigência de continuidade torna-o estruturalmente incompatível com a variabilidade das fontes renováveis. Um parque solar produz durante algumas horas por dia. Um parque eólico produz quando o vento sopra. Um data center não para. Nunca. Isso significa que a infraestrutura de rede pública tem de garantir capacidade de fornecimento em qualquer momento, dimensionada para o pico de consumo com redundância absoluta, isto independentemente de quantos PPAs o operador tenha assinado. Os acordos de compra de energia renovável não dispensam o reforço das redes de transporte e distribuição. E esse reforço implica infraestrutura adicional, mais cabos, mais subestações, mais capacidade de geração de reserva. Parte desta capacidade de reserva é ainda hoje assegurada por fontes convencionais. Este é o verdadeiro desafio de planeamento que o crescimento dos data centers coloca à REN e à E-Redes, e é um desafio que raramente aparece nas páginas de sustentabilidade dos operadores.

A questão não é, portanto, se os data centers usam energia renovável. Muitos usam, ou compram certificados que o atestam. A questão é se a renovável que financiam é adicionada ao sistema, ou se apenas é contabilizada em relatórios enquanto o consumo real aumenta a pressão sobre uma rede que ainda depende parcialmente de combustíveis fósseis para garantir segurança de abastecimento. Há uma diferença enorme entre um PPA assinado algures na Península Ibérica e um parque solar ou eólico novo, construído em Portugal, a alimentar diretamente a carga de um data center. Só o segundo representa uma âncora verde real. O primeiro é, em grande medida, declaratória.

Faria sentido que a E-Redes condicionasse a aprovação de novos pedidos de ligação de grande consumo à apresentação de um plano concreto de instalação de capacidade renovável dedicada. Não para bloquear o crescimento do setor, mas para garantir que esse crescimento tem uma correspondência real no sistema energético e não apenas nos relatórios anuais. Existem precedentes. Nos Estados Unidos, a Federal Energy Regulatory Commission introduziu o conceito de “Bring Your Own Generation” (BYOG), que levou os grandes hyperscalers a assumir o compromisso formal de trazerem a sua própria capacidade de geração. Na Irlanda, foi mais longe ainda: os novos data centers têm de garantir que uma parte significativa da energia consumida provém de renovável nova, desenvolvida no país. O data center deixa de ser apenas um consumidor e passa a ser parte da solução para a transição energética.

Existem duas consequências desta equação energética que merecem atenção redobrada da comunidade ambiental, precisamente porque surgem envoltas em argumentos aparentemente razoáveis.

A primeira é o regresso silencioso do debate nuclear. A tendência já é observável nos EUA, onde a Microsoft reativou a central de Three Mile Island encerrada em 2019, através de um contrato de 20 anos exclusivamente para alimentar os seus data centers. Google e Amazon seguiram com investimentos em reatores modulares de nova geração. A necessidade de geração despachável, energia que se liga e desliga conforme a procura, ao contrário do solar e do eólico (é um dos argumentos centrais que os defensores do nuclear têm utilizado para reabrir a discussão em Portugal). Os data centers são, neste contexto, o catalisador perfeito: uma carga enorme, contínua e previsível, que justificaria a estabilidade de base que o nuclear promete oferecer. O argumento tem uma lógica técnica própria, e seria desonesto ignorá-la por completo. Mas é também um argumento que merece escrutínio ambiental sério, sobre a possibilidade, se quer, de algum município aceitar na sua zona uma central nuclear, sobre custos reais, prazos de construção, gestão de resíduos e o que representa face a um sistema renovável bem desenhado com armazenamento. O que não pode acontecer é que a procura dos data centers se torne, por omissão regulatória, o pretexto para decisões energéticas estruturais que o país não debateu adequadamente.

A segunda é a pressão crescente sobre o território para instalar renovável em grande escala. Alimentar um único data center de 200 MW de forma contínua exigiria cerca de 400 ha de painéis solares. A resposta ao modelo BYOG e às exigências de fontes renováveis próprias tende a traduzir-se em projetos de grande dimensão, com decisões de localização condicionadas pela escala dos contratos e não necessariamente pela melhor integração territorial disponível. Em Portugal, onde o licenciamento de grandes infraestruturas energéticas já enfrenta contestação crescente, esta pressão adicional sobre o território é uma variável que os próprios promotores de data centers raramente incorporam nas suas projeções. A procura dos data centers não cria apenas um desafio para a rede elétrica, cria também uma pressão sobre o pipeline de projetos renováveis que o país terá de gerir com critério.

A digitalização da economia é um processo irreversível e, em muitos aspetos, positivo para a descarbonização de outros setores. Mas não é, por si mesma, sinónimo de sustentabilidade energética. Os data centers que chegam a Portugal trazem capital, emprego qualificado e capacidade computacional. Trazem também uma pegada energética considerável que o sistema elétrico nacional terá de suportar. A questão não é se os queremos cá. É se vamos exigir que a sua presença contribua genuinamente para a transição energética ou se nos contentamos com a narrativa verde enquanto a conta ambiental fica, silenciosamente, por pagar.

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