Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Corey Bradshaw. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Corey Bradshaw. Mostrar todas as mensagens

sábado, 11 de julho de 2026

No Mundial da População - Os Custos Horríveis da Negação Populacional



Neste Podcast  intitulado "The Ghastly Costs of Population Denial by Corey Bradshaw", aborda as crises ecológicas e sociais profundamente interligadas que a humanidade enfrenta devido ao crescimento populacional e ao consumo excessivo, com um foco central na forma como a negação da superpopulação foi assimilada pela academia e pela política.

Ao longo da entrevista, o ecologista Corey Bradshaw faz uma análise detalhada da saúde dos ecossistemas planetários, explicando que a degradação ambiental se manifesta pela perda generalizada de habitats, pela desflorestação agressiva - exemplificada pela perda de vegetação na Austrália e o impacto direto nos coalas - e pela proliferação de espécies invasoras trazidas pela atividade humana. No que respeita à discussão sobre a Sexta Extinção em Massa, Bradshaw esclarece que, embora as taxas atuais de extinção sejam centenas de vezes superiores às taxas de fundo naturais, a confirmação empírica do limiar formal de 75% de perda de espécies poderá demorar milhares de anos a computar, em grande parte porque a ciência ainda nem sequer catalogou a maioria dos organismos da Terra.

No tocante aos limites biológicos do planeta, Bradshaw e os seus colaboradores concluem que a capacidade de carga sustentável da Terra a longo prazo ronda os 2,5 mil milhões de pessoas. Este valor permitiria garantir um nível de vida saudável e com equidade sem esgotar os recursos regenerativos globais. Para reforçar esta tese, o ecologista desmistifica a narrativa económica dominante - partilhada tanto por setores conservadores como progressistas - de que a queda na taxa de fertilidade e o envelhecimento populacional conduzem inevitavelmente a um colapso financeiro. Acompanhado por economistas, Bradshaw analisou séries temporais e indicadores de riqueza em mais de uma centena de países, demonstrando que não existe qualquer evidência empírica de que populações em declínio ou mais velhas percam produtividade ou qualidade de vida; pelo contrário, os países com crescimento populacional mais lento e estruturas etárias mais maduras registam índices superiores de bem-estar e desenvolvimento.

Esta resistência em aceitar os limites populacionais é atribuída por Bradshaw a uma captura ideológica promovida pelo mundo corporativo, que depende do aumento contínuo de consumidores para sustentar margens de lucro no mercado de ações. Em vez de prever um cenário de apocalipse violento e instantâneo ao estilo cinematográfico, o ecologista define o "Futuro Horrível" (Ghastly Future) como um declínio gradual, contínuo e doloroso da qualidade de vida, marcado por maiores choques climáticos, escassez de recursos e crises de refugiados. Posicionando-se como um "pessimista otimista", assume abertamente o desgaste emocional e a depressão decorrentes da sua investigação, encarando o seu trabalho não com a ambição irrealista de salvar o mundo, mas com a missão diária de tornar o futuro menos penoso para as próximas gerações. Bradshaw sublinha ainda que recusar debater a superpopulação sob o pretexto da justiça social constitui um ato de profunda arrogância: essa omissão prejudica prioritariamente as populações mais vulneráveis dos países em desenvolvimento e acaba, na prática, por perpetuar estruturas patriarcais que limitam a autonomia reprodutiva e o poder de decisão das mulheres à escala global.

Artigos mencionados neste podcast

quinta-feira, 16 de abril de 2026

Measuring Ecological Limits: The United States and the World


The science is clear: Our rate of economic activity is having disastrous impacts on the environment, starting with the climate so crucial to our survival. Economic activities require the use of natural resources and systematically entail pollution. Resources eventually get used up, as does the capacity of the planet to assimilate waste. We are reminded of Herman Daly’s long-running emphasis that the economy is a subsystem of the environment, not the other way around.

Expanding on this, steady-state economists and other post-growth advocates argue that economic growth cannot be decoupled from material throughput. This can be explained with the trophic theory of money, which follows from the trophic structure of the economy of nature. Agriculture and extraction comprise the trophic foundation of the economy, and all other sectors rely on that trophic base. Therefore, we cannot rely on “dematerialized” sectors to grow the economy while decreasing its disastrous impacts on the environment.

Therefore, consumption must be reduced, particularly in high-income countries that consume more natural resources and release more waste. But just how much do high-income countries need to reduce their economic activity to be sustainable? Two metrics help us understand sustainable limits by quantifying the relationship between the environment and the economy: ecological footprint and biocapacity.

The Conceptual Framing of Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity
The ecological footprint is a measure of the area needed to support the demands of economic activity. Biocapacity is a measure of the area available to supply natural resources and absorb waste at a sustainable rate. When the ecological footprint exceeds biocapacity, that indicates ecological overshoot. The Ecological Footprint Initiative has been measuring global ecological footprint and biocapacity since 1961. We have been in overshoot since 1971.

The ecological footprint and biocapacity are made up of comparable components, including cropland, grazing land, forest land, fishing grounds, and built-up land. In addition, ecological footprint includes a carbon component.

Scientists measure ecological footprint and biocapacity with a unit called the global hectare. They convert the productivity of different ecosystems to global hectares based on the world average productivity of a hectare. This enables comparisons between different land types, places, and years.
Ecological Footprint and Biocapacity of the United States

The United States has a high ecological footprint that is larger than its biocapacity. In 2022, there were roughly one billion hectares across the United States. When categorized into the biocapacity components and compared to global average productivity, this equates to 1.25 billion global hectares (gha) of biocapacity.

In other words, U.S. land, most notably cropland and forest land, was more productive than the global average. The average biocapacity of one hectare of U.S. cropland was 3.7 gha. One hectare of forest land provided an average of 1.6 gha of forest land biocapacity. However, this above-average biocapacity of cropland and forest land does not indicate sustainability. The country’s total ecological footprint is far higher than its total biocapacity.

In 2022, the U.S. ecological footprint of production was over 2.5 billion gha. This was similar to the ecological footprint of consumption, because the footprints of imports and exports were nearly equal. However, there were differences among the footprint components of imports and exports. The carbon component was more prominent in the ecological footprint of imports, whereas the cropland component was more prominent in exports. This means the United States imported more carbon-intensive goods and services than it exported, and exported more cropland-intensive harvests than it imported.
U.S. Trends: Better or Worse?

One good sign is that total U.S. biocapacity has been increasing over time. In 1961, total biocapacity was just over 1 billion gha, and by 2024, biocapacity had grown to 1.3 billion gha (2023 and 2024 data were forecasted).1 This is because of increases in agricultural productivity. Biocapacity is a measure of what the environment can provide for human use, not of biodiversity or ecosystem health. In fact, it has a negative correlation with biodiversity indicators. Cropland illustrates this tension well, as using fertilizers and chemicals can increase agricultural productivity at the expense of ecosystem health.

The U.S. population has also been increasing over time, which has decreased biocapacity per person. In 1961 biocapacity was 5.7 gha/person, and in 2022 was 3.8 gha/person.

Meanwhile, the U.S. ecological footprint of consumption has been increasing. In 1961 it was 1.6 billion gha, and by 2024 it reached 2.5 billion gha. Counteracting that increase to some degree is the per-person ecological footprint of consumption, which has decreased in recent years. In 1961, it was 8.9 gha/person, and in 2022, it was 7.9 gha/person. Although this is not a huge reduction, it provides a glimmer of hope that the country can reduce its footprint per person to offset population growth. However, it would need a very sizeable reduction to retreat to the safe operating space of its biocapacity.

In summary, the best available ecological footprint and biocapacity science reveals that the United States is exceeding a sustainable level of resource use for the production and consumption of goods and services. In 2022, the ecological footprint of consumption was 7.9 gha/person, and biocapacity was 3.8 gha/person. Ecological footprint is more than double biocapacity, meaning that economic activity is (over) two times the amount the United States can sustain. And with its outsized carbon footprint, the American economy is impacting the biocapacity of ecosystems on Earth.
Diving Into the Footprint Details

The carbon component makes up 64 percent of the ecological footprint embodied in the consumption of goods and services in the United States. Almost all of this carbon component (95 percent) comes from fossil fuel emissions. The largest share of these emissions (37 percent) comes from transport, of which road transport constitutes the majority. The next-largest share of U.S. carbon emissions (34 percent) comes from public and private utility companies producing electricity and heat for sale to third parties.

For many people, these details highlight the importance of decarbonizing electricity and heat generation and shifting transportation to less emissions-intensive modalities, such as rail. However, the emissions reductions needed to bring the United States back within its biocapacity are so immense that “green” alternatives aren’t sufficient. Americans must also reduce consumption of electricity and heat, as well as the distance they travel, because “green growth” is not possible.

In 2022, cropland made up 18 percent of the U.S. ecological footprint of consumption. Of the cropland ecological footprint, 84 percent was used for crops consumed by people and pets, 15 percent was used to feed livestock, and less than 0.5 percent was used to feed fish. Almost 700 million metric tons of crops were harvested, and just over half was maize. The second most harvested crop was soybeans at 17 percent of total harvests.

Yet the proportion of ecological impact does not equal the proportion of total harvests. For instance, maize made up 52 percent of crop harvests (metric tons) and 43 percent of the cropland ecological footprint of production (gha) in 2022. On the other hand, soybeans accounted for 17 percent of harvests (metric tons) and 32 percent of cropland ecological footprint of production (gha). Therefore, soybeans had almost double the ecological impact per metric ton of harvest in the United States.
The United States in the Global Context

The United States consumes far more than its share of the Earth’s natural resources. The global average ecological footprint of consumption was 2.7 gha/person in 2022. The United States crushed that benchmark at 7.9 gha/person. The average U.S. citizen consumed resources at almost three times the rate of the average global citizen.

Here’s another way of thinking about this: The United States is responsible for twelve percent of the world’s ecological footprint of consumption. Yet the U.S. population only amounts to four percent of the world population. This represents a highly disproportionate environmental impact.

The U.S. ecological footprint per person is even higher than that of most other high-income countries. The average ecological footprint of consumption in high-income countries is 6.1 gha/person.

There are important debates about best practices for presenting ecological footprint and biocapacity data. Often, the ecological footprint of a territory is compared to the biocapacity of that territory. For example, U.S. ecological footprint is compared to U.S. biocapacity. This implies that a country achieves sustainability if its ecological footprint is lower than its biocapacity.

Many criticize this approach as an unfair representation of sustainability, because some countries are blessed with exceptionally high biocapacity. For instance, in 2022, the ecological footprint in Canada was 8.4 gha/person, and the biocapacity was 14.4 gha/person. Canada’s biocapacity was clearly higher than its ecological footprint. However, its ecological footprint per person was in the top ten highest in the world. Therefore, perhaps it is also important to compare a country’s ecological footprint to world average biocapacity (global ecological balance) in addition to the country’s biocapacity (local ecological balance).

In 2022, global biocapacity was 1.5 gha/person, significantly lower than the U.S. ecological footprint of 7.9 gha/person. In other words, U.S. citizens consume resources and emit carbon at five times the global average sustainable rate.

Ecological footprint and biocapacity data illustrate that we are using natural resources and releasing waste at unsustainable rates, in the United States and around the world. It shows that this has been happening for decades. The United States and other high-income countries are disproportionately responsible for this state of overshoot. They must pump the brakes on resource consumption and waste emissions if we are to exist within local and global sustainable limits. They must pump the brakes, in other words, on the economy.


Saber mais: 
Vídeomensagem de Brian Czech explicando o conceito Trophic Theory of Money

segunda-feira, 30 de março de 2026

Earth's Population Has Surpassed The Planet's Capacity



The Earth has already exceeded its ability to support the global population sustainably, with new research warning of increasing pressure on food security, climate stability, and human wellbeing. However, slowing population growth and raising global awareness could still offer humanity some hope.

Published in Environmental Research Letters, the study shows that humans have pushed well beyond the planet’s long-term capacity and that continued growth under current patterns of consumption will intensify environmental and social challenges for communities worldwide.

The research examined more than two centuries of global population data and uncovered a major shift in human population dynamics that began in the mid-twentieth century.

Lead author, Matthew Flinders Professor of Global Ecology Corey Bradshaw, from Flinders University says the trend reveals a clear biological signal that humanity is living far beyond what the Earth can support.

“Earth cannot keep up with the way in which we are using resources. It cannot support even today’s demand without major changes, with our findings showing that we are pushing the planet harder than it can possibly cope,” says Professor Bradshaw from the Global Ecology Laboratory in the College of Science and Engineering.

The researchers, including distinguished Professor Paul Ehrlich who recently passed away, analysed more than two hundred years of global population records and used ecological growth models to track how population size and growth rates have changed over time.

They tested the direction of these trends and compared results across world regions. They also measured how population size has historically aligned with changes in climate, emissions, and the ecological footprint to understand how human numbers cause environmental stress.

The study found that before the 1950s, global population growth actually sped up as human abundance increased. More people meant more innovation, more energy use, and more rapid technological development that supported further expansion.

However, this pattern broke down in the early 1960s when the global growth rate began to fall even as the population continued to rise.

“This shift marked the beginning of what we call ‘a negative demographic phase,” says Professor Bradshaw.

“It means that adding more people no longer translates into faster growth. When we examined this phase, we found the global population is likely to peak somewhere between 11.7 and 12.4 billion people by the late 2060s or 2070s if current trends hold.”

Professor Bradshaw says this upper limit is dangerous and has only been possible to date because human societies have relied on fossil fuels and drained natural resources faster than nature can replace them.

“The truly sustainable population is much lower and closer to what the world supported in the mid-twentieth century. Our calculations show a sustainable global population closer to about 2.5 billion people if everyone were to live within ecological limits and comfortable, economically secure living standards,” he says.

The researchers say the enormous gap between that sustainable number and today’s population of now 8.3 billion highlights the scale of global overconsumption. They argue that this overshoot has been hidden for decades by heavy reliance on fossil fuels, which boosted food production, energy supply, and industry, but also accelerated climate change and pollution.

The study shows a strong link between increasing population size and rising global temperatures, larger ecological footprints, and higher carbon emissions during the negative phase. Total population size explained more variation in these environmental indicators than per-capita consumption.

Professor Bradshaw says this highlights how both human numbers and consumption patterns jointly intensify environmental stress. “Humanity’s current path will push societies into deeper crises unless we make major changes,” he says.

“The planet’s life support systems are already under strain and without rapid shifts in how we use energy, land, and food, billions of people will face increasing instability. Our study shows these limits are not theoretical but unfolding right now.”

The researchers stress that the study does not predict sudden collapse, but instead offers a realistic assessment of the long-term pressures shaping humanity’s future. The consequences of overshooting Earth’s ‘biocapacity’ include stronger climate impacts, declining biodiversity, reduced food and water security, and widening inequality.

Professor Bradshaw says society must rethink how it uses land, water, energy, and materials if future generations are to live safe and stable lives.

“Smaller populations with lower consumption create better outcomes for both people and the planet,” he says. “The window to act is narrowing, but meaningful change is still achievable if nations work together.”

The team hopes the findings encourage governments, organisations, and communities to plan for the long term, recognise Earth’s environmental limits, and focus on strategies that reduce consumption, stabilise population, and protect natural systems.

“The choices we make over the coming decades will determine the wellbeing of future generations and the resilience of the natural world that supports all life,” concludes Professor Bradshaw.

Acknowledgements:

The Kids Research Institute Australia and Population Matters supported various aspects of the project.

The paper, ‘‘Global human population has surpassed Earth’s sustainable carrying capacity’ by Corey J.A. Bradshaw, Melinda A. Judge (University of Western Australia), Daniel T. Blumstein (University of California, USA), Paul R. Ehrlich (Stanford University, USA), Aisha N. Dasgupta (University of Cambridge, UK), Mathis Wackernagel (University of California, USA), Lewis J.Z. Weeda (University of Western Australia) and Peter N. Le Souëf (University of Western Australia) was published in Environmental Research Letters. DOI: 10.1088/1748-9326/ae51aa

domingo, 18 de julho de 2021

Underestimating the Challenges of Avoiding a Ghastly Future - Subestimando os Desafios de Evitar um Futuro Medonho


Summary of major environmental-change categories expressed as a percentage change relative to the baseline given in the text. Red indicates the percentage of the category that is damaged, lost, or otherwise affected, whereas blue indicates the percentage that is intact, remaining, or otherwise unaffected.

We report three major and confronting environmental issues that have received little attention and require urgent action. First, we review the evidence that future environmental conditions will be far more dangerous than currently believed. The scale of the threats to the biosphere and all its lifeforms—including humanity—is in fact so great that it is difficult to grasp for even well-informed experts. Second, we ask what political or economic system, or leadership, is prepared to handle the predicted disasters, or even capable of such action. Third, this dire situation places an extraordinary responsibility on scientists to speak out candidly and accurately when engaging with government, business, and the public. We especially draw attention to the lack of appreciation of the enormous challenges to creating a sustainable future. The added stresses to human health, wealth, and well-being will perversely diminish our political capacity to mitigate the erosion of ecosystem services on which society depends. The science underlying these issues is strong, but awareness is weak. Without fully appreciating and broadcasting the scale of the problems and the enormity of the solutions required, society will fail to achieve even modest sustainability goals.

Introduction
Humanity is causing a rapid loss of biodiversity and, with it, Earth's ability to support complex life. But the mainstream is having difficulty grasping the magnitude of this loss, despite the steady erosion of the fabric of human civilization (Ceballos et al., 2015; IPBES, 2019; Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020; WWF, 2020). While suggested solutions abound (Díaz et al., 2019), the current scale of their implementation does not match the relentless progression of biodiversity loss (Cumming et al., 2006) and other existential threats tied to the continuous expansion of the human enterprise (Rees, 2020). Time delays between ecological deterioration and socio-economic penalties, as with climate disruption for example (IPCC, 2014), impede recognition of the magnitude of the challenge and timely counteraction needed. In addition, disciplinary specialization and insularity encourage unfamiliarity with the complex adaptive systems (Levin, 1999) in which problems and their potential solutions are embedded (Selby, 2006; Brand and Karvonen, 2007). Widespread ignorance of human behavior (Van Bavel et al., 2020) and the incremental nature of socio-political processes that plan and implement solutions further delay effective action (Shanley and López, 2009; King, 2016).

We summarize the state of the natural world in stark form here to help clarify the gravity of the human predicament. We also outline likely future trends in biodiversity decline (Díaz et al., 2019), climate disruption (Ripple et al., 2020), and human consumption and population growth to demonstrate the near certainty that these problems will worsen over the coming decades, with negative impacts for centuries to come. Finally, we discuss the ineffectiveness of current and planned actions that are attempting to address the ominous erosion of Earth's life-support system. Ours is not a call to surrender—we aim to provide leaders with a realistic “cold shower” of the state of the planet that is essential for planning to avoid a ghastly future.

Biodiversity Loss
Major changes in the biosphere are directly linked to the growth of human systems (summarized in Figure 1). While the rapid loss of species and populations differs regionally in intensity (Ceballos et al., 2015, 2017, 2020; Díaz et al., 2019), and most species have not been adequately assessed for extinction risk (Webb and Mindel, 2015), certain global trends are obvious. Since the start of agriculture around 11,000 years ago, the biomass of terrestrial vegetation has been halved (Erb et al., 2018), with a corresponding loss of >20% of its original biodiversity (Díaz et al., 2019), together denoting that >70% of the Earth's land surface has been altered by Homo sapiens (IPBES, 2019). There have been >700 documented vertebrate (Díaz et al., 2019) and ~600 plant (Humphreys et al., 2019) species extinctions over the past 500 years, with many more species clearly having gone extinct unrecorded (Tedesco et al., 2014). Population sizes of vertebrate species that have been monitored across years have declined by an average of 68% over the last five decades (WWF, 2020), with certain population clusters in extreme decline (Leung et al., 2020), thus presaging the imminent extinction of their species (Ceballos et al., 2020). Overall, perhaps 1 million species are threatened with extinction in the near future out of an estimated 7–10 million eukaryotic species on the planet (Mora et al., 2011), with around 40% of plants alone considered endangered (Antonelli et al., 2020). Today, the global biomass of wild mammals is <25% of that estimated for the Late Pleistocene (Bar-On et al., 2018), while insects are also disappearing rapidly in many regions (Wagner, 2020; reviews in van Klink et al., 2020).

Freshwater and marine environments have also been severely damaged. Today there is <15% of the original wetland area globally than was present 300 years ago (Davidson, 2014), and >75% of rivers >1,000 km long no longer flow freely along their entire course (Grill et al., 2019). More than two-thirds of the oceans have been compromised to some extent by human activities (Halpern et al., 2015), live coral cover on reefs has halved in <200 years (Frieler et al., 2013), seagrass extent has been decreasing by 10% per decade over the last century (Waycott et al., 2009; Díaz et al., 2019), kelp forests have declined by ~40% (Krumhansl et al., 2016), and the biomass of large predatory fishes is now <33% of what it was last century (Christensen et al., 2014).

With such a rapid, catastrophic loss of biodiversity, the ecosystem services it provides have also declined. These include inter alia reduced carbon sequestration (Heath et al., 2005; Lal, 2008), reduced pollination (Potts et al., 2016), soil degradation (Lal, 2015), poorer water and air quality (Smith et al., 2013), more frequent and intense flooding (Bradshaw et al., 2007; Hinkel et al., 2014) and fires (Boer et al., 2020; Bowman et al., 2020), and compromised human health (Díaz et al., 2006; Bradshaw et al., 2019). As telling indicators of how much biomass humanity has transferred from natural ecosystems to our own use, of the estimated 0.17 Gt of living biomass of terrestrial vertebrates on Earth today, most is represented by livestock (59%) and human beings (36%)—only ~5% of this total biomass is made up by wild mammals, birds, reptiles, and amphibians (Bar-On et al., 2018). As of 2020, the overall material output of human endeavor exceeds the sum of all living biomass on Earth (Elhacham et al., 2020).

Sixth Mass Extinction
A mass extinction is defined as a loss of ~75% of all species on the planet over a geologically short interval—generally anything <3 million years (Jablonski et al., 1994; Barnosky et al., 2011). At least five major extinction events have occurred since the Cambrian (Sodhi et al., 2009), the most recent of them 66 million years ago at the close of the Cretaceous period. The background rate of extinction since then has been 0.1 extinctions million species−1 year−1 (Ceballos et al., 2015), while estimates of today's extinction rate are orders of magnitude greater (Lamkin and Miller, 2016). Recorded vertebrate extinctions since the 16th century—the mere tip of the true extinction iceberg—give a rate of extinction of 1.3 species year−1, which is conservatively >15 times the background rate (Ceballos et al., 2015). The IUCN estimates that some 20% of all species are in danger of extinction over the next few decades, which greatly exceeds the background rate. That we are already on the path of a sixth major extinction is now scientifically undeniable (Barnosky et al., 2011; Ceballos et al., 2015, 2017).

Ecological Overshoot: Population Size and Overconsumption
The global human population has approximately doubled since 1970, reaching nearly 7.8 billion people today (prb.org). While some countries have stopped growing and even declined in size, world average fertility continues to be above replacement (2.3 children woman−1), with an average of 4.8 children woman−1 in Sub-Saharan Africa and fertilities >4 children woman−1 in many other countries (e.g., Afghanistan, Yemen, Timor-Leste). The 1.1 billion people today in Sub-Saharan Africa—a region expected to experience particularly harsh repercussions from climate change (Serdeczny et al., 2017)—is projected to double over the next 30 years. By 2050, the world population will likely grow to ~9.9 billion (prb.org), with growth projected by many to continue until well into the next century (Bradshaw and Brook, 2014; Gerland et al., 2014), although more recent estimates predict a peak toward the end of this century (Vollset et al., 2020).

Large population size and continued growth are implicated in many societal problems. The impact of population growth, combined with an imperfect distribution of resources, leads to massive food insecurity. By some estimates, 700–800 million people are starving and 1–2 billion are micronutrient-malnourished and unable to function fully, with prospects of many more food problems in the near future (Ehrlich and Harte, 2015a,b). Large populations and their continued growth are also drivers of soil degradation and biodiversity loss (Pimm et al., 2014). More people means that more synthetic compounds and dangerous throw-away plastics (Vethaak and Leslie, 2016) are manufactured, many of which add to the growing toxification of the Earth (Cribb, 2014). It also increases chances of pandemics (Daily and Ehrlich, 1996b) that fuel ever-more desperate hunts for scarce resources (Klare, 2012). Population growth is also a factor in many social ills, from crowding and joblessness, to deteriorating infrastructure and bad governance (Harte, 2007). There is mounting evidence that when populations are large and growing fast, they can be the sparks for both internal and international conflicts that lead to war (Klare, 2001; Toon et al., 2007). The multiple, interacting causes of civil war in particular are varied, including poverty, inequality, weak institutions, political grievance, ethnic divisions, and environmental stressors such as drought, deforestation, and land degradation (Homer-Dixon, 1991, 1999; Collier and Hoeer, 1998; Hauge and llingsen, 1998; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Brückner, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2017). Population growth itself can even increase the probability of military involvement in conflicts (Tir and Diehl, 1998). Countries with higher population growth rates experienced more social conflict since the Second World War (Acemoglu et al., 2017). In that study, an approximate doubling of a country's population caused about four additional years of full-blown civil war or low-intensity conflict in the 1980s relative to the 1940–1950s, even after controlling for a country's income-level, independence, and age structure.

Simultaneous with population growth, humanity's consumption as a fraction of Earth's regenerative capacity has grown from ~ 73% in 1960 to 170% in 2016 (Lin et al., 2018), with substantially greater per-person consumption in countries with highest income. With COVID-19, this overshoot dropped to 56% above Earth's regenerative capacity, which means that between January and August 2020, humanity consumed as much as Earth can renew in the entire year (overshootday.org). While inequality among people and countries remains staggering, the global middle class has grown rapidly and exceeded half the human population by 2018 (Kharas and Hamel, 2018). Over 70% of all people currently live in countries that run a biocapacity deficit while also having less than world-average income, excluding them from compensating their biocapacity deficit through purchases (Wackernagel et al., 2019) and eroding future resilience via reduced food security (Ehrlich and Harte, 2015b). The consumption rates of high-income countries continue to be substantially higher than low-income countries, with many of the latter even experiencing declines in per-capita footprint (Dasgupta and Ehrlich, 2013; Wackernagel et al., 2019).

This massive ecological overshoot is largely enabled by the increasing use of fossil fuels. These convenient fuels have allowed us to decouple human demand from biological regeneration: 85% of commercial energy, 65% of fibers, and most plastics are now produced from fossil fuels. Also, food production depends on fossil-fuel input, with every unit of food energy produced requiring a multiple in fossil-fuel energy (e.g., 3 × for high-consuming countries like Canada, Australia, USA, and China; overshootday.org). This, coupled with increasing consumption of carbon-intensive meat (Ripple et al., 2014) congruent with the rising middle class, has exploded the global carbon footprint of agriculture. While climate change demands a full exit from fossil-fuel use well before 2050, pressures on the biosphere are likely to mount prior to decarbonization as humanity brings energy alternatives online. Consumption and biodiversity challenges will also be amplified by the enormous physical inertia of all large “stocks” that shape current trends: built infrastructure, energy systems, and human populations.

It is therefore also inevitable that aggregate consumption will increase at least into the near future, especially as affluence and population continue to grow in tandem (Wiedmann et al., 2020). Even if major catastrophes occur during this interval, they would unlikely affect the population trajectory until well into the 22nd Century (Bradshaw and Brook, 2014). Although population-connected climate change (Wynes and Nicholas, 2017) will worsen human mortality (Mora et al., 2017; Parks et al., 2020), morbidity (Patz et al., 2005; Díaz et al., 2006; Peng et al., 2011), development (Barreca and Schaller, 2020), cognition (Jacobson et al., 2019), agricultural yields (Verdin et al., 2005; Schmidhuber and Tubiello, 2007; Brown and Funk, 2008; Gaupp et al., 2020), and conflicts (Boas, 2015), there is no way—ethically or otherwise (barring extreme and unprecedented increases in human mortality)—to avoid rising human numbers and the accompanying overconsumption. That said, instituting human-rights policies to lower fertility and reining in consumption patterns could diminish the impacts of these phenomena (Rees, 2020).

Failed International Goals and Prospects for the Future
Stopping biodiversity loss is nowhere close to the top of any country's priorities, trailing far behind other concerns such as employment, healthcare, economic growth, or currency stability. It is therefore no surprise that none of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets for 2020 set at the Convention on Biological Diversity's (CBD.int) 2010 conference was met (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2020). Even had they been met, they would have still fallen short of realizing any substantive reductions in extinction rate. More broadly, most of the nature-related United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) (e.g., SDGs 6, 13–15) are also on track for failure (Wackernagel et al., 2017; Díaz et al., 2019; Messerli et al., 2019), largely because most SDGs have not adequately incorporated their interdependencies with other socio-economic factors (Bradshaw and Di Minin, 2019; Bradshaw et al., 2019; Messerli et al., 2019). Therefore, the apparent paradox of high and rising average standard of living despite a mounting environmental toll has come at a great cost to the stability of humanity's medium- and long-term life-support system. In other words, humanity is running an ecological Ponzi scheme in which society robs nature and future generations to pay for boosting incomes in the short term (Ehrlich et al., 2012). Even the World Economic Forum, which is captive of dangerous greenwashing propaganda (Bakan, 2020), now recognizes biodiversity loss as one of the top threats to the global economy (World Economic Forum, 2020).

The emergence of a long-predicted pandemic (Daily and Ehrlich, 1996a), likely related to biodiversity loss, poignantly exemplifies how that imbalance is degrading both human health and wealth (Austin, 2020; Dobson et al., 2020; Roe et al., 2020). With three-quarters of new infectious diseases resulting from human-animal interactions, environmental degradation via climate change, deforestation, intensive farming, bushmeat hunting, and an exploding wildlife trade mean that the opportunities for pathogen-transferring interactions are high (Austin, 2020; Daszak et al., 2020). That much of this degradation is occurring in Biodiversity Hotspots where pathogen diversity is also highest (Keesing et al., 2010), but where institutional capacity is weakest, further increases the risk of pathogen release and spread (Austin, 2020; Schmeller et al., 2020).

Climate Disruption
The dangerous effects of climate change are much more evident to people than those of biodiversity loss (Legagneux et al., 2018), but society is still finding it difficult to deal with them effectively. Civilization has already exceeded a global warming of ~ 1.0°C above pre-industrial conditions, and is on track to cause at least a 1.5°C warming between 2030 and 2052 (IPCC, 2018). In fact, today's greenhouse-gas concentration is >500 ppm CO2-e (Butler and Montzka, 2020), while according to the IPCC, 450 ppm CO2-e would give Earth a mere 66% chance of not exceeding a 2°C warming (IPCC, 2014). Greenhouse-gas concentration will continue to increase (via positive feedbacks such as melting permafrost and the release of stored methane) (Burke et al., 2018), resulting in further delay of temperature-reducing responses even if humanity stops using fossil fuels entirely well before 2030 (Steffen et al., 2018).

Human alteration of the climate has become globally detectable in any single day's weather (Sippel et al., 2020). In fact, the world's climate has matched or exceeded previous predictions (Brysse et al., 2013), possibly because of the IPCC's reliance on averages from several models (Herger et al., 2018) and the language of political conservativeness inherent in policy recommendations seeking multinational consensus (Herrando-Pérez et al., 2019). However, the latest climate models (CMIP6) show greater future warming than previously predicted (Forster et al., 2020), even if society tracks the needed lower-emissions pathway over the coming decades. Nations have in general not met the goals of the 5 year-old Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2016), and while global awareness and concern have risen, and scientists have proposed major transformative change (in energy production, pollution reduction, custodianship of nature, food production, economics, population policies, etc.), an effective international response has yet to emerge (Ripple et al., 2020). Even assuming that all signatories do, in fact, manage to ratify their commitments (a doubtful prospect), expected warming would still reach 2.6–3.1°C by 2100 (Rogelj et al., 2016) unless large, additional commitments are made and fulfilled. Without such commitments, the projected rise of Earth's temperature will be catastrophic for biodiversity (Urban, 2015; Steffen et al., 2018; Strona and Bradshaw, 2018) and humanity (Smith et al., 2016).

Regarding international climate-change accords, the Paris Agreement (United Nations, 2016) set the 1.5–2°C target unanimously. But since then, progress to propose, let alone follow, (voluntary) “intended national determined contributions” for post-2020 climate action have been utterly inadequate.
Political Impotence

If most of the world's population truly understood and appreciated the magnitude of the crises we summarize here, and the inevitability of worsening conditions, one could logically expect positive changes in politics and policies to match the gravity of the existential threats. But the opposite is unfolding. The rise of right-wing populist leaders is associated with anti-environment agendas as seen recently for example in Brazil (Nature, 2018), the USA (Hejny, 2018), and Australia (Burck et al., 2019). Large differences in income, wealth, and consumption among people and even among countries render it difficult to make any policy global in its execution or effect.

A central concept in ecology is density feedback (Herrando-Pérez et al., 2012)—as a population approaches its environmental carrying capacity, average individual fitness declines (Brook and Bradshaw, 2006). This tends to push populations toward an instantaneous expression of carrying capacity that slows or reverses population growth. But for most of history, human ingenuity has inflated the natural environment's carrying capacity for us by developing new ways to increase food production (Hopfenberg, 2003), expand wildlife exploitation, and enhance the availability of other resources. This inflation has involved modifying temperature via shelter, clothing, and microclimate control, transporting goods from remote locations, and generally reducing the probability of death or injury through community infrastructure and services (Cohen, 1995). But with the availability of fossil fuels, our species has pushed its consumption of nature's goods and services much farther beyond long-term carrying capacity (or more precisely, the planet's biocapacity), making the readjustment from overshoot that is inevitable far more catastrophic if not managed carefully (Nyström et al., 2019). A growing human population will only exacerbate this, leading to greater competition for an ever-dwindling resource pool. The corollaries are many: continued reduction of environmental intactness (Bradshaw et al., 2010; Bradshaw and Di Minin, 2019), reduced child health (especially in low-income nations) (Bradshaw et al., 2019), increased food demand exacerbating environmental degradation via agro-intensification (Crist et al., 2017), vaster and possibly catastrophic effects of global toxification (Cribb, 2014; Swan and Colino, 2021), greater expression of social pathologies (Levy and Herzog, 1974) including violence exacerbated by climate change and environmental degradation itself (Agnew, 2013; White, 2017, 2019), more terrorism (Coccia, 2018), and an economic system even more prone to sequester the remaining wealth among fewer individuals (Kus, 2016; Piketty, 2020) much like how cropland expansion since the early 1990s has disproportionately concentrated wealth among the super-rich (Ceddia, 2020). The predominant paradigm is still one of pegging “environment” against “economy”; yet in reality, the choice is between exiting overshoot by design or disaster—because exiting overshoot is inevitable one way or another.

Given these misconceptions and entrenched interests, the continued rise of extreme ideologies is likely, which in turn limits the capacity of making prudent, long-term decisions, thus potentially accelerating a vicious cycle of global ecological deterioration and its penalties. Even the USA's much-touted New Green Deal (U. S. House of Representatives, 2019) has in fact exacerbated the country's political polarization (Gustafson et al., 2019), mainly because of the weaponization of ‘environmentalism' as a political ideology rather than being viewed as a universal mode of self-preservation and planetary protection that ought to transcend political tribalism. Indeed, environmental protest groups are being labeled as “terrorists” in many countries (Hudson, 2020). Further, the severity of the commitments required for any country to achieve meaningful reductions in consumption and emissions will inevitably lead to public backlash and further ideological entrenchments, mainly because the threat of potential short-term sacrifices is seen as politically inopportune. Even though climate change alone will incur a vast economic burden (Burke et al., 2015; Carleton and Hsiang, 2016; Auffhammer, 2018) possibly leading to war (nuclear, or otherwise) at a global scale (Klare, 2020), most of the world's economies are predicated on the political idea that meaningful counteraction now is too costly to be politically palatable. Combined with financed disinformation campaigns in a bid to protect short-term profits (Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Mayer, 2016; Bakan, 2020), it is doubtful that any needed shift in economic investments of sufficient scale will be made in time.

While uncertain and prone to fluctuate according to unpredictable social and policy trends (Boas et al., 2019; McLeman, 2019; Nature Climate Change, 2019), climate change and other environmental pressures will trigger more mass migration over the coming decades (McLeman, 2019), with an estimated 25 million to 1 billion environmental migrants expected by 2050 (Brown, 2008). Because international law does not yet legally recognize such “environmental migrants” as refugees (United Nations University, 2015) (although this is likely to change) (Lyons, 2020), we fear that a rising tide of refugees will reduce, not increase, international cooperation in ways that will further weaken our capacity to mitigate the crisis.

Changing the Rules of the Game
While it is neither our intention nor capacity in this short Perspective to delve into the complexities and details of possible solutions to the human predicament, there is no shortage of evidence-based literature proposing ways to change human behavior for the benefit of all extant life. The remaining questions are less about what to do, and more about how, stimulating the genesis of many organizations devoted to these pursuits (e.g., ipbes.org, goodanthropocenes.net, overshootday.org, mahb.stanford.edu, populationmatters.org, clubofrome.org, steadystate.org, to name a few). The gravity of the situation requires fundamental changes to global capitalism, education, and equality, which include inter alia the abolition of perpetual economic growth, properly pricing externalities, a rapid exit from fossil-fuel use, strict regulation of markets and property acquisition, reigning in corporate lobbying, and the empowerment of women. These choices will necessarily entail difficult conversations about population growth and the necessity of dwindling but more equitable standards of living.

Conclusions
We have summarized predictions of a ghastly future of mass extinction, declining health, and climate-disruption upheavals (including looming massive migrations) and resource conflicts this century. Yet, our goal is not to present a fatalist perspective, because there are many examples of successful interventions to prevent extinctions, restore ecosystems, and encourage more sustainable economic activity at both local and regional scales. Instead, we contend that only a realistic appreciation of the colossal challenges facing the international community might allow it to chart a less-ravaged future. While there have been more recent calls for the scientific community in particular to be more vocal about their warnings to humanity (Ripple et al., 2017; Cavicchioli et al., 2019; Gardner and Wordley, 2019), these have been insufficiently foreboding to match the scale of the crisis. Given the existence of a human “optimism bias” that triggers some to underestimate the severity of a crisis and ignore expert warnings, a good communication strategy must ideally undercut this bias without inducing disproportionate feelings of fear and despair (Pyke, 2017; Van Bavel et al., 2020). It is therefore incumbent on experts in any discipline that deals with the future of the biosphere and human well-being to eschew reticence, avoid sugar-coating the overwhelming challenges ahead and “tell it like it is.” Anything else is misleading at best, or negligent and potentially lethal for the human enterprise at worst.

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