Philip Pilkington - O colapso do liberalismo global e ideias um pouco polémicas

No livro The Collapse of Global Liberalism (O Colapso do Liberalismo Global), o economista Philip Pilkington apresenta uma análise contundente sobre o declínio terminal da ordem liberal internacional, o sistema de cooperação política e comércio global liderado pelo Ocidente desde o pós-Segunda Guerra Mundial. A sua tese central baseia-se na ideia de que o "globalismo" não foi meramente um fenómeno económico de eficiência de mercados, mas sim um projeto ideológico falhado que pressupunha uma convergência universal para os valores da democracia liberal e do livre mercado. Pilkington argumenta que potências como a China e a Rússia demonstraram a fragilidade desta premissa ao integrarem-se na economia mundial sem abdicarem dos seus próprios modelos políticos e sociais, desmentindo a inevitabilidade da hegemonia ocidental.
Um dos pontos mais críticos da obra foca-se na desindustrialização do Ocidente. O autor sustenta que a busca desenfreada por lucros de curto prazo e eficiência logística impulsionou o offshoring, transferindo a base manufatureira para o exterior e criando uma dependência estratégica perigosa de rivais geopolíticos. Este processo não só enfraqueceu a segurança nacional das nações ocidentais, como também devastou a classe trabalhadora doméstica, servindo de combustível para a instabilidade política interna e para a ascensão de movimentos populistas. Paralelamente, Pilkington destaca a crise energética e de recursos, sublinhando que a prosperidade liberal dependia de energia barata e fluxos estáveis. Com a atual fragmentação geopolítica e os desafios da transição energética, o controlo do poder real deslocou-se para os países que detêm a produção física e os recursos naturais, deixando o Ocidente vulnerável na sua segurança material.
Para o economista, estamos a assistir ao fim da era do "idealismo liberal" e ao nascimento de um mundo dominado pelo "realismo geoeconómico". Neste novo paradigma, o comércio internacional deixa de ser visto como um instrumento de paz universal para ser utilizado como uma arma política, o que levará inevitavelmente à formação de blocos regionais fechados em detrimento de um mercado global único. Pilkington dirige ainda duras críticas às elites tecnocráticas ocidentais, acusando-as de estarem desconectadas da realidade material e de insistirem em estruturas obsoletas que apenas aceleram o colapso. Em última análise, o autor não prevê necessariamente o fim da civilização ocidental, mas sim o fim da ilusão do seu domínio global indefinido, defendendo que a sobrevivência nesta nova era de fragmentação exige um retorno pragmático à soberania nacional, à reindustrialização e à garantia da segurança material de cada Estado.

Minha análiseA tensão atual no liberalismo revela-se profunda quando confrontamos os ideais humanistas com a crueza da nova realidade geoeconómica. Para um liberal que se revê no Manifesto de Oxford, o cenário descrito por Philip Pilkington assemelha-se a um verdadeiro pesadelo, pois a fragmentação do mundo em blocos fechados e protecionistas coloca em causa a promessa fundamental de que cada indivíduo possa decidir o seu próprio rumo. Se a análise de Pilkington estiver correta, a mobilidade humana será drasticamente reduzida por fronteiras mais rígidas e o custo de vida sofrerá um agravamento inevitável, uma vez que o fim da eficiência global retira poder de compra às famílias, limitando as suas opções de vida reais e tangíveis.
Neste contexto, assistimos também a um crescimento perigoso do papel do Estado. Para garantir a reindustrialização e a segurança material exigidas pela soberania, o poder público tende a tornar-se cada vez mais interventivo, o que frequentemente resulta no atropelo da iniciativa privada e da autonomia individual. Ao admitir que Pilkington tem razão no seu diagnóstico do colapso, mas mantendo a fidelidade aos princípios de Oxford, o liberal contemporâneo mergulha num dilema intelectual fascinante: é o reconhecimento de que, embora o ideal de liberdade seja o destino desejado, a realidade material está a destruir a estrada que a ele nos deveria conduzir.
A questão crucial que agora se coloca é como salvar o espírito do Manifesto de Oxford num mundo que parece ter deixado de acreditar na cooperação global. O grande desafio passa por encontrar formas de preservar a dignidade e a liberdade da pessoa humana num ambiente que privilegia a segurança física e o poder estatal em detrimento da liberdade individual. Resta saber se o liberalismo terá a agilidade necessária para se reinventar, garantindo que o indivíduo não se torne um mero peão nas disputas geoeconómicas de uma nova era de fragmentação.

What use is NATO, anyway?

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As the Trump administration brings the war in Ukraine to a close, members of the NATO alliance are going to start asking some tough questions. Ukraine itself was never in NATO, of course—indeed, the war was in part fought over the question of Ukraine joining the alliance. Nevertheless, many NATO members, especially in Eastern Europe, came to view the conflict as a test of NATO’s resilience, and although they will be reluctant to admit it publicly for some time, NATO failed that test.

Within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), NATO effectively had a highly capable proxy military. Although the AFU was unable to defeat the Russian armed forces, it was not for lack of effort: no one doubts the determination and bravery of Ukrainian troops. Europe and the United States supplied the AFU with as many armaments as they were able to provide. This support meant that, at least in the short run and absent mass conscription or a conversion of European industry to a full war footing—if such a conversion were even possible—the AFU came close to representing the strongest army NATO could field in the European theatre. Even so, this army ultimately failed to achieve victory, and it is only a matter of time before NATO members are forced to confront this reality.

On top of this, evidence is starting to emerge that the United States is getting tired of the alliance. NATO-scepticism has been growing in America since Trump first ran for President in 2016. Then candidate Trump famously told The New York Times in March 2016 that he thought NATO was obsolete because it had been designed to counter the threat of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union no longer existed. Since 2016, this stance seems to have become close to official policy in the United States. Recently Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said that America would not send troops if Europe got involved in a conflict with Russia but it would be open to selling the Europeans weapons. Does this mean that NATO is de facto already dead? Probably.

‘NATO-scepticism has been growing in America since Trump first ran for President in 2016’

Throughout Trump’s first term Russiagate kept the Democrats interested in NATO and provided a bulwark against Trump’s own instincts regarding the alliance. One could argue that the politics of Russiagate played a very large role in the outbreak of the war in Ukraine under a Biden administration that was riven with paranoia and hostility toward Russia. But in Trump’s second term, there is far less interest in Russia or NATO amongst the Democrats. Russiagate is yesterday’s news, the Democrats have found a much juicer scandal in the drama surrounding the so-called Epstein files. When we look at some of the potential presidential candidates for the 2028 election amongst the Democrats we find few, if any statements on NATO. All this suggests that the American political class have lost interest in the European theatre.

Then there are the developments in weapons technologies. When the alliance was formed, and even when it was consolidated and expanded after the end of the Cold War, NATO’s standardization of weapons platforms across the alliance was uncontroversial. While this standardization obviously favoured the defence firms of some countries over others—and after the collapse of the Soviet Union it de facto banished most Soviet-era weaponry from militaries in the alliance—it did not seem like a particularly bad deal. After all, the weapons being produced by defence firms within the alliance were thought to be the best in the world.

In the wake of the war in Ukraine, many are starting to question these assumptions. The ‘cutting edge’ NATO technology is no longer looking very cutting edge in the face of drone warfare and the active use of hypersonic missiles by Russia—missiles that no NATO country possesses. The extremely expensive tanks that NATO countries produced fared no better or no worse than the much cheaper tanks that Russia produces or even the old Soviet-era tanks that Ukraine still had in its stockpiles. Perhaps, after all, tanks really are just large pieces of metal on tracks with a gun attached and trying to turn them into anything else is just a waste of time and money.

If the Ukraine war raised doubts about NATO military technologies, recent developments in China have started to create panic. The recent Chinese 2025 Victory Day Parade in September 2025 showed the world that the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) now has access to technologies that are out of the reach of NATO members. But while the technological developments are interesting, what is far more interesting is the cost. China has become famous for producing technology that used to be produced in the West at a fraction of the price. It should have been obvious that eventually the Chinese would apply these tried and tested manufacturing techniques to weaponry.

‘If the Ukraine war raised doubts about NATO military technologies, recent developments in China have started to create panic’

Recently a private firm in China unveiled the YKJ-1000, a hypersonic missile that some speculate can be produced for less than $100,000. It is hard to convey how much of a game-changer this technology could prove to be. These missiles are difficult, if not impossible, for air defence to intercept. The YKJ-1000 comes nestled in a launcher that looks identical to a standard shipping container, meaning that they could be transported without detection from overhead satellite or drone reconnaissance. The price tag puts them in reach not just of any state actor, no matter how small or poor, but even non-state actors or semi-state actors. An anti-shipping version of the YKJ-1000 could render American naval power projection largely obsolete as aircraft carriers might be threatened by these missiles if they parked off the coast of a country that possessed them.

If non-NATO countries start to purchase this new, low-cost technology, what will NATO countries think? Inevitably they will start to see NATO as constraining them in their capacity to defend themselves. Unless countries in NATO can produce these new weapons at similar cost—which is highly unlikely - the alliance will trap its members into a situation where they are buying overpriced, outdated weaponry while their rivals buy cheap, modern weaponry. This could actively undermine the ability of NATO member to defend themselves.

All of this suggests that NATO in its current form is not long left for this world. At just about every level, the alliance does not make sense anymore. It might hobble along for another few years. But as time goes on, all its members will start to lose interest. Can it be reformed? Possibly, but no one has provided a credible plan to reform it. Unless NATO can produce a credible plan to remain relevant in a world that is changing dramatically—geopolitically and technologically—it risks falling apart under the weight of its own irrelevance.