A Political Strategy for Degrowth

I agree with what Jason Hickel wrote in a recent blog, that we need a mass political party that would implement a degrowth agenda, and that currently the degrowth movement does not have a political agenda or capability. I also agree with Anitra Nelson, Vincent Liegey and Terry Leahy when they wrote that degrowth is a movement. Degrowth is a movement as much as Civil Rights, Marriage Equality, or the Sunrise Movement were or aremovements whether or not they were organized as political parties.

When we proposed last year that all degrowthers should join forces in solidarity, the very first point of our proposal was to decouple recognition from status and merit because we believed, and I still do, that comradery and understanding should be based on egalitarian principles. This proposal has been received with lackluster understanding and support.

More recently, I have advocated for a synergy of bottom-up and top-down strategy. Bottom-up is close to the horizontal anarchist position, however it follows scales from local to regional and (inter)national, rather than political hierarchies. It means that strategy would start at the local. Conversely top-down means strategy begins at the largest scale, being operationalized by respective large-aim institutions.

Here, I would like to add specificity to the idea of building mass parties which builds on the recognition of the tremendous effort that has been done by degrowth activists and practitioners, many of whom work for free, while also having to make a living. These mass parties need both bottom-up engagement, and top-down policy design. Yes, we have to take power, but we cannot do it without mass engagement. We already know that degrowth is popular and its label is a strength not a weakness as many have remarked already.

The 28% support in the US for the label “degrowth” without a description attached is as meaningful as the concept of “free buses” from Zohran Mamdani, the Mayor-elect of New York. Both concepts need to be elaborated in order to make full sense. Degrowth is not more jargony than “free buses”. It just needs unpacking and after it is unpacked it is as good as “free buses” if not better.

The upcoming degrowth-friendly parties should consider the following:

1.Governance based on qualified sortition (random selection)

Roger Halam, co-founder of Extinction Rebellion, Just Stop Oil, Insulate Britain recently said to Novara Media that he is a strong advocate for sortition and he is confident that people selected at random will rise up to the task. Sortition, which is basically a formation of government through various forms of selection by lottery, has been discussed by many authors. Just to name a few: Against Elections by David Van Reybrouck, Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative Governance edited by John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright, The Trouble With Elections by Terry Bouricius, and George Monbiot in a Guardian article.

The qualification part would be something determined by the entire collective, from a minimum time spent in the organization or not working in executive capitalist jobs. People who meet these qualifications would be placed on sortition lists from which governance bodies would be selected at random, while observing desirable demographics.

Your Party UK has used sortition for the selection of their inaugural launch conference. Let us be super frank: representative democracy is a failure and elections are a circus. If we want to reform democracy, elections have to be abolished. Getting degrowth done would require a separation of policy writing from policy selection. People who write policy should not be the same who vote on turning policy into law.

I cannot stress this enough: a Leninist-type party ran by a camarilla of degrowth cadres and experts defeats the purpose of the political revolution. The mass party must be of the people, by the people, and for the people with governance by sortition.

2. Running popular platforms hard on limitarian policies.

Free buses, rent freezes, and freehealthcare are policies that can win elections. However, all policy ideas, no matter how good or popular they are, can be co-opted by right-wing media and capitalist elites. Degrowth itself is painted with red scare and is associated with austerity by capitalists. A mass party should lead, loud and clear with the idea that having too much is a really bad idea that carves into the liberties and wellbeing of decent citizens and into the resilience of life on Earth. A mass party must lead with anti-capitalist policy proposals and the degrowth label. Moreover, since degrowth owns such a wide canvas of policy instruments, the ones that hit the right-wing ethos hardest are those from the limitarian space: limits on wealth and rationing.

Universal Basic Income, Universal Basic Services, Job Guarantee, and Work Time Reduction continue to be the most popular policies from the degrowth toolkit. They are not exclusionary but rather should be advanced together in the agenda of a mass party. The Job Guarantee may be the easiest to promote, even if it is at $15 hourly pay as suggested for the US by L. Randall Wray in Understanding Modern Money Theory (2025). In all cases, the mass party must include caps on wealth and forms of material rationing.

3.Running candidates in jurisdictions where centrists often rotate with right-wingers.

In Canada, Mark Carney’s Liberal Party won this year not because people love them, but because center-left and left voters who usually vote for the New Democratic Party (NDP) really hated the Conservatives. Similar story in the UK. However, the NDP is not too friendly to degrowth, since they are trying to sideline an ecosocialist degrowther anti-Zionist candidate from their current leadership race.

In Canada and the UK, there is no real alternative to the centrist status quo that has won elections. If a mass party that leads with degrowth policies ran candidates in jurisdictions like these, they stand real chances at winning local and general elections. Perhaps the Green Party UK and Your Party UK are poised to fill this gap. They should be infiltrated by degrowthers and swayed onto a committed path for degrowth.

We should not have to read more books such as More and More and More by Jean-Baptiste Fressoz about the delusions of the energy transition, or books such as The Long Heat by Andreas Malm and Wim Carton about the perils of techno-optimism, to be finally convinced that owning the degrowth label and the toolkit of degrowth policy instruments requires courage and vision.

4. Joining or creating an international political alliance, such as DIEM25 or Progressive International.

We already have the International Degrowth Network (IDN) but it does not function like DIEM25 or Progressive International. It does not collect membership fees, it does not have paid staff, and it does not run political candidates. Upgrading the sociocratic aims of IDN towards a political organization could be the strategy to be considered. Alternatively, IDN members and degrowthers at large could join DIEM25, Progressive International or various ecosocialist parties and infuse these organizations with degrowth. In all cases, the degrowth label should be owned by those advocating for it, and must be qualified and unpacked as the occasion requires.

5. Leaders should not be tainted with perceptions of elitism and credentialism.

A sortition-based governance structure would weed out opportunists and status seekers. Socialist parties are not immune to corruption and special interests. Only sortition can mitigate these risks. Policy making cannot be, as a matter of principle, an affair run by the elite policy wonks. In the Bouricius sortition model, experts can still offer significant input in policy making, but they would not be elected into leadership positions.

6. Significant effort should be deployed to popularize ethics of sufficiency.

Before sortition is realized, when we accept the compromise with representative democracy based on elections, political leaders would have to recognize ethics of sufficiency that are shared by humans that have not been duped by consumerism and material status signaling. The imperial mode of living is something real, even if we choose to place responsibility on the design of capitalism instead on individual lifestyle choices. The imperial mode of living refers to a way of life in the Global North that relies heavily on the exploitation of resources and labor from the Global South, leading to ecological and social inequalities. It highlights how everyday consumption practices are intertwined with global power dynamics and the unsustainable nature of capitalism.

In this approach, degrowth can be presented as an ethic of liberation from the oppression of material status signaling, and expansion of social agency (more personal freedom in a social context). Work Time Reduction, for example, is a great public relations tool for degrowth but it must be framed in a dematerialized and decommodified economy. The same applies to UBI, UBS, and JG.

7. Nifty memes and bitesize ideas must complement storytelling and policy unpacking.

A mass party should not be afraid to embrace simple ideas that can capture the imagination of the people. Something along these lines: What if all products imported from the Global South had QR codes on them that would take you to a website where you could see the working conditions of those humans who made that thing, their names, their salaries, their living conditions, their health status, how much free time they have with their families? What if the same QR code showed you the wealth of the owners of those companies, their names, and their living conditions? Would you still buy that thing? Would you still want to keep this economic system? Moving the imagination of supporters for the mass party toward empathy and an egalitarian global ethic may be the key towards the much-needed delinking of the Global South from the Global North, as I understand them in their geographical sense.

8. Designing policy that aims at the fundamental causal structure of capitalism.

In the bottom-up vs top-down integrative approach, the bottom-up part is experiential and the top-down is structural. The mass parties must offer the experience of a new kind of politics and society, by actually showing up for local causes, listening to its members and citizens at large, and being influenced by them via crowd-sourcing policy proposal. I have suggested a tool for such purpose in the form of a crowd-sourced policy cloud.

Mass parties should be friendly and welcoming, not exclusionary and dogmatic. At the same time, they must aim at redesigning the structure of the economy by attacking and dismantling capitalist hierarchies, by decoupling power from property, and by halting the dispossession of private and common property by capital. Even if Universal Basic Income, Universal Basic Services, Job Guarantee, and Work Time Reduction were all implemented, they may remain confined within national borders. Decolonisation and delinking must also be at the center of strategy.

Where would these mass parties start

To conclude, where would these mass parties start? In which country? In Romania, my country of origin, where the far-right party leads in polls by close to 40% and where there is no party on the left, not even center-left? In Germany, France, Italy? In India or China? Once we deploy the heavy anchor of reality we are hit with terrifying apparent impossibilities. The answer is all of the above, with various caveats. Some countries have parties that may be swung further towards degrowth. Others need the invention of new parties from scratch, such as Romania and Canada. In all cases, a political strategy for a mass party must emerge from the mass of people that it is supposed to serve.

Ted Trainer - A (Friendly) Critique of the Degrowth Movement

Over many years I have put forward a vision of The Simpler Way, and introduced visiting groups to it at Pigface Point.

The above video includes models of a typical suburb before and after such changes have been made.

The explosion of interest in degrowth since 2000 has seen the development of a large literature, international conferences, and many active groups spread around the world.

This is astounding, given that pioneers such as Georgescu-Roegen, Paul Ehrlich, Serge Latouche, and Herman Daly worked for decades to draw attention to the possibility that the pursuit of limitless growth and affluence might be problematic — and they were largely ignored. In the early 1970s, The Limits to Growth made quite an impact, but did not go into possible alternative social goals or forms. My book, Abandon Affluence and Growth (1985), summarized the case and argued that the only solution has to be transition to a Simpler Way. For the following 20 years these few works had almost no impact on mainstream thinking about the commitment to growth.

The recent spread of degrowth is encouraging — however, the movement is founded on a number of confusions and mistaken initiatives. This is understandable given its early stage, and can be regarded as a healthy exploring of possibilities. The literature welcomes ‘pluralism’, but we should be trying to find unifying directions.

The current focus of the degrowth movement

The focus within the degrowth movement has (understandably) been on why the pursuit of growth is a huge mistake, and little attention has been given to two crucial themes. One is strategy: this lack is recognised within the movement, and I discuss it at length in the current edition of Environmental Values. The other, which has received almost no attention, is the concept of simplicity. The defining principle of a society that has undergone degrowth to a sustainable and just state must be transition to far simpler lifestyles and systems.

First, the issue of definition; what is degrowth about, and what should it be about? The term is not a good descriptor for the movement that has emerged. The movement is asserting a wild variety of criticisms of and alternatives to the present globalized, industrialized, urbanized, financialized, neo-liberal, sexist, grotesquely unequal, extractivist, imperialist etc. world order. The expressed goals include all manner of social criticisms, ideals, and policies, ranging from mildly reformist to ultra radical. Many of these — such as monetary reform, making trade more equitable, housing justice, patriarchy, curbing advertising, fairer taxes, reducing debt, indigenous rights, and decolonization — actually have nothing to do with the reduction of economic growth, or could easily be implemented within an economy that continues to be about growth.

Degrowth should, instead, be seen in terms of a concern to reduce resource consumption and environmental impact, which means it is essentially about one thing, which is reducing GDP. It is in order for many sub-goals and domains to be seen as existing under this umbrella, as fields of endeavor relevant to the general quest or for which it has implications.

Thus the term degrowth has become ‘… a rag-bag of utopian dreams’. A more accurate title might be the ‘Finally Fed Up With Capitalism’ movement. All manner of ideals, dreams, alternate policies in a wide variety of fields have been put forward as degrowth proposals. This is highly desirable because it shows that discontent with consumer-capitalist society is finally boiling over. For 70 years its legitimacy and desirability have been largely unquestionable. But now the dominant paradigm is crumbling, evident in the weakening capacity of the rich countries to control the global geo-physical imperial system, the emergence of intractable resource scarcities and environmental problems, accelerating rates of inequality generating hardship and ‘cost of living’ difficulties, rising levels of debt etc. There is increasing realization that the system is causing the big global problems, notably climate change, that it can’t solve them and that it needs to be replaced.

Probably even more serious is the social situation, the loss of cohesion being caused by the inevitable march of capitalism, the deprivation and discontent accompanying rising inequality, and the decreasing capacity of governments to meet demands or provide for people. Large numbers in even the richest countries are poor or homeless. Thirty percent of Australians are reported to be going without sufficient food. The number one health problem in rich countries now is likely to be depression. The UK government recently established a ministry for loneliness. Large proportions of people are losing respect for ‘democracy’ and turning towards authoritarian and fascist options.

These many and varied discontents can be welcomed as undermining the complacency that characterized previous decades. But the scene is quite confused and chaotic, especially with respect to causes and solutions, and this is reflected within the degrowth movement. Even among degrowth advocates there is little realization that the multifactored global predicament cannot be resolved unless there is an extremely big and difficult revolution whereby most of the elements within our present economic, political, and cultural systems are scrapped and replaced by radically different systems. The crucial point here is that the new lifestyles and systems must be materially very simple. Little of the degrowth literature recognizes this, let alone focuses on it. Most of it proceeds as if we can all go on living more or less as we do now, with more or less the same kinds of ways and institutions that we have now, via reformed institutions and better policies. The degrowth movement does not recognize that the magnitude of the overshoot, the degree of unsustainability, of present society, totally prohibits that. To recognize this would decisively focus thinking about goals and strategies, and rule out many currently popular options.

The global situation

Most people do not grasp the extent to which this society has become unsustainable. We have far exceeded the limits to growth. There is no possibility that the per capita levels of resource consumption in rich countries can be kept up for long. Only a few of the world’s people have these ‘living standards’ and the rest can never rise to anything like them. This is the basic cause of the big global problems, including resource depletion, environmental damage, the deprivation of billions in the poor countries, and resource struggles.

There is a strong case that if we are to live in sustainable ways that all could share then rich world per capita rates of consumption must be reduced by 90 percent. The common response is the ‘tech-fix’ claim that technical advance will enable GDP growth to be ‘decoupled’ from resource and environmental impact. But there is now overwhelming evidence that apart from in some limited areas this is not happening and is not going to happen. (Haberle’s review examined over 800 studies.) If GDP is increased, impacts increase. It is not possible to solve the big problems if we are determined to maintain present levels of consumption and production — the solution can only be found on the demand side; that is, by greatly reducing production and consumption.

A major cause of our predicament is the fact that we have an economic system which must have growth and which allows the market and profit to determine what happens. As a result, what is produced, who gets it and what is developed, is determined by what is most profitable to the few who own most of the capital. The outcome is not determined by what is most needed. That is why the one percent now own about half the world’s wealth, and the poor countries have been ‘developed’ into a form which ships their resources out to enrich the corporations and rich world shoppers, while most people in even the richest countries struggle to get by.

The crucial point is that we have to try to shift to values and ways that enable all to live well on a very small fraction of the per capita resource and environmental impacts we in rich countries have now. We cannot achieve a sustainable way of life which all could share unless there is an enormous degrowth transition to far simpler lifestyles and systems. The magnitude of the required Degrowth is not sufficiently recognised within the movement. Nor are the implications for social change; because the over-shoot is so big that only change to extremely different lifestyles and systems can solve the big global problems.

Para compreender o "Decrescimento"

Pequeno Tratado Do Decrescimento Sereno by João Soares on Scribd

Movimento não é saudosista, nem anticivilizatório. Mas sustenta: sem rever padrões de consumo e produção, “progresso” resultará em desigualdade e devastação

Por Alan Bocato-Franco

Pouco frequente, ainda, no Brasil, um debate tomou corpo e expandiu-se rapidamente nos últimos anos, em paralelo ao desconforto com o capitalismo e seus impasses. Trata-se da ideia de “decrescimento”. “Outras Palavras” abordou-o em diversos textos, no passado — mas deu-lhe destaque especial em 10 de outubro. Um artigo do cientista político catalão Vicenç Navarro criticava “algumas teorias” do decrescimento. Em sua opinião, elas acabam reduzindo-se a um ambientalismo elitista e antissocial, ao sugerirem, diante de países em crise, a continuação das políticas de “austeridade”, que geram mais desemprego e desindustrialização.

O artigo de Navarro gerou importante polémica, na seção de comentários dos leitores. “Outras Palavras” convidou um dos polemistas, Alan Bocato-Franco, a escrever uma réplica. O resultado foi melhor que a encomenda. Muito mais que polemizar com Navarro — com quem, aliás, parece compartilhar pontos de vista –, Alan traça, no texto a seguir, um importante panorama sobre a origem, sentido e história das teorias do “decrescimento”.

É algo de enorme atualidade, num país que precisa encontrar uma síntese entre duas posições igualmente indispensáveis. Por um lado, as críticas cada vez mais frequentes a símbolos antes intocáveis do “progresso” — por exemplo, o automóvel, as grandes obras viárias e a multiplicação de projetos de geração de energia, desacompanhada de uma análise séria sobre o consumo de eletricidade.  Por outro, a ênfase na redistribuição de riqueza e na necessidade de assegurar condições de vida dignas à ampla maioria da população — o que exige, por exemplo, muito mais infra-estrutura (portanto, obras…) de transporte público, saneamento ou urbanização das periferias. (A.M.)

O movimento pelo decrescimento tem sido alvo de crítica recorrentes e repetitivas. De modo geral, acusam-no de tratar o crescimento econômico apenas em termos quantitativos, sem considerar suas variantes qualitativas. Além disso (ou por isso), afirma-se que seus defensores são malthusianos, porque propõem que a população e o consumo global sejam  estabilizados, se não reduzidos. Seriam os decrescentistas saudosistas de um estilo de vida pré-civilizatório, por não reconhecerem que o progresso tecnológico libertou a população humana dos limites biofísicos da natureza e nos apresentou o progresso? Este artigo tem como objetivo dialogar com essas críticas.

A questão do crescimento

Há, no decrescimento, uma defesa explícita pelo aumento das atividades econômicas que fortalecem a saúde humana e a diminuição das que intoxicam a sociedade. Defende as atividades que causam impactos menos acentuados e a diminuição das que degradam o ambiente de modo acelerado. Defende ainda o aumento das que fortalecem a autonomia das pessoas, estreitam seus laços e distribuem renda e a diminuição das que alienam, fragilizam as relações sociais e geram exclusão. Mas os decrescentistas reconhecem que mesmo para as atividades económicas qualitativamente diferenciadas os limites biofísicos do planeta persistem. Certamente a humanidade terá uma maior margem de manobra. Mas os limites ao crescimento econômico continuarão existindo.

A partir disto, a qualidade do crescimento econômico é relevante, mas secundário. O ponto principal é o paradigma do crescimento ilimitado. O decrescimento coloca em questão o modelo de sociedade, e as teorias de desenvolvimento que o sustentam, que tem o crescimento como condição fundamental para a “harmonia” socioeconômica ou, em outras palavras, a ausência de crise. Para o decrescimento, uma sociedade organizada sob o paradigma do crescimento ilimitado está fadada ao fracasso, pois é impossível crescer indefinidamente seja qual for a qualidade desse crescimento.

População, consumo e tecnologia

O decrescimento reconhece como verdadeira a equação I=PAT formulada por Ehrlich. Essa referência aparece de modo pontual e periférico em algumas publicações do decrescimento (1). Ela nada mais diz que o impacto ambiental (I) tem relação direta com o tamanho da população (P), sua afluência ou consumo (A) e a tecnologia (T). Com base nela, os decrescentistas aceitam a conclusão de que a redução de (A) por suficiência e sobriedade, bem como a de (T) pelo progresso tecnológico não determinam a redução indefinidamente do impacto sem que a população seja estabilizada ou diminua.

Dessas três variáveis, o decrescimento foca sua crítica no consumo. E por isso, seus partidários são acusados de negligenciarem os avanços tecnológicos. A verdade é que o decrescimento não nega que estratégias como reciclagem, diversificação da matriz energética e ecoeficiência sejam essenciais e devam ser estimuladas. Mas não as vê como soluções salvadoras do crescimento econômico ilimitado. Desta forma, reconhece a tecnologia sem a ingenuidade de acreditar que seu avanço seja prova de que a sociedade não deve se libertar da “gaiola do consumismo” (2). De modo que somente numa sociedade fora do paradigma do crescimento, que tem como base o consumismo, a tecnologia ganha alguma eficácia para conciliar atividade econômica e capacidade de carga do planeta.

Já a variável população está muito pouco presente na literatura e nos debates sobre o decrescimento (3). A redução da população é categoricamente entendida como uma falsa solução (4). Quando se trata de uma eventual regulação da população, ela deve ser igualitária e democrática, em vez de violenta e desumana, conforme propunha Malthus. Os decrescentistas rejeitam a limitação do número de filhos e assumem uma transição demográfica por meio da emancipação das mulheres, da alfabetização e da democracia (5).

Diferentes raízes

O decrescimento não tem uma única raiz. Podem ser identificadas até seis fontes intelectuais do movimento (6) como: 1) ecológica; 2) pós-desenvolvimentista e anti-utilitarista (7); 3) sentido da vida e bem viver (8); 4) bio económica (9); 5) democrática (10) e; 6) justiça (11). Uma das influências intelectuais é Ivan Illich, que figura em duas dessas seis fontes (2 e 5). Uma das inspirações buscadas nesse autor está no processo de “coisificação” que consiste na transformação da percepção das necessidades reais em produtos manufaturados de massa. Ou seja, as necessidades reais das pessoas transformam-se na necessidade por produtos industriais: a sede se converte na necessidade de um refrigerante, a mobilidade se reduz à necessidade de se ter um carro e a saúde se transforma na necessidade de tomar remédios e suplementos comprados numa farmácia. Assim, a indústria passa a deter um monopólio radical sobre as necessidades humanas. A técnica industrial cria as necessidades fictícias para as pessoas, e sugere que apenas  os bens e serviços produzidos por ela são capazes de atender essas necessidades.

Uma das críticas feitas pelo decrescimento e inspiradas em Illich recai sobre a hegemonia do sistema de saúde pautado numa abordagem industrial, individual, privatista e heteronômica. Isso não significa negar os avanços da medicina científica. Aponta-se, isto sim, a apropriação perversa da medicina pela indústria, que transforma a primeira em mero produto destinado ao consumo. Ao denunciar este processo, o decrescimento pretende contribui para a democratização do acesso à medicina científica. Mais do que isto, denuncia a supremacia da prática médica em detrimento às outras formas de conhecimento e práticas de cuidado com a saúde. Isto implica em entender a saúde individual e coletiva a partir de múltiplas perspectivas. É ampliar o leque das possibilidades de cuidados, de modo que ao mesmo tempo aumenta-se a autonomia do indivíduo em cuidar de si, naquilo que for adequado. Em outros casos, defende-se acesso democrático ao serviço especializado.

Diferentes correntes

Sobre o tema do decrescimento, existem dezenas de livros, centenas de artigos acadêmicos, muitos blogs, inúmeros coletivos de experimentação prática, grupos de discussão, de pesquisa e de formação em países dos hemisférios Norte e Sul (12), inclusive o Brasil (13) que se auto-reconhecem como parte do movimento pelo decrescimento. Todos à sua maneira e entendimento vêm contribuindo para a construção das múltiplas identidades e entendimentos sobre o decrescimento. Há inclusive uma sistematização (14), que não abrange a totalidade dessa diversidade, que reconhece ao menos duas “vertentes” que se complementam: o decrescimento à francesa, que foca sua crítica à modernidade; e o decrescimento sustentável, mais alinhado com a disciplina Economia Ecológica. Assim, este é um movimento ainda em processo de formação e significação, sendo que qualquer crítica dirigida a ele baseada em apenas um único autor constitui um erro precário.

A novidade

Ao reconhecer e divulgar suas fontes intelectuais, o decrescimento assume que o debate que provoca não é novo (15). Desta forma, o decrescimento ao mesmo tempo, incorpora e articula movimentos e autores que já empreenderam criticas à modernidade, ao desenvolvimentismo, ao consumismo, à democracia, à impossibilidade de generalização do padrão de consumo dos países e das classes ricas e às desigualdades ecológica e social.

Mas o decrescimento abre perspectivas radicalmente novas, quando denuncia que, sem superar o paradigma do crescimento ilimitado, o crescimento das economias já desenvolvidas irá agravar as desigualdades globais. Além de explicitar que todas as teorias de desenvolvimento, sejam quais forem, tratam de como provocar mais crescimento econômico. Ademais, o decrescimento retoma o debate sobre a autonomia da sociedade com relação ao Estado e sobre a influência da razão contábil e instrumental das grandes burocracias públicas ou privadas. Assim, os decrescentistas rejeitam as falsas soluções que se focam apenas na gestão e na escolha dos tipos de recursos. Mais que isto, os decrescentistas buscam provocar mudanças de sentido, não só dos meios, mas também dos fins (16). Em suma, a novidade está no entendimento de que sem modificar a essência do modelo socioeconómico e dos valores pessoais não haverá saída.

1. KERSCHNER, C. Economic de-growth vs. steady-state economy. Growth, Recession or Degrowth for Sustainability and Equity?, v. 18, n. 6, p. 544–551, abr. 2010;

MARTINEZ-ALIER J. Environmental justice and economic degrowth: An alliance between two movements. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, v. 23, n. 1, p. 51–73, 2012.

SORMAN, A. H.; GIAMPIETRO, M. The energetic metabolism of societies and the degrowth paradigm: analyzing biophysical constraints and realities. Degrowth: From Theory to Practice, v. 38, n. 0, p. 80–93, jan. 2013.

XUE, J.; ARLER, F.; NÆSS, P. Is the degrowth debate relevant to China? Environment, Development and Sustainability, v. 14, n. 1, p. 85–109, 2012.

2. JACKSON, T. Prosperity without growth: economics for a finite planet. London: Earthscan, 2009.

3. A questão da população, sobretudo relacionada às ideias de Ehrlich, considerado por alguns como um autor malthusiano, não é sequer citada em diversos livros sobre o decrescimento, em edições especiais de revistas acadêmicas dedicadas exclusivamente ao decrescimento ele tampouco figura entre as raízes intelectuais do movimento. Para verificação veja:

BAYON, D. et al. Decrecimiento : 10 preguntas para comprenderlo y debatirlo. [Mataró]: Ediciones de interveción cultural/El Viejo Topo, 2011.

DEMARIA F et al. What is degrowth? from an activist slogan to a social movement. Environmental Values, v. 22, n. 2, p. 191–215, 2013.

FLIPO, F. Conceptual roots of degrowth Proceedings of the First International Conference on Economic De-Growth for Ecological Sustainability and Social Equity. Paris: Research & Degrowth, Telecom Sud-Paris, 2008

KALLIS, G.; KERSCHNER, C.; MARTINEZ-ALIER, J. (EDS.). Special Section: The Economics of Degrowth. Ecological Economics, v. 84, n. 0, p. 172–269, dez. 2012.

LATOUCHE, S. Pequeno Tratado do Decrescimento Sereno. São Paulo: WMF Martins Fontes, 2009.

LATOUCHE, S. La apuesta por el decrecimiento ¿cómo salir del imaginario dominante? Barcelona: Icaria, 2009.

MARTINEZ-ALIER, J. et al. Sustainable de-growth: Mapping the context, criticisms and future prospects of an emergent paradigm. Ecological Economics, v. 69, n. 9, p. 1741–1747, 2010.

TAIBO, C. En defensa del decrecimiento : sobre capitalismo, crisis y barbarie. Madrid: Los Libros de la Catarata, 2009.

4. Ver a subseção “Uma falsa solução: reduzir a população” do livro Pequeno tratado do decrescimento sereno, de Latouche (2009) – citado acima.

5. Ver o capítulo “El decrecimiento, ¿es malthusiano?” do livro Decrecimiento: 10 preguntas para comprenderlo y debatirlo, de Bayon e colaboradores (2011) – citado acima.

6. DEMARIA e colaboradores (2013) – citado acima

7. Algumas referencias desta fonte intelectual são: os criticos do desenvolvimento das décadas de 1970 e 1980, como Latouche, Arturo Escobar, Gilbert Rist, Helena Norberg-Hodge, Majid Rahnema, Wolfgang Sachs, Ashish Nandy, Shiv Visvanathan, Gustavo Esteva, François Partant, Bernard Charbonneau e Ivan Illich. Inclui também os críticos inspirados por Marcel Mauss como Alain Caillé e outros membros do MAUSS. Além de outros autores como Karl Polanyi e Marshall Sahlins.

8. Algumas referencias desta fonte intelectual são Pierre Rabhi, Mongeau, Schumacher, Kumarappa e Easterlin.

9. Georgescu-Roegen, Herman Daly, Donella Meadows, Kenneth Boulding, E. F. Schumacher, Howard T. Odum e Elizabeth C. Odum

10. Algumas referências desta fonte intelectual são: Ivan Illich, Jacques Ellul e Cornelius Castoriadis.

11. Uma das referências desta fonte intelectual é Paul Aries

12. Demaria e colaboradores (2013) – citado acima

13. BOCCATO-FRANCO, A. A. O decrescimento no Brasil. In: LÉNA, P.; NASCIMENTO, E. P. DO (Eds.). Enfrentando os limites do crescimento: sustentabilidade, decrescimento e prosperidade. Rio de Janeiro: Garamond, 2012. p. 269–2

Entrevista a Dennis Meadows no 50º aniversario da publicação do livro The Limits to Growth

Only rarely does a book truly change the world. In the nineteenth century, such a book was Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. For the twentieth century, it was The Limits to Growth. Not only did this best-selling 1972 publication help spur the environmental movement, but it showed that the underlying dynamics of the modern industrial world are unsustainable on the timescale of a couple of human lifetimes. This was profoundly important information, and it was delivered credibly and clearly, so that every policy maker could understand it. Sadly, the book was rejected by powerful people with vested interests in the Western growth-based economic model that was overtaking the rest of the world. Today we are starting to see the results of that rejection.

Of the book’s four authors, only Dennis Meadows and Jørgen Randers are active (Donella Meadows died in 2001). I recently reached out to Dr. Meadows, whom I’ve gotten to know during the past few years, to see if he would be willing to engage in a short discussion, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of The Limits to Growth. He graciously agreed.

Richard Heinberg: Dennis, it is an honor to have this opportunity to interview you. Congratulations on having co-authored the most important book of the past century. I’m delighted that you’re willing to reply to a few questions.

First, how is reality tracking with the scenarios you and your colleagues generated 50 years ago?

Dennis L. Meadows: There have been several attempts, recently, to compare some of our scenarios with the way the global system has evolved over the past 50 years. That’s difficult. It’s, in a way, trying to confirm by looking through a microscope whether or not the data that you gathered through a telescope are accurate. In fact, accuracy is not really the issue here. Our goal in doing the original analysis was to provide a conceptual framework within which people could think about their own options and about the events that they saw around them. When we evaluate models, we always ask whether they’re more useful, not whether they’re more accurate.

Having said that, I will also say that the efforts which have been undertaken have generally concluded that the world is moving along what we termed in our 1972 report to be the standard scenario. It’s an aggregated image of the global system, showing growth from 1972 up to around 2020, and then, over the next decade or two, the principal trends peaking out and beginning to decline. I still find that model very useful in understanding what I read in the papers and in trying to think about what’s coming next.

RH: Generally, when it comes to discussions about environmental impacts on society, resource depletion gets a lot less attention than pollution. Nearly everybody talks about climate change these days, but the background assumption seems to be that, if we reduce emissions to “net zero,” we can continue living essentially as we do now—with a consumer culture, 8 billion people, and cruise ships (hydrogen powered, of course). There’s very little discussion in the mainstream—even among most scientists, it seems to me—about how growing population and consumption will lead to a series of depletion crises even if we somehow avert the worst climate impacts. How do you see the impacts of depletion and pollution developing as constraints on future growth?

DLM: I would say that depletion and pollution are already constraints on future growth. Take just oil, for example. In the 90s, the average price was about $30 a barrel. We’re now in the vicinity of $100 a barrel, even taking inflation into account. That is beginning to put a significant damper on investment decisions. And plus, there is of course, no possibility of avoiding climate change, even if we did reduce emissions to net zero. The lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere (its half-life is about 120 years) means we’re going to have to live for the rest of this century with the consequences of almost everything we’ve dumped into the atmosphere up until now.

The last time the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere was this high was about 4 million years ago. There were no humans around, and sea level was about 60 feet higher than it is today. This is not science fiction. We know that if the Antarctic ice sheet melts off, it will raise global sea levels by about 190 feet. That will add, of course, to the expansion of the water in the oceans which is coming from warming temperatures. We also see that the Arctic ice sheet is melting. And there’s absolutely no reason I’ve seen to imagine other than that the effects of current warming will accelerate that process.

However, it is useful to imagine (although it’s a fantasy) that we could eliminate climate change as an issue. Even then, major changes would be required. If you read the papers and look at the data, we see that natural resources are deteriorating on every single continent. We’re far above sustainable levels. Even if we could avoid climate change, there is no possibility of sustaining 8 billion people at anything near the living standards we’ve come to expect. There have been some academic exercises to calculate how many people the earth could support. That’s really a silly sort of exercise, because it ignores most of the values and goals that we have for making human life on this planet worthwhile: equity, liberty, welfare, human health. These things are all intimately affected by overpopulation. I don’t know what a sustainable population level is now, but it’s probably much closer to a billion people, or fewer, if we aspire for them to have the kind of living standards and the political circumstances that we enjoy in the West.

Depletion in the future is probably going to manifest most directly through what look like political forces. As countries like the United States and China become dependent on imports to sustain their living standards, which they are already with respect to oil, they will begin to implement political, military, and economic measures to gain control over those assets abroad. And that’s certainly going to bring us into conflict. Diverting resources off to the mechanisms of control will reduce the kind of growth that’s possible domestically. We can argue about how much technology will make new resources available to us, but the key thing to remember is that, generally speaking, technology is to be understood as a way of using fossil energy to secure something. And as our fossil energy resources start to decline, the ability of technology to make evermore abundant resources available is certainly going to go down.

RH: The Limits to Growth was heavily scrutinized and criticized. Much of the criticism was unfair and based on numbers from the book that were taken out of context and treated as forecasts—which they explicitly weren’t. But I wonder, with 50 years of hindsight, if any critics made you rethink some of your early assumptions or conclusions? 

DLM: Of course, I’ve often wondered how I would do things differently if I knew back in 1972 what I know now, and were once again constructing a team and organizing an effort to develop and analyze a global model. By and large, I think we made the right choices. I’ll talk in a moment about energy where, I think some important changes could have been made. One of our crucial assumptions was to look at the globe as a whole, and not try to differentiate amongst regions or countries. In hindsight, I think that was the right thing to do—although it did, of course, open us up to criticism. As little as we know about long-term global trends, we know even less about the dynamics of international transfers of people, finance, resources, energy, and so forth. So, trying to make a multinational model for the long term is going to leave you with an extremely complicated set of assumptions, all of which are based on ignorance, and that’s not a very useful model.

RH: The Integrated Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are not systems models like World3 (the model used for The Limits to Growth) and do not consider the possibility of degrowth, only growth. Can you reflect on the differences in modeling approaches and what implications they have—for example, for the most extreme scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions?

DLM: There are profound differences between what we did and the modeling which has been carried out in support of the IPCC. I respect that effort enormously. I know many of the people involved in trying to model long-term climate change. They are excellent scientists, and they’re doing good work. They have generated much useful new knowledge. But the nature of their analysis is just totally different from what we did. It wouldn’t be too much of an exaggeration to say that the IPCC model starts first with what is politically acceptable, and then tries to trace out its scientific consequences, whereas we looked at what was scientifically known, and then tried to trace out its political consequences.

The IPCC model leaves many things exogenous. To use it you have to specify population growth assumptions, economic GDP level assumptions, and so forth. We worked very hard to make the important determinants of our model endogenous. It means that it evolves over time in response to changes that are occurring within the model. Making the important variables, like population, exogenous saves you a lot of criticism. You can give a bunch of different scenarios, and within that set, almost any politician will find something that they like.

The IPCC scenario is just telling us about climate change, and does not get into other issues. We were trying to provide an overall framework. So, they’re both useful efforts, just totally different. It’s like picking up a hammer and picking up a paintbrush, and asking which is better. And of course, the answer is, each has its own purposes.

RH: The Limits to Growth model just has “resources” as inputs to the economy, with energy included as a resource. I wonder if you see energy as special, as it takes energy to access all other resources, such as minerals. Would you think resource declines in general will follow energy declines specifically?

DLM: The most serious omission in our model, as far as I now understand it, was energy. We lumped all forms of energy implicitly into either the nonrenewable resource sector, or, in some farfetched way, the agricultural sector. That implicitly assumes that energy is infinitely substitutable—an assumption the economists make all the time, but which is, of course, totally erroneous.

I still remember when the oil embargo occurred, I think it was in 1972. And economists said, “Well, don’t worry. The energy economy in the United States is only 4 or 5 per cent of GDP. So even if it stops totally, the GDP isn’t going to go down very much.” Well, of course, that’s just an incredibly silly way of understanding reality. If there’s no energy, there is very little GDP. Whether or not the decline in energy availability will track closely or only loosely with resource availability remains to be seen. Energy availability, of course, is not only a matter of physical quantities, but also useful energy. The concept of energy return on investment (EROI) is extremely important, and probably well known to the people who monitor your website. We know that it’s trending down. Charlie Hall, in his pioneering work, has done the best job I’ve seen to calculate what EROI needs to be in order to sustain an economy as complex as ours. We have a ways to go, but it will be the decline of energy return on investment, which is the biggest problem.

RH: In rereading your book, I was struck by the excellent recommendations you made, starting on page 161. If only these had been adopted back then by policy makers globally! Unfortunately for us all, they weren’t, for the most part (though some successful efforts were made to slow population growth). Now, 50 years on, do you think different recommendations are appropriate?

DLM: I went back and looked at all three editions of our book. I couldn’t find anywhere that set of recommendations, excellent or otherwise. [RH Note: Dennis is correct here, of course: there are no “recommendations” per se, merely hypothetical conditions, such as the application of policies to produce an equalization of birth and death rates starting in 1975, that were fed into the scenarios in an attempt to produce a stable world condition throughout the 21st century.] However, whatever it was that we recommended back then certainly is not relevant now. In 1972, the impact of humanity on the globe was probably below sustainable levels, and the goal at that time was to slow things down before we hit the limit. Now it’s clear that the scale of human activities is far, far above the limit. And our goal is not to slow down, but to get back down: to find ways to maneuver the system, in a peaceful, equitable, hopefully fairly liberal way, and bring our demands back down to levels that can be borne by the planet. That’s a totally different question than the one we addressed. It would require a totally different kind of model than the one we built, and a totally different set of books than the ones we wrote. We were careful in our analyses, when describing our different scenarios, never to make statements about the output of the model, after the first major variable peaked and started to go down, because we understood that that would bring very profound changes in the social and the political system, which would almost undoubtedly make our model quite irrelevant. So, there’s still lots of interesting research to be done. There’s a whole new set of interesting questions. But you’ll have to look elsewhere than our work in order to get started on it.

RH: Do you think policy makers are any more open now than they were then?

DLM: It’s not a question of whether policymakers are open or not; it’s whether they’re more likely now to take constructive action than they were 50 years ago. That’s a complex question, and I don’t know the answer. Action requires not just openness, but also resources and concern. I’ve been able to convince people that, for example, climate change is coming. They don’t take action, not because they don’t believe me, but because they just don’t care. They’re focused on a short-term perspective within which the current system is giving them the power and the money they aspire to. They see no need for change.

It’s ironic, but with these kinds of problems over time, the concern tends to go up, but the discretionary resources tend to go down. And it’s often the case that, by the time policymakers become sufficiently concerned about something to start wondering what to do, they no longer have sufficient discretionary resources to be very effective. And this is all compounded with what I call the time horizon vicious circle. Because we haven’t taken effective action in the past, crises are mounting. It’s in the nature of the political response that, when crisis comes, you focus more and more on the short term, and your time horizon shrinks. And because that leads you to do things which fundamentally don’t solve the problem, the crisis gets worse. So, as the crisis gets worse, the time horizon shrinks even more, bad decision making increases, and the crisis goes up even further. That’s where I see us now.

I’ve used the metaphor sometimes of the roller coaster, which, for my German audiences, the most prominent example would be the one at Oktoberfest in Munich. In 1972, using this metaphor, I could say that the situation was kind of like a group of people standing at the ticket window and wondering whether or not they ought to get on the train. They still had a chance not to do it. But, in this analogy, they did. They got on the car, and they enjoyed a short period of growth up to the top of the first hill. Now they’re about to start to descend, and they no longer have much room for constructive action. All they can do is hold on and hope to survive the trip. That’s a simplistic way of understanding our situation, but it puts policymaking into a useful perspective.

RH: Of all the recommendations you made then (or new ones), what is the single most important? Is there a pebble of an idea that can start an avalanche of change?

DLM: The recommendations we made back in 1972 simply aren’t relevant now. So, although I could say, in theory, stopping population growth or increasing people’s concern for those far away might have been the most important things we could have done 50 years ago, now it’s really too late for that. If I were trying to start a new momentum for change, it would be on understanding the nature of human perception. Why is it that we tend to focus on the short term and the local, when in fact, the fundamental solutions to these problems are long-term and far away? And there’s a lot of research to be done. Economists have predicated their recommendations on the assumption that GDP will continue to expand forever. Certainly, it will not. We need to understand the implications of that and try to think through what practical policy recommendations could be implemented in response to that fact. I think about those things, but I certainly haven’t come to the point where I’m able to spell out a set of detailed recommendations.

RH: What do you think about the prospects for people to relinquish the idea of maximizing their power over nature, and to accept the idea of “enough” as an organizing principle for a good life? Would that be going against our genes, or just our cultural conditioning?

DLM: To an extent that we don’t appreciate in most cases, our species, Homo sapiens, and therefore its global society, are the result of 300,000 to 400,000 years of evolution, during which there was high survival value in focusing on the short-term nearby, and not worrying about the long-term far away. As a consequence, that’s the mental and the institutional endowment we have now for dealing with questions that, for the first time, really need something else. There are two ways we change: socially and biologically. Fundamental genetic change in our species requires 3,000 or 4,000 years. It takes about that long before a constructive mutation can become fairly widespread. Social adaptation can, at least in theory, occur quicker, so the question here is: what are the prospects for our social system to change in ways that are more congruent with the reality? It’s high in theory. In practice, I’m not sure. The dominant issue we face is that the current system is serving the interests of many people very well. There are a lot of people who get wealth and political power from the current system. And of course, when somebody else recommends a change, the people with that power are going to resist, and they have resisted. The fossil fuel industry is one example, but there are thousands. You can’t understand the nuclear debate if you don’t realize that some people are making millions of dollars by building nuclear reactors.

So, you need to ask not a physical scientist like me, but a sociologist or political scientist about the prospect for changing society. In the past, change happened rapidly under periods of crisis, not typically during periods of peace and success. As the crises grow we will see what change is available.

RH: You’ve done some research into how people change their behavior; have you learned some lessons that might be valuable for young activists?

DLM: I’m an old activist. I’m 80 years old. I don’t imagine that I have the capacity to put myself in the head of somebody who’s just starting out life and sees 60 or 70 years ahead of them. Nonetheless, I might offer at least a few things for them to consider. One is to recognize that people are motivated by many different factors: wealth, affection, fame, power. And if you want somebody to change, you need to understand what motivates them, and to persuade them that the change you recommend is going to serve their interests. This will be easier if their interests extend to people far away or out into the future. But one way or another, they need to find it to be in their self-interest. I’ve seldom found somebody who was willing to drop everything and do things I told them to do just because I thought it was a good idea.

Another thing I would say is that, no matter what happens over the next decades, at each moment there’s always an opportunity to do many different things. Some of them will make the situation better, and some of them will make it worse. And it’s ethically satisfying, and probably even effective in some way, to try and find the things that will make things better.

I don’t know what’s coming. I look at those downward sloping curves in my scenario, and I honestly don’t know what it’s going to look like on the ground over the next 40 to 50 years. But my guess is that some people may come through this period not even being much aware of collapse, whereas others, of course, are already far into the decline of their personal situation, their culture, their community, and so forth. Whatever turns out to be the case, I know that the people who have some practical skills, modest aspirations, and a good social network are going to fare better. So, if I were to conclude with any sort of simplistic recommendation, I guess it would be to build up your social networks. Use them as a source of new ideas, support, reinforcement, and satisfaction.

RH: Dennis, thank you again for talking with me, and deep and sincere thanks for all you’ve done over the years to help us understand our global predicament.

A farewell to copitalism

The COP26 conference has failed to usher in a new era where capital is constrained to prevent catastrophic climate breakdown.

The future was supposed to be copitalism: a new global economic paradigm where national governments work together through the United Nations (UN) Conference of the Parties (COP) process to limit emissions and prevent runaway climate breakdown - while leaving capitalism otherwise intact.

The climate conferences have taken place annually for a quarter of a century. The aim is to negotiate global emissions targets that will be translated into national policies. The high-water mark was the Paris Agreement of COP21 when the worlds’ leaders agreed to limit global heating to 1.5C.

The mechanism agreed was "nationally determined contributions" (NDCs). This means national governments are responsible for submitting commitments to cut emissions to the UN. The COP process is also supposed to include a “ratchet mechanism” where those government commitments are made increasingly ambitious.

Credibility

In order to deliver on the NDCs each country would have to use a combination of carrot – investment, incentives, tax cuts – and stick – regulation and taxation – to move capital away from fossil fuels and towards “green” technology and infrastructure. The most obvious and effective means of reducing emissions is a limit or stop on the exploitation of coal, oil and gas.

Thus, "copitalism" is designed to maintain the status quo except where specific economic activity drives us towards climate breakdown. Capital accumulation remains the logic of our economies. Economic growth is maintained, or profit is delivered by the distribution of wealth from the poorest to the richest. Corporations continue to deliver profits for shareholders. Social inequality deepens. Poverty grinds.

The Glasgow conference, COP26, was the first deadline for presidents and prime ministers to hand in their Paris Agreement homework. The problem is, reducing fossil fuel exploitation involves a confrontation with the wealthiest, most entrenched monopoly corporations in human history.

And even on its own terms, the outcomes from the COP process over the last two weeks are catastrophic. As Climate Action Tracker (CAT) reported during the conference: "The projected warming from current policies - not proposals, what countries are actually doing – is...at 2.7 ̊C with only a 0.2 ̊C improvement over the last year and nearly one degree above the net-zero announcements governments have made."

The distressing truth is Copitalism should be a dystopian nightmare.

Bill Hare, the chief executive of Climate Analytics, a CAT partner organisation, has said: “It’s all very well for leaders to claim they have a net zero target, but if they have no plans as to how to get there, and their 2030 targets are as low as so many of them are, then frankly, these net zero targets are just lip service to real climate action. Glasgow has a serious credibility gap.”

The new promises emanating from Glasgow would reduce this warming by just 0.1C. As Climate Action Tracker has established, there is a “very big credibility gap” when it comes to net-zero policy. Life under such conditions will not be worth living for millions, if not billions, of people.

Damage

The primary weakness of the COP process is that even the best outcomes are, by design, not action but words. The conferences are focused on national governments setting out new commitments, always framed by deadlines years into the future. The politicians and their parties may not even be in power when those chickens come home to roost.

Those members of civil society paying the most attention - concerned citizens, protesters, charities and NGOs and the thousands of journalists - feel duty bound to celebrate and amplify the smallest successes from the COP process. There is a deep concern that the general public will become disheartened, climate anxiety will intensify and campaigners will switch off.

And so one of the major successes being touted at the conference is an agreement signed by 40 countries to phase out coal power by the 2030s for the coloniser economies and 2040s for the colonised, and to end all investment in new coal power generation. China has not agreed to reduce coal production and burning at home.

There has also been much fanfare about the surprise agreement between the United States – historically the largest contributor to climate breakdown – and China – currently the largest national contributor. But even here the response of many at COP26 has been characterised thus: "This was a stage-managed nothingburger. There was nothing new bar words, nothing on coal, finance or loss and damage."

The problem is, climate breakdown is a physical reality.

Share price

A total of 88m barrels of oil were produced per day globally in 2020. The historically unprecedented international shutdown of production as a result of the global pandemic did not come close to reducing our use of oil by the levels necessary to prevent climate breakdown. Indeed, production was at a historic high of 95m barrels per day in 2019. There is no reason to believe it will not return to these suicidal levels in the coming years.

Further, a total of 7,741,600,000 tonnes of coal were produced globally in 2020. Again, the pandemic slowdown resulted in a dip in mining. But, even so, coal production globally is higher today than when the gavel was struck to mark the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2016. And bear in mind that there remains 1,074,108,000,000 tonnes of proven coal reserves around the world.

The actual introduction of a copitalist economy would inevitably result in coal, oil and gas becoming stranded assets. Those companies that hold these assets would not be able to exploit them, turning assets into sales into profits into dividends for shareholders. The share prices might not collapse, but they would certainly move. If capitalism works on any level, then it is that those with capital will only invest in companies that deliver a return on that investment.

The share prices of the major energy companies tell the same story. ExxonMobil currently has a market capitalisation of $281 billion. A share in the company today is worth $64 - indistinguishable from the price on the opening day of COP26 and well above the $35 price from this time last year. ExxonMobil shareholders do not fear copitalism.

Likewise, the share price of the Peabody Energy Corporation - the world’s largest private coal company - remains steady at $11, almost three times its value last year. Closer to home, shares in BP have risen from £2.36 each to £3.41 in the course of the last year, as the company recovers from the pandemic.

Campaigners

The justification for this political project is that the need to avert climate breakdown is so urgent and critical, and the likelihood of a wider and deeper political transformation of our societies and our economies is so remote, that the capitalists must be appeased while being persuaded that climate mitigation is in their interests as much as anyone else’s.

The problem with the capitalist project is that capitalists are not running the capitalist system, but perversely the capitalist system runs the capitalists. The corporate leadership of any country does not choose what or how it produces but instead is the flotsam of our societies willing to do anything to ride the wave of capitalist wealth-making at any cost.

Ben van Beurden, the chief executive of Shell, is a moral vacuum. But this is not a personal failing of a human being who just happens to have risen through the ranks of his corporation through hard work and diligence.

A capitalist logic has promoted those executives who deliver results, deliver profits, precisely by grinding the most out of the human and natural resources they control. No amount of evidence or hectoring can change van Beurden’s mind. And if it does, he will be out of a job.

The assembled delegates, the surrounding banks of NGO campaigners and exhausted journalists try to understand the daily shocks and disappointments of the COP process. It is assumed that a failure of understanding on the part of a particular leader – usually someone else’s leader – is the cause of failure at the conference. We are wedded to the idea of human agency, of powerful saviours, of national leaders.

Billionaires

The delegates of COP26 negotiating our collective future are hidden away in a cordoned off zone within the Blue Zone. More than 500 of those delegates are either directly within the employ of fossil fuel companies or delegates for government departments working with Big Coal, Oil and Gas. The NGOs and the journalists accredited to the zone are locked out of the real discussions, relying on press conferences for any crumbs of information.

The Blue Zone itself feels like a military encampment on the banks of the River Clyde. The fences tower overhead with delegates rushing through turnstiles guarded by security. The Green Zone along the road is entirely separate, but here the pavilions are dominated by National Grid, Unilever, Sainsbury’s and Microsoft. The message – that corporations are the solution – is not subtle. The Green Zone is open to the public, and school children tour the science museum styled displays.

Civil society is represented in Glasgow. But the COP26 Coalition is both physically and metaphorically cast into the hinterland in venues scattered across the living centre of the city of Glasgow. Here the science of climate change is understood and accepted, and the reality of the actual change needed to prevent calamity is discussed. The attendees are actual people from Glasgow.

The discussions at the venue in Adelaide Place were wide ranging and meaningful, taking in the Green New Deal, degrowth, Indigenous traditions, the threat of green colonialism, food sovereignty, international trade, and more. But the event seemed only to coincide with the COP negotiations happening less than two miles away. There seemed no possibility of these debates influencing the proceedings.

Copitalism should be a dystopian nightmare. The COP26 conferences are a political project aimed at maintaining as much as possible of our current global economic system. The billionaires will continue to make gargantuan profits, fuelling their intergalactic fantasies. At the same time, 15 million people have likely died from coronavirus and billions are denied a cheap vaccine to maintain the profits of the pharmaceutical industry.

Monsters

But the experience of COP26 during the last few days suggests that copitalism itself is an unachievable utopian dream, as vacuous as Charles Fourier’s vision of the oceans turning to lemonade. There is, alas, no real need for a neologism. Capitalism cannot allow copitalism to exist, such is its rapacious need for mountains and oceans of coal, oil and gas.

Barack Obama when president of the United States was instrumental in defusing the Paris Agreement and now calls on young people to protest for climate action. During his speech on Monday he made the following confession: “There are times where the future seems somewhat bleak. There are times where I am doubtful that humanity can get its act together before it’s too late, and images of dystopia start creeping into my dreams.”

The reality is that COP26 is failing because capitalism cannot allow copitalism to supersede. We cannot postpone the work of ending capitalism until after we have moved to avert climate breakdown. Because capitalism is climate breakdown. Ta’Kaiya Blaney of the Tla A’min Nation, the Indigenous activist told People's Plenary meeting before a walkout today: “Cop26 is a performance. It is an illusion constructed to save the capitalist economy rooted in resource extraction and colonialism. I didn’t come here to fix the agenda – I came here to disrupt it.”

This argument does not have to be simplified for the public. We already know. As Cora, a 15-year-old member of Fridays For Future from Edinburgh said so eloquently this week: “Letting that kind of capitalist theatre run every COP? We are never going to see the change that we need now.”

But if copitalism is now an impossible utopia, is capitalism really the only game in town? Is it easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of the billionaire? Or is now the time for the climate movement to merge fully into the environment movement, the social justice movement, the (dare I say it) anti-capitalist movement so that we can aggregate our traumas, our grievances, our hopes, into something with the force and multitude that can begin to challenge the capitalist machine at the core of our misfortunes?

The famous quote from the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci also seems apposite right now. “The old world is dying and the new world struggles to be born. Now is the time of monsters.”

This Author

Brendan Montague is editor of The Ecologist.

Dossiê Economia

ATENÇÃO © Copyleft - É permitida a partilha do dossiê exclusivamente para fins não comerciais e desde que o autor e o BioTerra sejam citados.
Leitura obrigatória: A Educação Ambiental nas empresas e o sistema de Gestão Ambiental

Não esqueças de visitar regularmente este espaço para manteres-te actualizado

Circularity Gap Report

End Plastic Pollution by 2040

GCAP - Global Call to Action Against Poverty

Global Tax Expenditures Database

One Planet Network

Plano de ação para uma economia circular

UN - Decade on Restoration (2021-2030)

UNFCC - Race to Resilience and Race to Zero

World Inequality Database

Prémios

Earthshot

Goethe Medal

Nobel Prize for Sustainable Development

John Bates Clark Medal

Prémio Herbert Baxter Adams

Prémio Internacional Catalunha

Prémio Nobel da Economia

Prémio Planeta Azul

Prémio Tyler de Conquista Ambiental

Right Livelihood Award

Woodrow Wilson Awards

Ação Directa

List of Occupy Movement topics

ONG || Activismo

1% for the Planet

Bank Track

Banking on Climate Chaos

Carbon Market Watch

Carbon Tracker Initiative

Changing Markets Foundation

Corporate Human Rights Benchmark

Citizens for Tax Justice

Class Matters

Climate Advisers

Climate and Capitalism

Climate Safe Lending Network

CEE- Bank Watch

Conservation International

Consumers International

Corporate Europe Observatory

CorpWatch

Debt Justice

EEB - European Environmental Bureau

Elements by Visual Capitalism

ESG - Environmental, Social and Governance Risks

Excellent Development

FBES - Fórum Brasileiro de Economia Solidária

Feasta

Finance Watch

Force For Good

Global Action for Debt Cancellation

Global Witness

Good On You

Go Transparent

GOF - Green Finance Observatory 

GOTS - Global Organic Textile Standards

GRS - Global Recycled Standard

Great Transition Initiative
Green Biz

Green Economy Coalition

Gross National Happiness (USA)

IFG - International Forum on Globalization

Layoffs Tracker

Lobby Control

Make My Money Matter

Natural Capitalism Solutions

Network of Wellbeing

Peak Prosperity

Plataforma Simbiotico - Eco

Plataforma TROCA

Power Poor

Public Citizen (USA)

Reclaim Finance

Rethink Economics

Right to Energy Coalition 

Social Watt

Spinwatch

The Green Market Oracle

The Minimalists

The Pathfinders Collective

Visual Capitalist

World Benchmarking Alliance

Zero Hedge

Instituições || Plataformas sobre Economia Ecológica

AERE - Association of Environmental and Resource Economics
APEMETA - Associação Portuguesa de Empresas e Tecnologias Ambientais

Bee Circular

Beijer Institute of Ecological Economy (SE)

Blue Green Alliance (USA)

Bretton Woods Project

Business for Nature

BCSD Portugal

Carbon Credits

C2ES -Center for Climate and Energy Solutions

CACOR - Canadian Association for the Club of Rome

CANSEE - Canadian Society for Ecological Economics

CASSE - Center for the Advancement of the Steady State Economy

CEBDS - Conselho Empresarial Brasileiro para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável

CEC - Commission for Environmental Cooperation

CENSE – Center for Environmental and Sustainability Research

Center for Global Development 

Centre for the New Economy and Society

CEP - Centre for Economic Performance 

CERES

Circle Economy

CIEL- Center for International Environmental Law

CICES – Common International Classification of Ecosystem Services

Club of Rome

CNCS - Centre for Nature-based Climate Solutions

CONCORD- Confederação Europeia das ONG de Emergência e Desenvolvimento

Conselho Empresarial para o Desenvolvimento Sustentável

Conservation International

Consumers International
COTEMA - Conselho Temático do Meio Ambiente

CPI - Climate Policy Initiative

CUSP - Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity 

DEAL - Doughnut Economics Action Lab

DESA- Department of Economic and Social Affairs (ONU)

EAP Green

EAERE - Associação Europeia de Economistas Ambientais e de Recursos

Earth Policy

EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Develepoment

Ecological Economics For All

ECOMAN - Centro de Economia Ecológica e Gestão do Ambiente

Ecosystem Marketplace

Eco Vadis

EDF - Fundo de Defesa Ambiental

EDIRC - Economics Departments Resource and Environmental 

ESEE - European Society for Ecological Economics

EfD - Environment for Development

Ellen MacArthur Foundation

Environmental Economics Knowledge Center (Nova SBE)

Environmental Finance

EY - Ernst & Young Global Limited (Global)

EY Portugal

FAW/n - The Research Institute for Applied Knowledge Processing

FOET - The Foundation on Economic Trends

FSB - Conselho de Estabilidade Financeira

Fundación Ambiente y Recursos Naturales

Fundo Ambiental

Futures of Sustainability - Universität Hamburg

GABV - Global Alliance for Banking on Values 

Generation Investment Management

GED -  Global & European Dynamics

GFANZ - Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero

GFC - Fundo Climático Verde

GGGI - Global Green Growth Institute 

Global Economic Dynamics and the Biosphere

Global Footprint Network

Global Sustainability Hub

Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change  and Environment

Green Biz

Green Growth Knowledge Pltaform

Happier Way Foundation

HSA - Happiness Studies Academy

I4CE – Institute for Climate Economics

IATP - Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy

IBD - Inter-American Development Bank

IBD- Invest

IBD- Lab

ICROA - International Carbon Reduction and Offset Alliance

ICVCM - Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market

IEA - Institute for Environmental Analytics

IEEFA - Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis

IEP - Institute for Economics and Peace

IGP- Institute for Global Prosperity

IIED - Instituto Internacional para o Meio Ambiente e Desenvolvimento

INET - Institute for New Economic Thinking

IPBES - Plataforma Intergovernamental sobre Biodiversidade e Serviços Ecossistémicos 

ISEE- International Society for Ecological Economics
Initiative For Equality

Inspire Green Finance

Long Finance

Meeschaert Asset Management

Instituto Ludwig von Mises (Global)

Instituto Ludwig von Mises (BR)

Instituto Ludwig von Mises (PT)

Natural Capitalism Solutions

NDC Partnership

NEF- New Economics Foundation

Net-Zero Banking Alliance

NEXT - Nuova Economia

Newday Impact Investing

NIESR - National Institute of Economic and Social Research

OCDE- Green Growth

OSCE - Organização Para a Segurança e Cooperação na Europa 

PAGE - Partnership for Action on Green Economy (ONU)

Planetiers

PGI- Post Growth Institute

PIK- Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Polo Lionello Bonfanti

Project Drawdown

Project Syndicate

Post Carbon Institute

Ray C. Anderson Foundation

Refinitiv

REScoop - European Federation of Citizen Energy Cooperatives

Resources for the Future

Ride Free Fearless Money

RIPESS Europe – Solidarity Economy Europe

Rocky Mountain Institute

Roosevelt Institute

Rótulo Ecológico da União Europeia (site oficial)

RSA -  Royal Society of Arts

S&P Global

Schumacher Center for New Economics

SEEA - System of Environmental Economic Accounting

SDSN -  Sustainable Development Solutions Network
SEforALL - Sustainable Energy for All

SFC - The Shareholders for Change network 

SGS - Société Générale de Surveillance (Internacional)

SGS - Société Générale de Surveillance (PT)

Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Ecológica

Socio Eco

SSEE - Smith School of Enterprise and the Environment

Simbiótico

Stockholm Resilience Centre

Sustanya

Sustainable Markets Initiative

Sustainability Insights

TBLI - Triple Bottom Line Investing

TEEB - Economia dos Ecossistemas e da Biodiversidade

Terra Carta Impact Report

The B Team

The Blue  Economy

The Real Green New Deal

THNK - School of Creative Leadership

UNEP - FI: Finance Initiative

UNEP-WCMC: World Conservation Monitoring Centre
Universo Ambiental

Verra 

Vertis
WBCSD - World Business Council for Sustainable Development

We Mean Business Coalition

WEED - World, Economy, Ecology and Development

Wellbeing Economy Alliance

WEGo -  Wellbeing Economy Governments 

WIDER - World Institute of Development Economics Research 

World-Ecology Network

World Happiness Report

WRI - World Resources Institute

ZEF - Center for Development Research

Z/Yen Group

ZERI- Zero Emissions Research and Initiatives 

Comércio Justo

Altermundi

Altromercato – Commercio Equosolidale

Artisans du Monde
Associação Reviravolta

CIDAC- Centro de Intervenção para o Desenvolvimento Amílcar Cabral

Dream Act

Economia Solidária

EFTA - European Fair Trade Association

Ethical Consumer

Etiquable
Fairtrade

Fair Squared

Fair Trade Towns International
GRESEA - Groupe de Récherche pour un Stratégie Economique Alternative

Ideas – Comercio Justo

IFC - International Finance Corporation

Sustainable Markets Iniciative
WFTO - Organização Mundial do Comércio Justo

Decrescimento
Alternatives Economiques

Beautiful Truth

Common Wealth

CUSP - Centre for the Understanding of Sustainable Prosperity 

Decrescimento
Decroissance

Degrow US

Degrowth Info

Degrowth UK

FEASTA- Foundation for the Economics of Sustainability

FaDA - Feminisms and Degrowth Alliance

Global Inequality

Konzeptwerk Neue Ökonomie

IDN - International Degrowth Movement

Institute for Degrowth Studies 

La Ligne d'Horizon
Les Économistes Atterrés
Movimento Decrescita Felice

Post-growth Innovation Lab

Research and Degrowth

Rede Para o Decrescimento

Revista 15/15\ 15

R&D - Research and Degrowth 

Resilience

Sobrevivir Al Descalabro

Economia Crítica || Economia Ética || Economia Heterodoxa

4-Day Week Global

80.000 Hours

AdC - Autoridade da Concorrência
As Transnacionais

Aliança contra la Pobresa Energètica
Alternatives Economiques

APEE - Associação Portuguesa de Ética Empresarial

Banca Ética Latinoamericana

Banco de Tempo

BIEN - Basic Income Earth Network 

Business & Human Rights Resource Centre
Casseurs de Pub

CEE Bankwatch

Centre for Effective Altruism

Charity Navigator

Contas-Poupança

Circular Bioeconomy Alliance

Coop 99 - Cooperativa Integral do Porto
Data Code

Doutor Finanças

Economia Crítica (portal,fr)

Economia de Comunhão

ECOSOC - UN Platform on Economic, Environmental and Social Issues
Effective Altruism

Effective Ventures Foundation

EoF - The Economy of Francesco

EPI - Economic Policy Institue

Eurodad

FREE - Forum for  Real Economic Emancipation

Forethought Foundation

Give Well

Giving What We Can

Grupo Bancário Ético

Heterodox Economics Directory

Hinrich Foundation

Hussonet

IBIW - International Basic Income Week

ICL - Instituto Conhecimento Liberta

IGC - International Growth Centre

IMD - International Institute for Management Development
Inegalités
ITEP - Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (USA)

LabPATS - Laboratório Português de Ambientes de Trabalho Saudáveis

Longview Philanthropy

Parecon

Open Philanthropy

Our World in Data

Project Syndicate

RAND - Research ANd Development

RBI - Rendimento Básico Incondicional
Redefining Progress

Resolution Foundation

SAPRI-NGO-Network

Seattle to Brussels - Netzwerk

SEDES - Associação para o Desenvolvimento Económico e Social

Somo´s CSDDD Databse

Society for Economic Anthropology

The Multinationals Resource Center
The World Economy
Third World Network

Time Banking Network
TNI - Transnational Institute

Triodos Bank
UBIE - Unconditional Basic Income Europe

UBIEXP - UBI Experiments

Transnationale
UNCTAD – United Nations Conference on Trade and Development

Vida Justa

Vison Of Humanity

WEA - World Economics Association

Woodrow Wilson Center

Economia

100 Women in Finance

Accenture

AGCS - Allianz Global Corporate & Specialty

AICEP -  Agência para o Investimento e Comércio Externo de Portugal

AIER - American Institute for Economic Research

APPM- Associação Portuguesa dos Profissionais de Marketing
Bain & Company

BCE- Banco Central Europeu

BID - Banco Interamericano de Desenvolvimento

Blackrock

Blackrock (PT)

Canadian Technology Network

Capital Group

Cato Institute

CEPR - Centre for Economic Policy Research

CPES- Confederação Portuguesa de Economia Social Crédito y Caución PortugalCSES - Center for the Study of Economy & SocietyCommonwealth Club of CaliforniaData Bridge Market Research

Directório de Negócios Portugueses
Econolandia
Economia
Economia com Futuro

EH.net -  Economic History Association 

EMCC Global

ESHT - European Society for History of Economic Thought
European Public Finance

FMI-IMF

Forbes

Goldman Sachs

ICC - Câmara de Comércio Internacional

ICC- Portugal

International Finance Corporation

ITUC - Confederação Sindical Internacional

Kinnevik AB

Mais Liberdade (anarco-capitalista)

Market Oracle
Marktest

Mises Institute (anarco-capitalista)
Money Basics

National Taxpayers Union (EUA)

OCDE- Economy

OCDE- Tax

OCDE- Trade

Okei Institute

Ordem dos Economistas de Portugal
Outline of Finance

Placer.AI

Ritholtz Wealth Management (EUA)

Social Europe

Sociedade Mont Pèlerin (anarco-capitalista)

State Street Corporation

Stern Strategy Group

Tax Foundation

TTR Data

UNCTAD - Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Comércio e Desenvolvimento

UNECE - United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 

WEF - Fórum Económico Mundial

WTO- Organização Mundial do Comércio

Empresas de Rating

AM Best

DBRS Morningstar

Expert RA

Fitch Ratings

JCR Eurasia Rating

JP Morgan

KBRA - Kroll Bond Rating Agency 

Moody´s

Rapid Ratings

Scope Ratings

Standard & Poor's 

World Bank Group

Criptomoedas || Cryptocurrency

ADAM - Association for Digital Asset Markets

Blockchain Association

CRC - Crypto Rating Council

Corporate Finance Institute

Decrypt

E-Cash Act (USA) (com muitos links e recursos)

Live Coins

Modern Consensus

Portal do Bitcoin

Rankings

Eco Vadis - Sustainability Index and Impact

Environmental Performance Index 2022

Europe´s 2024 Green Transiction

Future Possibilities Index 2024

The Green Future Index 2021

The Green Future Index 2022

The Green Future Index 2023

Tratados Internacionais

Acordos de Bretton Woods

Acordo de Paris

Cross-Sector Biodiversity Initiative

Equator Principles

Implementation Plan "Towards a Pollution-Free Planet"

Protocolo de Quioto
Emenda de Doha ao Protocolo de Quioto

Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs)

Princípios Orientadores sobre Empresas e Direitos Humanos

Principles for Responsible Banking - UNEP

Terra Carta

Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage

UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights

Relatórios

1972 - Relatório de Meadows

1979 - Relatório Charney

1987 - Relatório Brundtland – Nosso Futuro Comum

2006 - Relatório Stern

2021 - Relatório Dasgupta

2022 - Stockholm+50: Unlocking a Better Future

2023 - Germany’s great hydrogen race

Investigação

Financial Stability in a Planetary Emergency

Taking the Carbon Out of Credit

The Carbon Bankroll

The Good Transition Plan

Conceitos

Capital de Risco (Venture Capital)

Crescimento deseconómico

Criptomoeda

Cryptocurrency

Decrescimento

Diligência Prévia

Ecological Footprint

Economia de Oferta (Gift Economy) 

Economia Partilhada

Economia Verde

ESG - Environmental, Social, and Corporate Governance

FIB - Felicidade Interna Bruta (Gross National Happiness)

Fundo de Cobertura (Hedge Fund)

Gestão Ambiental

ISEW - Índice de Bem-Estar Económico Sustentável

Longtermism (Longoprazismo)

Moeda Fiduciária

Reforma Fiscal Verde

Rótulo Ecológico da União Europeia

Serviços Ecossistémicos

Sistema bancário sombra (shadow  banking)

Textos  || Estudos 

Crise Financeira: Oportunidade para a Economia Ecológica 

John Keynes versus Milton Friedman

Manifesto 21 Horas

O Papel da Educação Ambiental em Empresas

E-Livros

Awakening Earth,  - Duane Elgin

Green Economics: An Introduction to Theory, Policy and Practice

Natural Capitalism: Creating the Next Industrial Revolution

Small is Beautiful - O Negócio é ser Pequeno - E. F. Schumacher 

Tratado do Decrescimento Sereno - Serge Latouche

Recursos Pedagógicos

Grandes Economistas

HES - History of Economics Society 

Investopedia

Investorpolis

MEC-  Desenvolvimento Sustentável

MEC - Educação Ambiental

MEC - Educação para a Igualdade de Género

MEC - Educação para a Interculturalidade

MEC - Educação para o Mundo do Trabalho

MEC- Literacia Financeira e Educação para o Consumo

Conferências || Palestras || Ted Talks

A Terceira Revolução Industrial (Jeremy Rifkin)

An economic case for protecting the planet

Conferência: Decrescimento: uma proposta polémica?  (Serge Latouche)

Naomi Klein: "This Changes Everything" - Capitalism vs. The Climate 

Palestra: Global Megatrends 2052 – Jørgen Randers

Palestra: Limits to Growth - Dennis Meadows at Ulm University

Palestra: Crise Financeira - Oportunidade para a Economia Ecológica - Richard Douthwaite

Entrevistas

Entrevista a Dennis Meadows no 50º aniversario da publicação do livro The Limits to Growth

Estará o capitalismo condenado? Entrevista a Mariana Mazzucato

Sessão || Webinars

Sessão "Lei de Bases do Clima" no 6º Encontro Nacional pela Justiça Climática

Webinar "Decrescimento e consumo responsável"

Curta-Metragem

Compramos e Vendemos Sentimentos

Documentários

2077 - 10 Segundos Para o Futuro (4 episódios)

A Crise da Civilização

A Economia da Felicidade
A Era da Estupidez (2009)

A Ordem Criminosa do Mundo

Antropoceno - A Era Humana | Anthropocene - The Human Epoch (legendado)

All Wars Are Bankers' Wars 

Before The Flood (A Inundação da Terra)

Bitcoin: The End of Money as we Know It

Bright Green Lies

Capitalism: A Love Story - Michael Moore (2009)

Catastroika - 2012

Decrescimento: salvar o mundo renunciando o consumo e a sustentabilidade

Desigualdade para Todos (Inequality for All, legendado)

Dividocracia Internacional (Debtocracy International- legendado)

Don't Tell Me to Just Breathe

A Terceira Revolução Industrial: Uma nova e radical economia de partilha

Family Romance, LLC

Filantrópica

Food, Earth, Happiness

Gas Leak!

Los Derechos de la Naturaleza

Mente Minimalista

Minimalismo: Um documentário sobre as coisas importantes

Naomi Klein - This Change Everything (PT)

O assassino da economia

O Fim dos Subúrbios

O Lado Negro das Energias Verdes

O que está errado com o Mundo? por John Perkins
O Sal da Terra

Oil, Smoke & Mirrors

Os Mestres do Dinheiro - The Money Masters (1996)

Pare, Escute e Olhe

Paradise or Oblivion (Paraíso ou Ruína/Esquecimento)

Patent for a Pig

Planet of the Humans- Michael Moore

Portugal Terra - A Natureza em Portugal

RBUI, nosso direito de viver
Root of all Evil?
Sobrevivendo ao Progresso

The Corporation

The Panama Papers: Behind the Scheme

The Rights of Nature: A Global Movement

The Shock Doctrine (legendado)
The Take

United Natures

Jornais || Notícias

Bloomberg

Business Green

Business Insider

Cadernos de Economia

Common Dreams - Economy

Crypto World

Degrowth Journal

Dinheiro Vivo

Eco

Economia Verde

Época Negócios

Eu sou Economista

Executive Digest

Expresso-Economia

Forbes

Forbes Portugal

Green Biz

Idealista News

Info Money (BR)

Investopedia

Jornal de Negócios

Money Control

O Jornal Económico

Quartz News

Revista Business Portugal

Revista Frontline

The Planetary Press

Triple Pundit

Valor Económico (BR)

Vida Económica

Revistas

Asterisk 

Bloomberg Green

Ecologia e Desenvolvimento

Ecological Economics

Environmental and Development Economics

Environmental and Resource Economics

Environmental Economics (Business Perspectives)

Fortune
Impactus- Revista Portuguesa sobre Sustentabilidade Empresarial

Journal de La Decroissance

Meio Ambiente Industrial

Mint Magazine

Renew Econonomy

Retail Bank International

Review of Environmental Economics and Policy

Revista Líder

Youtube

Accenture

AICE PortugalGlobal

Aliança contra la Pobresa Energètica

Allianz Global

Atlantic Council

Bain & Company

Banking on Values

BCSD Portugal

Bloomberg Markets and Finance

Blue Economy

Carbon Credits

CACOR - Canadian Association for the Club of Rome

Carbon Tracker Initiative

CECweb

CEPR & VideoVox Economics

Changing Markets Foundation

Charity Navigator

Climate Safe Lending

Commonwealth Club

Conservation International

Consumers International

Contas-poupança

Corp Watch

C2ES -Center for Climate and Energy Solutions 

CPI - Climate Policy Initiative

Cornell CSES

Crédito y Caución

CUSP

Data Code

Decrypt Media

DEAL - Doughnut Economics Action Lab

EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

ECB - European Central Bank

Ecological Economics For All

Economistes Atterrés

Economia di Comunione

Economia Solidária

ECOSOC

Eduardo Moreira

EfD

Ellen MacArthur Foundation

EMCC France

EMCC Global

EMCC Portugal

EoF - The Economy of Francesco 

European Sustainable Energy Week

Forbes

Futures of Sustainability - Universität Hamburg

Global & European Dynamics

Green Biz

Grantham Imperial

IATP

IDB Lab

IBD Invest

ICC - International Chamber of Commerce 

IEEFA.org

Independent POV

Institute for Global Prosperity

Instituto Mises Brasil

Instituto Mises Portugal

ISEE videos

International Growth Centre

International Degrowth Network

Meeschaert

Michael Roberts

Mises Media

Moconomy

Money Control

Money Explained

Natural Business Intelligence

Natural Capitalism Solutions

Network of Wellbeing

New Economics Foundation

New Economic Thinking

OAS-OEA Videos

OECD Environment

One Planet Network

Our Changing Climate

Our World in Data

PGI - Post Growth Institute

Post-growth Innovation Lab

PIK - Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research

Polo Lionello Bonfanti

Post Carbon Institute

Quartz News videos

Ray C. Anderson Foundation

Research & Degrowth

Rethinking Economics (muito bom)

Royal Society of Arts

S&P Global

Segreteria Internazionale EdC

SGS - Société Générale de Surveillance

Schumacher Center for New Economics

Sobrevivir Al Descalabro

Sociedade Brasileira de Economia Ecológica

Stockholm Resilience Centre TV

SSEE - The Smith School

Sustainable Energy For All

Sustainia

Tax Foundation

TEEB - The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity

Textile Exchange

The B Team

The International Society for Ecological Economics

The Pathfinders Collective

The Planetary Press

THNK - School of Creative Leadership

Time Banks

UBI4ALL

UNCTAD Online

UN DESA

UNECE

UNU-WIDER

Viz Kanté (LIMIT)

Verra

WBCSD - World Business Council for Sustainable Development

Woodrow Wilson Center

Visual Capitalist

ZEF - Bonn

Blocos Económicos e Paramilitares

APEC - Cooperação Económica da Ásia e do Pacífico

ASEAN - Associação de Nações do Sudeste Asiático

Atlantic Council

BRICS- Brazil,Russia,India, China, South-Africa

CAEU - Council of Arab Economic Unity

CEI - Comunidade dos Estados Independentes (RU)

CEDEAO - Comunidade Económica dos Estados África Ocidental

CETA - Acordo Integral de Economia e Comércio

Combatant Commands

Comunidade Andina

CPLP - Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa

COMESA - Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa

Commonwealth

EAC - East African Community

ECOWAS - Economic Community of West African States

Eurogrupo

Grupo Wagner

Intergovernmental Group of 24 

JEFTA - Japan and EU on the Economic Partnership Agreement

GATS - General Agreement on Trade in Services

GATT - General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Mercosul - Mercado Comum do Sul

NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement

OCTA - ACTO - Organização do Tratado de Cooperação Amazónica 

OEA - Organização dos Estados Americanos 

OEI - Organização de Estados Ibero-americanos

OPEC - Organização dos Países Exportadores de Petróleo

SADC - Southern African Development Community

SCO - Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Tigres Asiáticos

TISA - Trade in Services Agreement

TTC - Trade and Technology Council

TTIP - Acordo de Parceria Transatlântica de Comércio e Investimento

TTP - Trans-Pacific Partnership

União Europeia

Activistas

Ali Sheridan

Charles Eisenstein

Clara Mattei

Dan O'Neill

Daniel Christian Wahl

Diana Ürge-Vorsatz

Eduardo Moreira

Florent Marcellesi

Francisco Louçã

Giorgos Kallis

Hazel Henderson

Jason Hickel

Jeffrey Sachs

Joel Makower

Joan Melé

Julia Steinberger

Ladislau Dowbor

Mariana Mazzucato

Naomi Klein

Paul Hawken

Robert Reich

Robert Skidelsky

Thomas Piketty

Tim Jackson

Vinz Katé

Yanis Varoufakis

Yannick Jadot

Investigadores || Pesquisadores || Empresários

Adam Smith (pai do capitalismo)
Alfred Marshall

Amartya Sen

André Gorz

Andrew Oswald

Barry Ritholtz

Bernard Lietaer

Bernard Stiegler

Bertrand Piccard

Branko Milanović

Charles Eisenstein
Cristovam Buarque

Dani Rodrik

Daron Acemoglu

Dennis Meadows

Donella Meadows - Wiki
Donella Meadows - Limites do Crescimento

Darryl McLeod

David Harvey

Duane Elgin

Elinor Ostrom
E. F. Schumacher

Ernest Mandel
Florent Marcellesi
Francisco Louçã
François Morin

François Partant
François Schneider

Friedrich Hayek

Gabriel Leite Mota
Georgescu-Roegen

Gilberto Sarfati

Gunter Pauli

Henry George

Herman Daly

Howard T. Odum

Ivan Illich

Jacques Ellul

James Robertson

Jason Hickel

Jean Baudrillard

Jean-Marie Harribey 

Jeffrey Sachs

Jeremy Rifkin

Joel Makower

Joan Martinez Allier
Joanne Poyourow

John Maynard Keynes

Joseph Eugene Stiglitz

Joseph Schumpeter

Joshua Farley

Jørgen Randers

John Maynard Keynes
John Perkins
Jorge Landeiro de Vaz

Julien Hanoteau

Karl-Göran Mäler

Karl Polanyi

Kate Raworth

Kenneth Boulding 

Ken Saro-Wiwa

Ladislau Dowbor

Larry Fink

Leonardo Becchetti

Ludwig von Mises (ultra-liberal)

Manfred Max-Neef

Marilyn Waring

Martin Hart Landsberg
Mathis Wackernagel

Michael Roberts

Michel Husson

Milton Friedman (ultra-liberal)

Murray Rothbard (ultra-liberal)

Nat Keohane

Nicholas Stern

Naoko Ishii

Nikolai Kondratiev

Paul Hawken

Paul Krugman

Paul Ralph Ehrlich

Paul Romer

Partha Dasgupta

Pavan Sukhdev

Ray Anderson

Ricardo Abramovay

Riccardo Petrella

Richard Ainley Easterlin

Richard Douthwaite

Robert Costanza
Robert Reich

Robert Skidelsky
Rohan Silva

Rui Nabeiro

Serge Latouche

Stefano Zamagni

Steve Killelea

Thomas Piketty

Tim Jackson 

Walter Pengue

Wilhelm Röpke

William D. Nordhaus

William Rees

Zig Ziglar

Blogues sobre Eco-Economia
Alternatives Economiques (colectivo de blogueiros)
Bioneconomy
Degrowth

Earth and Economy
Ecological Economics
Economia Ecologica

Economia Sustentável

Economy and Happiness

Environmental Economics

Florent Marcellesi

Green as a Thistle

Jeffrey Sachs

Spinwatch
The Commons Blog: Free-Market Environmentalism

The Next Recession

Blogues sobre Economia
A Destreza das Dúvidas

Bluskye

Elgar Publishing

Global Economic Analisys

Global Inequality (Branko Milanovic)

Interesse Privado, Acção Pública

Marc Gunther
Paul Krugman
PPP Lusofonia
Reports from the Economic Front

Velha Economia

Dossiês BioTerra Relacionados

Agenda 2030

Austeridade
Direito do Ambiente
Ecoturismo
Globalização
Justiça

Politica
Resistir à Publicidade

Transparência

NOVA ATENÇÃO © COPYRIGHT-  Ao partilhar, agradeço atempadamente a indicação do autor e do meu blogue Bioterra. Estes dossiês resultam de um apurado trabalho de pesquisa, selecção de qualidade e organização.