Despejo dos hortelões no Porto - "Misericórdia" só de nome

O caso do despejo dos utentes da Horta Comunitária do Porto deixa-me triste e indignado. Contrariamente ao último relatório da SCMP (2025), que é totalmente positivo - destacando inclusive a atribuição de 62 novos talhões, em 2025, no âmbito do projeto Horta à Porta -, a realidade atual demonstra o oposto.

Uma instituição cujo foco histórico é a "Misericórdia" e o apoio social não pode extinguir um projeto com tanto impacto positivo na comunidade e na sustentabilidade urbana. Com esta decisão, a SCMP comporta-se como uma empresa privada de saúde mental, descurando o facto de que o contacto com o meio ambiente é parte fundamental da terapia e da recuperação dos utentes. Inúmeros estudos clínicos comprovam que tratar a saúde mental ignorando o meio ambiente e a natureza é uma abordagem clinicamente ineficaz. 

Isto traduz-se em pura lavagem verde (greenwashing), fazendo desaparecer, em pouco mais de três meses, uma das maiores hortas urbanas da Europa.

A polémica em torno do fim das hortas públicas da LIPOR no Porto (o programa "Horta à Porta") e o consequente despejo dos hortelãos é o reflexo perfeito de um trade-off político e social - aquele cenário clássico em que, para se ganhar de um lado, tem de se sacrificar o outro, sem que exista uma solução que agrade a todos. No centro da discussão, a postura do executivo liderado por Pedro Duarte ilustra bem esta balança de prioridades.

De um lado da balança, a autarquia e os proprietários dos terrenos, como a Santa Casa da Misericórdia do Porto (dona do espaço junto ao Hospital Conde Ferreira), justificam a desocupação com a necessidade de avançar com planos de reestruturação interna. No caso da Misericórdia, o argumento oficial não é a venda dos terrenos para a especulação imobiliária, mas sim a modernização e requalificação do complexo hospitalar, além da reorientação da horta para fins puramente terapêuticos e sociais da própria instituição. Sob o ponto de vista da gestão de ativos, trata-se de rentabilizar e ordenar o património para garantir a sustentabilidade das suas próprias obras de assistência.

Do outro lado da balança, o custo deste ganho institucional é inteiramente social e ambiental. O encerramento do projeto destrói uma das maiores redes de hortas comunitárias da Europa, retira o sustento e o passatempo de mais de duas centenas de famílias e elimina focos essenciais de biodiversidade e coesão social no meio do asfalto da cidade. É precisamente aqui que o trade-off se torna mais evidente para Pedro Duarte: ao focar-se na gestão rigorosa de ativos, na reavaliação de cedências antigas e na aplicação estrita da lei sobre a ocupação dos terrenos, o executivo municipal prioriza a eficiência e o ordenamento do património público. Contudo, assume o pesado custo reputacional e político de ser criticado pela oposição por falta de sensibilidade social e pela ausência de alternativas viáveis de realojamento para os produtores locais. 

Mesmo que o objetivo declarado não seja o lucro imediato através de imobiliário, a decisão mexe com feridas abertas na cidade. O receio da oposição e dos hortelãos de que a libertação destes espaços centrais acabe por abrir portas à pressão imobiliária a longo prazo é o que alimenta o conflito. A atuação do executivo neste caso não se resume a um acerto ou erro absoluto, mas sim à escolha consciente de um dos lados da balança; é uma escolha ideológica e de gestão. Optou-se pelo ordenamento e requalificação dos equipamentos, aceitando como "dano colateral" o desalojamento de uma comunidade que ali tinha criado raízes.

Apenas 7% das empresas implementaram uma estratégia de negócio, tecnologia e sustentabilidade

São poucas as empresas que estabelecem uma estratégia de negócio, tecnologia e sustentabilidade, revela o mais recente estudo “Uniting Technology and Sustainability: How to Get Full Value From Your Sustainable Technology Strategy” da Accenture. A análise inquiriu 560 Chief Information Officers, Chief Technology Officers, Chief Sustainability Officers e representantes, de 12 países e 11 indústrias diferentes.

O estudo revela que a ambição crescente das organizações por metas ambientais, sociais e de governança (ESG) só poderá ser atingida por estratégias alinhadas de sustentabilidade e tecnologia, que permitam obter vantagem competitiva, valor financeiro e um impacto positivo duradouro na sociedade e no meio ambiente. Porém, os resultados demonstram que apenas 7% dos entrevistados integraram totalmente as suas estratégias de negócio, tecnologia e sustentabilidade.

Para as empresas, a tecnologia é “importante” ou “muito importante” para alcançar as suas metas de sustentabilidade. Embora reconheçam o valor associado a uma estratégia integrada, existem barreiras que as impedem alcançar estes objetivos, nomeadamente, a falta de soluções e standards (40%), a complexidade (33%) e a falta de consciência das consequências não intencionais da tecnologia (20%). Esta divergência entre intenção e ação leva as empresas a fazer trade-offs entre metas de negócios e sustentabilidade – os quais, segundo a Accenture, podem ser reduzidos ou eliminados com uma estratégia de tecnologia holística e sustentável.

Os Chief Information Officers podem desempenhar um papel crítico no apoio aos esforços gerais de transformação da sua empresa e devem ser considerados no processo de tomada de decisão em matérias de sustentabilidade. Contudo, como demonstram os dados recolhidos, somente 49% fazem parte da equipa de liderança que define metas de sustentabilidade e 45% são avaliados no cumprimento destas metas.

O documento indica que, uma estratégia de tecnologia sustentável eficaz, ajuda a impulsionar o crescimento dos negócios e o desempenho ESG. Para tal, esta deve basear-se em três pontos:

Sustentabilidade através da tecnologia: A tecnologia pode ser utilizada para acelerar os esforços de sustentabilidade em toda a organização. 92% das empresas analisadas pretendem atingir metas líquidas de zero emissões até 2030, o que exigirá a implementação de tecnologias avançadas para medir, reduzir e remover a pegada de carbono de uma organização. A tecnologia também é fundamental para avançar em direção a cadeias de valor responsáveis; promover escolhas sustentáveis para os clientes; e construir uma organização sustentável. 70% das organizações reduziram com sucesso as emissões na produção e nas operações, usaram inteligência artificial (IA) para fazê-lo.

Sustentabilidade na tecnologia: Proteger as pessoas e o planeta, tornando a própria tecnologia progressivamente mais sustentável. À medida que mais pessoas ficam online e o uso da tecnologia cresce, também aumentam as emissões de carbono das TI. Como tal, é necessário adotar software verde que seja eficiente em carbono e consciente; construir sistemas confiáveis que incorporem privacidade, justiça, transparência, robustez e acessibilidade; e instituir os mecanismos de governança corretos. Apenas 2 das 560 empresas analisadas afirmaram que consideram a eficiência energética em todas as fases do ciclo de vida de desenvolvimento de software, indicando um espaço considerável para melhorias. O relatório identifica uma estrutura robusta de desenvolvimento de software verde que prioriza áreas de emissões de materiais, incluindo o ciclo de vida de desenvolvimento de software, bem como experiência digital, cloud, edge, data centers, IA, DLT (distributed ledger technology) e infraestrutura verde.

Sustentabilidade em escala: Trabalhar com os parceiros de ecossistema para criar inovação disruptiva e desenvolver formas completamente diferentes e mais sustentáveis de fazer negócios no futuro. Nenhuma organização pode enfrentar os desafios globais de sustentabilidade em escala por conta própria. As empresas devem trabalhar além dos limites das suas próprias organizações para cumprir os Objetivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS) das Nações Unidas. 43% das empresas analisadas estão agora a aderir a colaborações na indústria, alianças e grupos de defesa focados em tecnologia amiga do ambiente.

10 myths about net zero targets and carbon offsetting, busted

Carbon neutrality targets are often not as ambitious as they sound, relying on problematic carbon offsets and unproven technologies.

By 41 scientists

The idea of carbon offsetting, which underpins so-called net zero targets, is founded on a number of myths.

In many cases, offsetting relies on capturing carbon in vegetation and soils. Such capacity is however limited and is needed to store carbon dioxide that we have already emitted.

Assumptions of future technologies and targets decades ahead delay immediate action. Countries and corporations must shift focus from distant net zero targets to real emissions reductions now.

The impacts of the climate crisis are becoming increasingly severe, everywhere. We are experiencing heat waves, floods, droughts, forest fires and sea level rise as a result of global heating. The average global temperature is rising at an unprecedented rate, rapidly diminishing the prospect of keeping global warming below 1.5C and with increasing risks of crossing irreversible tipping points.

In the face of growing demands for action, many countries and companies are making promises and setting targets to reach “net zero” emissions or “carbon neutrality”. These often sound ambitious and may even give the impression that the world is awakening and ready to take on the climate crisis.

Parisversaire climate ambition summit: who’s in and who’s out

In practice, however, net zero targets several decades into the future shift our focus away from the immediate and unprecedented emissions reductions needed. Net zero targets are generally premised on the assumption that fossil fuel emissions can be compensated for by carbon offsetting and unproven future technologies for removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. But offsetting does not cancel out our emissions – yet action to do so is immediately needed.

There are a number of myths about net zero targets and carbon offsetting that must be dispelled. By revealing them, we aim to empower people, so that they can pressure governments and companies to create real solutions, here and now:

Myth 1: Net zero by 2050 is sufficient to solve the climate crisis. Misleading.

Major and unprecedented reductions in emissions are needed now. Otherwise, our current high emissions will consume the small remaining global carbon budget within just a few years. Net zero targets typically assume that it will be possible to deliver vast amounts of “negative emissions”, meaning removal of carbon dioxide from the atmosphere through storage in vegetation, soils and rocks. However, deployment of the technologies needed for negative emissions at the required scale remains unproven, and should not replace real emissions reductions today.

Myth 2: We can compensate for fossil fuel emissions using so-called “nature-based solutions” (such as carbon sequestration in vegetation and soils). Misleading.

Fossil fuels are part of the slow carbon cycle . Nature-based solutions are part of the fast, biological carbon cycle, meaning that carbon storage is not permanent. For example, carbon stored in trees can be released again by forest fires. Fossil emissions happen today, while their uptake in trees and soils takes much longer. The overall capacity of nature-based solutions is also limited, and is anyway needed to help remove the carbon dioxide that we have already released into the atmosphere.

Myth 3: Net zero targets as well as carbon offsetting increase the incentives to reduce emissions because emissions are allocated a cost. Misleading.

The incentive decreases as long as it is financially more advantageous and socially acceptable to buy low-cost carbon offsets from abroad than it is to reduce emissions at home. Promises of future negative emissions also reduce the incentive to cut carbon emissions now, as their costs in decades to come are heavily discounted.

Myth 4: Carbon offsetting in low-income countries must increase to meet the Paris agreement. Misleading.

Low-income countries have also established climate targets in connection with the Paris Agreement. They will need all the emissions reductions that can be achieved in their own country to deliver on their own climate targets. There is no remaining carbon budget for wealthy high-emitting nations to pass the burden for cutting their emissions on to low-income nations.

Myth 5: Funding renewable energy projects is a good way to compensate for fossil fuel emissions. Problematic.

Expansion of renewable energy in growing economies is crucial, but often only adds to, rather than replaces the fossil fuels in the energy mix. Because renewable energy is now often cheaper than fossil energy, these investments would likely have happened anyway, and should therefore not be counted as offsets. Actors in high-income countries should rather finance renewable energy expansion as a form of climate investment (as opposed to offsetting).

Myth 6: Technological solutions for carbon dioxide removal will solve the problem. Overly optimistic.

Technologies are being developed but they are expensive, energy intensive, risky, and their deployment at scale is unproven. It is irresponsible to base net zero targets on the assumption that uncertain future technologies will compensate for present day emissions.

Myth 7: Tree plantations capture more carbon than leaving old forests undisturbed. Misleading.

Old forests can contain centuries worth of carbon, captured in trees and soils, and can continue to capture carbon for hundreds of years. It is better to cut fewer trees, so that the carbon already stored is not released. The carbon released by felled trees can take a hundred years or more to be recaptured by new trees. We do not have that time.

Myth 8: Planting trees in the tropics is a cost-effective win-win solution for both nature and local communities. Oversimplified.

There are trade-offs between managing forests for cost-efficient carbon capture and for meeting the needs of nature and local communities. Planting trees with carbon capture as the main goal threatens the rights, cultures, and food security of Indigenous Peoples and local communities. These risks, as well as threats to biodiversity, increase as such projects multiply.

Myth 9: Each ton of carbon dioxide is the same and can be treated interchangeably. False.

Carbon dioxide removal tomorrow cannot compensate for emissions today. Emissions from luxury consumption should not be considered equal to emissions from essential food production. Storage of carbon in plants and soils cannot compensate for emissions of fossil carbon (see fact box).

Myth 10: Products and travel can be “climate neutral” or even “climate positive”. False.

Products and travel that are sold as “climate neutral” or “climate positive” due to offsetting, do still have a carbon footprint. Such marketing is misleading and may even lead to more emissions as the offsetting incentivises increased consumption. We contribute more to climate solutions by consuming and travelling less.

Climate change poses existential threats to people, nations, children and to vulnerable groups all over the world. Unprecedented, rapid and sustained emissions reductions, starting here and now, are essential for tackling the climate crisis and living up to the commitments in the Paris Agreement:

We must shift focus from mid-century net-zero targets to immediate, real emissions reductions in our own high-income countries. Reductions of at least 10% per year are needed. This massive transformation of our societies is our only way to fulfil the Paris agreement without relying on risky and unproven, large-scale deployment of negative emission technologies.

We in high-income countries, in addition to maximizing emissions reductions at home, must hugely increase climate finance contributions to low-income countries. The countries that are least responsible yet most vulnerable to the climate crisis must be supported in their efforts to adapt and transform to zero carbon societies, as part of the climate debt they are owed.

We must reject offsetting between high- and low-income countries and replace it with climate financing based on scientific evidence, a limited carbon budget and global climate justice.

We must define separate targets for negative emissions and emissions reductions. It is essential that socially and environmentally appropriate negative emissions are undertaken as climate investments or climate financing, not as carbon offsets.

We must stop marketing products as being “climate neutral” or “climate positive”.

We must stop extracting and using fossil fuels, the primary cause of the climate crisis. As well as real-zero targets, we need an international treaty for the termination of fossil fuel production.

Authors

Alasdair Skelton, Professor of Geochemistry & Petrology, Stockholm University

Alice Larkin, Professor of Climate Science & Energy Policy, Tyndall Centre, University of Manchester

Andrew Ringsmuth, Researcher in Complex Systems & Sustainability, Complexity Science Hub Vienna

Caroline Greiser, Researcher in Ecology, Stockholm University

David Fopp, Senior Lecturer, Youth Studies, Stockholm University

Duncan McLaren, Professor of Cultural Political Ecology, Lancaster University

Doreen Stabinsky, Professor of Global Environmental Politics, College of the Atlantic,

Erik Huss, Geographer & Glaciologist, CEO Husstainability

Flora Hajdu, Associate Professor of Rural Development, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Greg Marsden, Professor of Transport Governance, University of Leeds.

Hanne Svarstad, Professor of Development Studies, Oslo Metropolitan University

Henrik Lagerlund, Professor of Theoretical Philosophy, Stockholm University

Isak Stoddard, PhD student in Natural Resources & Sustainable Development, Uppsala University

James Dyke, Assistant Director, Global Systems Institute, University of Exeter

Jens Friis Lund, Professor of Political Ecology, University of Copenhagen 

Jillian Anable, Professor of Transport & Energy, University of Leeds

Joanna Haigh, Emeritus Professor of Atmospheric Physics, Imperial College London

Judith Nora Hardt, Postdoctoral Researcher in Climate Change & Security, Franco-German Centre for Social Science Research, Berlin

Julia Steinberger, Professor of Social Ecology & Ecological Economics, University of Lausanne

Kate Dooley, Research Fellow, Climate & Energy College, University of Melbourne

Kathleen McAfee, Professor of International Relations, San Francisco State University

Kevin Anderson, Professor of Energy & Climate Change, Uppsala University and the University of Manchester 

Klara Fischer, Associate Professor of Rural Development, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Linda Engström, Researcher in Rural Development & Policy, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences

Magnuz Engardt, Reader in Meteorology, Researchers Desk

Maria Johansson, PhD in Fire Ecology, Researchers Desk

Maria Wolrath Söderberg, Researcher in Rhetoric & Climate Communication, Södertörn University

Mats Björk, Professor of Marine Plant Physiology, Stockholm University

Niclas Hällström, Environment and Development Studies, WhatNext? 

Nils Markusson, Senior Lecturer in the Politics of Environmental Technology, Lancaster University

Paul Glantz, Associate Professor of Atmospheric Science, Stockholm University

Peter Newell, Professor of International Relations, University of Sussex

Richard D. Pancost, Professor of Biogeochemistry, University of Bristol

Sarah Milne, Senior Lecturer in Environment and Development, Australian National University

Stephen Woroniecki, Researcher of Sustainability Science, Linköping University

Stig-Olof Holm, Senior Lecturer in Ecology, Umeå University

Stuart Capstick, Deputy Director, Centre for Climate Change and Social Transformations, Cardiff University

Svetlana Gross, PhD student in Business Administration, Stockholm School of Economics

Sören Andersson, Sustainability Advisor, thefuture 

Tor A. Benjaminsen, Professor of International Environment and Development Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences

Wim Carton, Assistant Professor of Sustainability Science, Lund University

The article was initiated by members of www.ResearchersDesk.se and is available in Swedish at Dagens Nyheter where it was first published.

We Can’t Return to Capitalism as Usual After This Crisis

Here are questions we need to ask right away: If foundational economic principles must be abandoned when things get tough, does capitalism really serve our needs? If rapid, radical change is possible when circumstances demand it, what excuse is there for failing to act with similar urgency to prevent cataclysmic climate change?

Fonte: aqui

Over the past few weeks, the UK strategy on COVID-19 has veered dramatically from contrarian laissez-faire to hasty, panicked adoption of social control measures similar to those in other European countries. An endless stream of British journalists implored us, initially, to simply trust our government’s favored experts (and, implicitly, to ignore the suspiciously foreign advice of most other epidemiologists, including those employed by the World Health Organization).

This stance became increasingly hard to defend after it emerged that the government’s initial strategy — allowing the virus to infect the young and healthy in the hope of building “herd immunity” that would protect vulnerable groups — was, at least partly, based on faulty modeling. Specifically, scientists advising the government had used data for a different disease with a much lower hospitalization rate than had been observed in countries hit earlier by COVID-19.

Pro-government commentators quickly divided into two camps, with the first adopting a position that’s almost too absurd to engage with seriously. They claimed that nothing about the government’s approach had actually changed, the public had simply failed to understand it properly.

That footage you watched of the UK’s chief scientific adviser explaining why “herd immunity” through widespread infection was a desirable goal? Those words didn’t actually mean what you thought they did. The Newsnight segment where a Public Health England official told us to see our elderly relatives, go to the pub, and generally carry on as usual if we didn’t have symptoms, despite the evidence globally of asymptomatic transmission? It simply never happened. Who are you going to trust, your lying eyes or the 2017 winner of the Political Commentator of the Year award?

The second group attempted a more subtle defensive maneuver. Rather than informing us, Ministry of Truth–style, of the absolute infallibility of the government response, they asked us to trust the good intentions of the people in charge. Under the headline “Our politicians are only trying to do their best,” the Spectator’s Alex Massie opined that the pandemic “is a time for generosity and kindness; a moment for the cutting of slack and the making of allowances.” A sentiment that seems unobjectionable in the abstract, but rather misses the point when it comes to assessing the actions of political leaders during a crisis.

I do not care whether Boris Johnson means well. Nor am I interested in the purity of Matt Hancock’s heart. Frankly, I do not claim to be able to judge whether Rishi Sunak is trying his absolute hardest, or whether he could be going at it with a bit more welly. I imagine they all believe themselves to be good people, doing as best they can in difficult circumstances. That seems to be true of most politicians.

Indeed, it’s true of most people in most walks of life. In situations like this, where our leaders appear to have made a whole series of gravely suboptimal decisions — risking hundreds of thousands of lives in the process — asking “incompetence or malice?” obscures far more than it reveals.

A foundational myth of technocracy is the existence of a single set of desirable political goals. It imagines some unified “public good” that people in power will generally aim to maximize, even if they use different tools and strategies to do so. According to this logic, political decisions cannot be morally right or wrong, only effective or ineffective.

An estimated 130,000 preventable deaths due to austerity are simply a regrettable, unintended consequence of David Cameron and George Osborne’s attempt to do what they believed was right. The “incompetence or malice” binary posits only one, unlikely seeming, possible alternative: that killing people was a deliberate policy goal.

I have no doubt that, all things being equal, Boris Johnson would like to minimize the number of deaths from COVID-19. The pertinent question is not whether the UK government has this aim at all, but the extent to which they prioritize it over other, competing concerns.

While some have attempted to argue that a recession could result in more loss of life than the virus (relying on the dubious assumption that government cannot prevent people dying prematurely due to poverty), it’s generally been understood that there is a direct trade-off between economic growth and saving lives.

In the United States, Republicans have made the issue explicit. Texas lieutenant governor Dan Patrick went as far as to suggest that “lots of grandparents” would prefer to risk their survival than see the United States adopt public health measures that further damage the national economy. Though Donald Trump has not stated the apparent trade-off in quite such stark language, he’s repeatedly pushed for Americans to return to work just when epidemiologists expect the pandemic to hit its peak, saying that “the cure cannot be worse than the problem.”

As is often the case with Trump, this seems less a deviation from conventional elite opinion than an example of him saying the quiet part loud. Though no UK politician has dared to say similar publicly, a recent Sunday Times article said that government adviser Dominic Cummings outlined the government’s original strategy as, according to one observer’s summation: “protect the economy, and if that means some pensioners die, too bad.”

The notion that it might be justifiable to sacrifice human lives in service of “the economy” only makes sense if you conceive of economic growth having some independent, intrinsic value beyond promoting human well-being. In reality, this euphemistic language serves to obscure the truth: that the people who are sacrificed are predominately poor, and the people who benefit from a buoyant stock market are the rich.

Though viruses do not discriminate based on class, working-class people are significantly more likely to have jobs that cannot be done remotely. The individuals who are urging that we “carry on as normal” likely have far more ability to take measures to protect themselves and their families.

In the case of the UK, it seems likely that ideological priors also influenced decision-making in more subtle ways. Anyone paying attention knows that the NHS consistently operates at close to full capacity, to the extent that even regular seasonal flu can send hospitals into crisis. This state of affairs is the result of a decade of underfunding by the Conservatives, rationalized as the pursuit of “efficiency.”

You don’t need to be an epidemiologist, or even to have studied the numbers closely, to wonder why the government ever believed it could deal with the sharp spike in demand expected under a minimalist strategy. Bad modeling notwithstanding, there was ample evidence from other countries that hospitals were struggling to cope.

I can only assume that those in government who backed the “herd immunity” strategy desperately wanted to believe an easy, non-economically disruptive option was available. The alternative — that a significant increase in government spending was going to be necessary, and that systematically cutting public services to the bone has disastrous consequences — presents a significant challenge to the Conservative worldview.

All of us tend to be less skeptical of ideas that align with our existing beliefs about how the world works, and how things should be done. It’s unsurprising, then, that many jumped at the prospect of a laissez-faire solution. The idea that other countries (and the World Health Organization) had gotten it wrong, and that more interventionist approaches would ultimately be futile, must have been highly seductive. One anonymous senior figure even briefed journalists that measures taken in Italy were “populist, non-science-based measures that aren’t any use.” In reality, going into lockdown seems to have significantly slowed the rate of infection.

Eventually, the current crisis will pass, but it will be a huge mistake if we attempt to return to “normal.” The issues we’ve been forced to confront have lasting implications. Namely, if foundational economic principles must be abandoned when things get tough, does this system really serve our needs? If rapid, radical change is possible when circumstances demand it, what excuse is there for failing to act with similar urgency to prevent cataclysmic climate change? What can and should we do differently, now that we know doing things differently is possible?

Orangotangos e Economia de Gestão Florestal Sustentável em Sumatra

Acção Internacional: Salve a vida dos orangotangos Bornéu [assina e divulga a petição] 

O que vale mais? O lucro ou a vida de quase cinco mil orangotangos? Um tribunal na Indonésia tem que responder esta pergunta, porque a empresa britânica de mineração Churchill Mining quer explorar um mina de carvão que foi descoberta no Parque Nacional de Kutai. Mas é exatemente aqui onde morram mais de 2000 orangotangos-de-bornéo, o projeto vai pôr a vida dos animais em perigo. A sobrevivência dos primatas em extinção está directamente relacionada com as áreas protegidas como o Parque Nacional de Kutai. Aqui eles encontram um refúgio de mais ou menos 200.000 hectares, onde vivem juntos com outras espécies ameaçadas, como os Ursos-malaios ou os Panteras-nebulosas.

A desflorestação é responsável por aproximadamente 17% das emissões globais de gases de efeito estufa e, portanto, um dos principais contribuintes para as alterações climáticas, mas também responsável pela perda de biodiversidade e serviços ambientais e uma ameaça direta para os grandes primatas da Ásia - o orangotango. Entre 2005-2010, a Indonésia acelerou a perda da floresta em comparação com 2000-2005 e está dentro dos cinco países com mais perda de floresta primária em todo o mundo.

Grande parte da desflorestação é causada por ambos os ganhos ilegais e económicos a curto prazo, muitas vezes comprometendo as metas de longo prazo de desenvolvimento. O relatório da UNEP quantifica os trade-offs para o orangotango e clarifica as formas mais vantajosas do uso da terra a favor da sustentabilidade, e considera o papel de Redução de Emissões por Desflorestação e Degradação (REDD) e a ampliação de medidas do programa Pagamento por Serviços Ambientais (PSA) como esquemas de atingir a conservação equilibrada e os objectivos de desenvolvimento, evitando a extinção do orangotango.

O Dossiê Eco-Activismo do Bioterra foi actualizado.