Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Coreia do Norte. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Coreia do Norte. Mostrar todas as mensagens

sábado, 28 de junho de 2025

Renate Dillmann - Pesquisadora alemã fala sobre mentiras, poder e manipulação


Renate Dillmann

Uma visão geral, abrangente e o papel que os principais meios de comunicação têm na forma errática e não factual dos acontecimentos a nível global.

A China não se intromete de forma escancarada como o ocidente. A China usa outros métodos de persuasão, como paralisia das negociações   comerciais, um apagão na comunicação diplomática e por aí vai, são sempre métodos velados. Mas conforme o poder deles crescem, aumentam as atividades marítimas ilegais apoiadas pelo governo em áreas economicamente ativas de outros países, vejam por exemplo o vídeo de muitos navios na Argentina com pesca predatória e exploração mineira em África.

terça-feira, 23 de janeiro de 2024

Tic tac. Estamos a 90 segundos do fim, continua a marcar Relógio do Apocalipse



O Relógio do Apocalipse diz, de novo, que estamos a 90 segundos da meia-noite, o que significa a destruição da humanidade.

Os especialistas da revista Bulletin of Atomic Scientist acertaram esta terça-feira os ponteiros e, tal como no ano passado, continuamos bem perto do dia do "juízo final", ou seja a 90 segundos da meia-noite, que é como quem diz para a auto-destruição da humanidade.

Pela 77ª vez, o Dooms Day Clock é acertado e representa um alerta que a comunidade científica faz à humanidade, uma chamada de atenção para o dia em que tudo termina.

"A humanidade continua a enfrentar um nível de perigo sem precedentes", refere a Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, responsável por acertar o relógio, que mantém-se a 90 segundos da meia-noite, tal como em 2023, ano em que a proximidade da humanidade ao dia da auto destruição foi justificada pela guerra na Ucrânia, mais concretamente a ameaça nuclear proveniente da Rússia.

Este ano, os ponteiros do relógio voltaram a ser acertados, mas mantemo-nos a 90 segundos, apenas um minuto e meio, da meia-noite. O que não significa estagnação. "A nossa decisão não deve ser tomada como um sinal de que a situação da segurança internacional se atenuou. Em vez disso, os líderes e os cidadãos de todo o mundo devem encarar esta declaração como um aviso severo e reagir com urgência, como se hoje fosse o momento mais perigoso da história moderna. Porque pode muito bem ser", alerta o Conselho de Ciência e Segurança do Boletim.

Aliás, o mundo enfrenta mais uma guerra, agora no Médio Oriente, entre Israel e o grupo extremista palestiniano Hamas.

Além da guerra na Ucrânia, o mundo enfrenta a ameaça das armas nucleares, com a deterioração dos acordos de redução deste tipo de armamento, as alterações climáticas, que levaram a que 2023 fosse considerado como o ano mais quente já registado. Os avanços nas tecnologias de engenharia genética, bem como os registados na área da Inteligência Artificial também preocupam.

"Não se deixem enganar: acertar o relógio a 90 segundos para a meia-noite não é uma indicação de que o mundo está estável. Muito pelo contrário. É urgente que os governos e as comunidades em todo o mundo ajam. E o Boletim continua esperançoso – e inspirado – em ver as gerações mais jovens liderar a luta”, refere Rachel Bronson, presidente e diretora executiva do Bulletin of Atomic Scientist, em comunicado.

Para Jerry Brown, presidente executivo do Boletim, é como se os líderes mundiais "estivessem no Titanic". Afinal, "estão a conduzir o mundo para a catástrofe – mais bombas nucleares, grandes emissões de carbono, patógenos perigosos e inteligência artificial". "Só as grandes potências como a China, a América e a Rússia podem fazer-nos recuar. Apesar dos antagonismos profundos, eles devem cooperar – ou estaremos condenados", conclui o responsável.

Fundado em 1945 por Albert Einstein, J. Robert Oppenheimer e cientistas da Universidade de Chicago que ajudaram a desenvolver as primeiras armas atómicas no âmbito do Projeto Manhattan, o Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists criou o Relógio do Apocalipse dois anos mais tarde, em 1947, "um indicador universalmente reconhecido da vulnerabilidade do mundo a catástrofes globais causadas por tecnologias criadas pelo homem".

Saber mais:

sábado, 10 de junho de 2023

5G: China quer que Portugal adote políticas "racionais" e "autónomas" após decisão


A China disse esta quinta-feira esperar que Portugal adote políticas “racionais” e “autónomas”, após um órgão consultivo do Governo português ter deliberado a exclusão de facto de empresas chinesas do desenvolvimento das redes de quinta geração (5G).

“Esperamos que o lado português faça escolhas políticas racionais de forma autónoma e adira à criação de um ambiente de negócios aberto, justo e não discriminatório”, afirmou o ministério dos Negócios Estrangeiros chinês, numa nota enviada à agência Lusa, em Pequim.

A diplomacia chinesa considerou que “construir muros e barreiras” e “quebrar laços” só “prejudica os mais vulneráveis”.

“A cooperação com benefícios mútuos é o único caminho certo”, realçou.

No mês passado, a Comissão de Avaliação de Segurança, no âmbito do Conselho Superior de Segurança do Ciberespaço de Portugal, divulgou uma deliberação sobre o “alto risco” para a segurança das redes e de serviços 5G do uso de equipamentos de fornecedores que, entre outros critérios, sejam de fora da União Europeia, NATO ou OCDE e cujo “ordenamento jurídico do país em que estão domiciliados permita que o Governo exerça controlo, interferência ou pressão sobre as suas atividades a operar em países terceiros”.

A deliberação não refere nomes de empresas ou de países, mas surge após anos de pressão exercida por Washington sobre os países aliados para que excluam o grupo tecnológico chinês Huawei das infraestruturas de telecomunicações.

Os Estados Unidos apontam para a Lei Nacional de Inteligência da China, que estipula que “todas as organizações e cidadãos devem apoiar, ajudar e cooperar com o Estado em matéria de Inteligência Nacional”.

A empresa negou categoricamente aquelas acusações e lembrou que a lei chinesa não exige que a Huawei instale mecanismos ocultos nas redes ou equipamentos que permitam o acesso não autorizado a dados e informações.

Outros países, incluindo Reino Unido, Austrália ou Suécia, baniram já a Huawei de participar no desenvolvimento das suas redes de 5G.

No comunicado enviado à Lusa, o Governo chinês diz que se opõe à “politização” de questões tecnológicas, ao “abuso do poder do Estado” e à “violação das regras do comércio internacional” e dos “princípios da economia de mercado”.

“A China é contra a formulação de políticas e regulamentos discriminatórios e exclusivos e opõe-se à supressão e imposição de restrições a empresas estrangeiras”, lê-se na mesma nota.

“Esperamos que o lado português proteja os direitos e interesses legítimos das empresas chinesas e adote medidas práticas para atrair investimento estrangeiro e expandir as oportunidades de cooperação”, acrescentou.

As redes de quinta geração, a Internet do futuro, estão na base de vários avanços tecnológicos, incluindo a condução autónoma ou fábricas inteligentes.

sexta-feira, 23 de dezembro de 2022

Hackers norte-coreanos roubaram 1,2 mil milhões de dólares em bens digitais

A principal agência de espionagem da Coreia do Sul, o National Intelligence Service, disse que a capacidade da Coreia do Norte para roubar bens digitais é considerada entre as melhores do mundo.


Os hackers norte-coreanos roubaram cerca de 1,2 mil milhões de dólares em criptomoeda e outros bens virtuais, nos últimos cinco anos, anunciou na quinta-feira a agência de espionagem da Coreia do Sul.

Especialistas e oficiais dizem que a Coreia do Norte se voltou para a pirataria criptográfica e outras atividades cibernéticas ilícitas, como fonte de moeda estrangeira, muito necessária para apoiar a sua frágil economia e financiar o seu programa nuclear, na sequência das duras sanções da ONU e da pandemia de covid-19.

A principal agência de espionagem da Coreia do Sul, o National Intelligence Service, disse que a capacidade da Coreia do Norte para roubar bens digitais é considerada entre as melhores do mundo devido ao foco em crimes informáticos desde que as sanções económicas da ONU foram endurecidas em 2017, em resposta aos seus testes nucleares e de mísseis.

As sanções das Nações Unidas impostas em 2016-17 proíbem exportações norte-coreanas fundamentais, tais como carvão, têxteis e mariscos, e também levaram os Estados membros a repatriar trabalhadores norte-coreanos no estrangeiro.

A economia sofreu novos retrocessos, após a imposição de algumas das restrições mais draconianas do mundo contra a pandemia.

O NEI afirmou que os hackers norte-coreanos patrocinados pelo Estado terão roubado 1,5 triliões de won (cerca de 1,2 mil milhões de dólares) em bens virtuais em todo o mundo, desde 2017, incluindo cerca de 800 mil milhões de won (626 milhões de dólares), só este ano.

Mais de 78 milhões de dólares terão origem na Coreia do Sul.

É esperado que os hackers norte-coreanos realizem mais ciberataques no próximo ano para roubar tecnologias sul-coreanas avançadas e informação confidencial sobre a política externa e segurança nacional sul-coreana.

No início deste mês, diplomatas superiores dos Estados Unidos, Coreia do Sul e Japão concordaram em aumentar os esforços para refrear as atividades cibernéticas ilegais norte-coreanas.

Em fevereiro, um painel de peritos da ONU afirmou que a Coreia do Norte continuava a roubar centenas de milhões de dólares a instituições financeiras e a empresas e bolsas de divisas criptográficas.

Apesar das suas dificuldades económicas, a Coreia do Norte realizou este ano um número recorde de testes de mísseis, no que alguns peritos dizem ser uma tentativa de modernizar o seu arsenal e aumentar a sua influência em futuras negociações com os seus rivais para obter alívio de sanções e outras concessões.

terça-feira, 6 de dezembro de 2022

Author of 'Silent Invasion' warns against non-citizens' right to vote

'Beijing will certainly exploit it to influence elections,' Australian academic says


Only several weeks ago, a Chinese woman living in Delhi under a false identity was arrested on suspicion of spying on senior officials of the Indian government. In January, a British lawyer of Chinese heritage was named by the U.K.'s spy agency as an "agent" of Beijing, seeking to influence its parliamentarians.

Given the many reports of such episodes, an Australian scholar claims it is naive to assume that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will not exploit the voting rights of non-citizens in Korea ― because it will.

"The Chinese government will certainly exploit the non-citizen right to vote in an attempt to influence the elections and the composition of the government," Clive Hamilton, a professor of public ethics at Charles Sturt University in Canberra, Australia, and the author of "Silent Invasion: China's Influence in Australia," told The Korea Times. "Koreans should be very worried about CCP influence. All important institutions, or rather the elites that lead them, are targets of CCP influence campaigns."

His warning comes several days after Justice Minister Han Dong-hoon said he would press to reform the current voting system in cooperation with the National Assembly, because giving non-citizens that right "may distort the will of the people."

Concerns have been raised here over the growing political influence of non-citizen F-5 visa holders (permanent residents), most of whom are Chinese nationals, who could help determine the winners of regional elections, such as city mayors, provincial governors and education superintendents. In the Gyeonggi governor election on June 1, Kim Dong-yeon of the opposition Democratic Party of Korea defeated then rival Kim Eun-hye of the ruling People Power Party by just 8,900 votes. Government data showed more than 50,000 non-citizen voters live in the province.

Permanent residents in Australia do not have the right to vote in federal, state or territory elections with a few exceptions for "British subjects." Yet the CCP has been accused repeatedly of trying to influence politics there. The efforts are believed to include placing its agents in the offices of politicians as well as giving donations to certain politicians through businessmen it had ties to. Such allegations prompted Australia's parliament to pass laws in 2018 aimed at preventing foreign interference in the country.

Hamilton said that Australian citizens of Chinese heritage have become the main targets of the CCP's influence campaigns, which he thinks could also happen in Korea.

"A number of people with secret allegiance to the CCP have been elected to positions in local and state governments in Australia, and even one or two to the federal government," he said. "The CCP has a name for using people of Chinese heritage to influence democratic processes, 'huaren canzheng (ethnic Chinese participation in overseas politics)' … If Koreans loyal to the CCP want to run for election, then that is their right. But they should declare it publicly so voters know who they are voting for."

Hamilton warned of the CCP's ability to "use democracy to undermine democracy," urging the public to keep an eye out for any such attempts.

Under the Korean election law, F-5 visa holders can vote in elections for local government positions, after three years have passed since they acquired their visas. More than 126,000 people falling into that category were eligible to vote in the latest local elections. Among them, Chinese nationals accounted for nearly 79 percent, followed by Taiwanese (8.4 percent), Japanese (5.7 percent), Vietnamese (1.2 percent) and Americans (0.8 percent).

Some people have voiced their opposition to revising the law, saying that non-citizens should keep the right to vote as they pay taxes in Korea. But Hamilton disagrees.

"Foreign tourists pay taxes, should they have the right to vote? Rich Koreans find ways of avoiding taxes, should (they) be banned from voting? Citizenship involves much more than simply paying taxes. It means commitment to one's country," he said.

On Monday, Rep. Cho Jung-hun of the minor opposition party, Transition Korea, said he proposed a bill to take away the voting rights of most non-citizens based on the principle of reciprocity.

quarta-feira, 2 de novembro de 2022

A ativista climática sueca Greta Thunberg não vai participar na Cimeira do Clima no Egipto


Jovem sueca alega que a conferência da ONU vai ser uma “oportunidade para líderes e pessoas no poder chamarem a atenção”

A jovem ativista climática sueca Greta Thunberg vai falhar a conferência climática da COP27, em novembro, no Egito.

A jovem critica o encontro das Nações Unidas e apelida-o de “lavagem verde”, alegando que servirá apenas para “os líderes mundiais chamarem a atenção, mentirem e enganarem”.

A ativista climática sublinha que a reunião vai ter lugar “num paraíso turístico que viola vários direitos humanos básicos”.

“Não vou à COP27 por muitas razões, mas o espaço para a sociedade civil este ano é extremamente limitado”, disse Greta Thunberg, numa entrevista durante o lançamento de seu último livro, em Londres.

“As COPS são usadas ​​principalmente como uma oportunidade para líderes e pessoas no poder chamarem a atenção, usando muitos tipos diferentes de ‘lavagem verde’”, alegou.

A ativista acrescentou que estas reuniões “não são realmente destinadas a mudar todo o sistema”, mas incentivam o progresso gradual.

A 27ª conferência da ONU sobre o clima começa na cidade turística de Sharm el-Sheikh, no Mar Vermelho, a 6 de novembro. As manifestações públicas estão proibidas e há fortes limites à acreditação de ativistas para participarem no encontro.

Thunberg estava entre aqueles que na semana passada assinaram uma petição de uma coligação cívica e política  de direitos humanos pedindo às autoridades egípcias que abram espaço cívico, liberdade de expressão e libertem os prisioneiros políticos.

A petição teve quase mil signatários organizacionais e individuais, incluindo 350.org, Amnistia Internacional e Climate Action Network, a maior rede climática do mundo composta por mais de 1.500 organizações da sociedade civil.

Muitos governos e ONGs acusam a organização de ajudar o regime do Egito, liderado por Abdul Fatah Al-Sisi, ao legitimar o governo através da conferência, apontando o dedo para os mais de 60 mil presos políticos no país.

Entre esses presos políticos está Alaa Abd El-Fattah, uma das principais vozes da revolução egípcia durante a Primavera Árabe de 2011, que derrubou a ditadura de Hosni Mubarak. No entanto, anos mais tarde, o Egito está de novo sob o controlo de um regime ortodoxo que reprime liberdade de expressão e liberdade de imprensa - segundo a ONG Reporters Without Borders, o Egito é dos países que mais jornalistas prende no mundo, situando-se no 168.º na lista de 180 países medidos (apenas à frente de países como a Síria, a China, Cuba, Irão ou a Coreia do Norte).

quarta-feira, 30 de março de 2022

Why the war in Ukraine is also a make-or-break moment for climate change

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is barely three weeks old, but it’s already brought unspeakable suffering and destruction, as well as momentous shifts in the global order. Now, as Western countries have effectively started decoupling from Russia both economically and politically, a lot of attention is focusing on energy security and increasing fossil fuel production.

“We can come back to tackling climate change” later, we’re starting to hear. This puts the existential effort to decarbonize the global economy at risk of becoming collateral damage of the war — and that would be catastrophic.

But can we be outraged about the war, worry about energy security and fight climate change all at the same time?

Those goals aren’t necessarily at odds. But they will require a clear-eyed understanding of the dramatic forces now at work, both economically and geopolitically.

The war in Ukraine is, in many ways, an energy war. Europe in particular is becoming acutely aware of its dependence on Russian fossil fuels — a dependence that is literally fueling the conflict. The European Union, and to a lesser extent the UK and the US, buy hundreds of millions of dollars worth of oil and gas from Russia every day (some of it transiting through pipelines that cross Ukraine), and it’s those millions that finance Russia’s regime and its army.

Europe relies on Russia for about 40 percent of its gas and about one-quarter of its oil imports. Cutting those flows is dual-edged — it would cripple Russia economically but could also trigger blackouts and chaos across the continent. That helps explain why EU sanctions currently do not extend to Russia’s fossil fuels (The US and the UK import far less and moved to ban oil imports).

Olaf Scholz, the recently elected German Chancellor who with a single, historic speech reversed decades of non-military foreign and security policy, has had to acknowledge that Europe’s supply of energy “can’t be secured otherwise at the moment.” His economic and energy minister Robert Habeck from the Green party warned of “mass unemployment and poverty.”

Hence, the flows keep flowing — and the fueling of Europeans’ cars and the heating of their homes funds the war. Columnist Javier Blas calls it “the commodities market version of the Cold War doctrine of mutual assured destruction, or MAD.” It’s that madness that threatens to derail the efforts to decarbonize the global economy.

Europe’s energy predicament is largely self-inflicted. But that doesn’t alter the fact that weaning the continent off Russian gas and oil — a need that has been spoken between the lines in European discussions for years — has suddenly become an urgent security imperative. The European Commission has presented a plan to make Europe independent from Russian fossil fuels before 2030, starting with reducing gas imports by two-thirds by year’s end. (It includes increased imports of liquified gas, deploying renewables faster, conserving energy, developing hydrogen and taking measures to respond to rising energy prices.) The International Energy Agency (IEA) has added its own thinking towards reducing that reliance.

This has definite positives when it comes to dealing with climate change, and there are plenty who see the instability provoked by the war as a fork-in-the-road moment, a renewed incentive to accelerate the adoption of clean energy.

Getting rid of the dependence on Russian fossil fuels means getting rid of fossil fuels — and once that shift to cleaner sources is achieved, there would be no way back. That is, for now, the position of Europe, which has found new unity and political vigor in response to the war. (It’s worth noting that this shared goal isn’t matched by a consensus on method yet: while Germany is phasing out nuclear plants, France is planning a vast expansion of nuclear power, for instance.)

Others, however, think that we cannot confront both energy security and decarbonization at the same time. In this view, the instability provoked by the war creates disruptions in energy supplies and price increases with significant economic and social repercussions. We should therefore tackle this crisis first, and worry about climate change later, by giving priority to securing energy supplies, increasing oil and gas production and delaying the phasing out of coal. This seems to be the position of the US (which is even trying to convince Venezuela and Iran to increase oil production), and to some extent, also the UK and China.

Who is right? This tension between energy security needs and overarching climate goals is now central to the climate discussion. It can’t be — and shouldn’t be — easily resolved. Either/or is a luxury we can’t afford. There are merits to both points of view, at least in the short term. It is not a choice so much as a dilemma, in which we need to keep two conflicting goals in mind at the same time, with the same high level of priority.

Which brings me to the second major challenge now facing climate action: deglobalization. Fighting climate change needs global collaboration. However, after decades of global integration, accelerated in 2001 when China joined the World Trade Organization, the world is now becoming less integrated. This deglobalizing trend isn’t new, it can be traced back to the 2008 financial crisis, and has been hastened over the last few years by the growing economic and strategic rivalry between the United States and China and by the Covid-19 pandemic, which has added to global inequality and provided new rationales for more protectionist policies.

For this trend, too, the war in Ukraine is a dramatic accelerating factor. To avoid a confrontation with a nuclear-armed Russia that could escalate into a generalized conflict — a third World War — the West has elected not to engage militarily in Ukraine but to offer external support. By itself, that’s a prudent and rational decision: no one wants NATO and Russian jet fighters getting too close to each other.

In parallel, however, Western countries have initiated severe economic sanctions on everything from Russian banks to technology imports to the assets of oligarchs. As a consequence of the sanctions (and of popular outrage at the war), hundreds of companies have withdrawn from Russia or suspended their operations. Many think that the country has become “un-investable” for a long time. This is putting huge pressure on Russia, but it has also transferred the theater of the conflict to the global economic sphere.

For instance, in a recent TED conversation Ian Bremmer, the founder of Eurasia Group, told me that the Chinese ambassador to Moscow gathered Chinese investors in Russia to suggest that the Western withdrawal represents a unique opportunity to “go in and do more because Russia is going to be relying on us.” Most of the sanctions, Bremmer suggested, are potentially functionally permanent (at least as long as President Putin is in power, and especially if he acts on his threat to seize the assets of Western companies), and their ripple effects will ignite a repatterning of the global economy.  

Watch the full discussion about the war in Ukraine between TED’s Bruno Giussani and geopolitical analyst Ian Bremmer: 



Many scenarios can spin out of this situation, and here’s one. The world splinters into two ideologically incompatible parts, an authoritarian one around China and Russia and a democratic one around the United States and Europe. The underlying infrastructure also starts diverging, with separate credit card and payment systems, Internet networks, information spheres (this is already happening, especially after the thorough shutdown of any independent source of information in Russia), technological developments and supply chains. If it sounds familiar, that’s because it is — the world was split into two such halves during the Cold War.

This New Cold War is different, however, for at least three reasons. First, the world has grown way more interconnected and interdependent, which means that a rapid reorganizing (or disorganizing) of global supply chains is going to bring significant disruption, from higher prices to shortages. Second, China is not the Soviet Union: it is a big, successful economy with an assertive foreign policy that has by and large achieved technological parity with the US, has the world’s largest navy, and is inching closer every day to the moment when it will regain control of Taiwan, the world’s semiconductor hub.

Finally, it is not obvious that much of the rest of the world would align itself with the US and Europe. The Western media has focused on the fact that the United Nations General Assembly resolution condemning the invasion of Ukraine has gathered 141 votes, with 35 countries abstaining and only 5 voting against (Belarus, Eritrea, North Korea, Syria and Russia itself), framing it as a demonstration of a world united against Russia.

Meanwhile, too little airtime has been given to the list of countries that have actually joined the West’s sanctions, which is much shorter: the US, the UK, the EU, Canada, Japan and a dozen others. Southern countries, for instance, are staying out of it, possibly because they recognize the double standards the West is applying. Middle Eastern countries are also keeping their distance, their motivations likely both economic and political.

In other words, we are at a geopolitical juncture, facing a future of less “global liberal order” and more raw national self-interest. We already see less attention on international institutions and rules — which need to be re-imagined — and more to national sovereignty, and a competitive edge tilted towards those who control reliable sources of energy, materials and food, as well as technology and supply chains. Europe has surely woken up to the fact that “tectonic shifts” are happening and, in the words of France’s President Emmanuel Macron at last week’s Versailles meeting of EU heads of State, that energy, food and defense are issues of sovereignty.

Within countries, spiraling energy (and food) prices, which hit less-well-off groups harder, have the potential to destabilize political systems, making ambitious climate policies even more difficult. In this sense, the coming energy crisis will be a crucial test. It’s going to make very tangible how costly the climate transition is going to be, and the response will show how earnest we are. As the IEA puts it, “The faster EU policymakers seek to move away from Russian gas supplies, the greater the potential implication, in terms of economic costs and near-term emissions.” Absorbing those costs will demand huge effort, commitment and political creativity.

What are the implications of all this for the climate?

In the last few years, the fight against climate change has finally gained momentum, propelled by a combination of public pressure from the youth movement, of growing apprehension with catastrophic wildfires, floods, droughts and heatwaves on all continents, of increasingly accurate (and disquieting) scientific evidence and of the development of still vague (and often abused) but useful concepts such as net-zero and ESG.

The COP26 climate conference last November in Glasgow, although depicted by some activists as a failure, produced a series of real commitments with cities, the private sector, finance, science and civil society leading the way. Climate scientist Johan Rockström, a regular at COP gatherings, said that for the first time he saw “momentum that’s beyond incremental.”

Overall, the momentum is still towards an energy transition (including when viewed through the behavior of stock market investors). But it’s now frighteningly easy to see how we could careen towards a world where the decarbonizing efforts of some could be entirely wiped out by others, less sensitive to public opinion and more focused on economic growth, just pumping and burning away. If you want to make it even more dystopian, think of a future split in two between a group of authoritarian fossil-energy-rich economies versus a group of democratic green-energy-fragile states. And when it comes to CO2, it doesn’t matter where and by whom it is emitted, because the atmosphere is one and shared.

For exactly that reason, fighting climate change needs global cooperation. The new configuration emerging from the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the West’s economic sanctions in response threatens to make that collaboration exponentially harder, if not impossible.

Moreover, fighting global heating and its impacts needs rich countries to share technologies and financial resources with poorer ones to allow them to adapt and develop their economies and societies without resorting to fossil fuels.

Until now, that support has been lacking, as the Prime Minister of the Barbados Mia Mottley said in her much-discussed talk at COP26, adding that “our people are watching and taking note.” At a more recent Financial Times conference, Mottley defended her country’s plan to expand fossil fuel exploration off its coast. According to the newspaper’s own account, she explained that developing countries need “a way to finance our route to net-zero,” and if the wealthy nations that “caused the problem” would not provide funding, they would need to find other ways to generate revenue, such as extracting and exporting fossil fuels. That’s probably a majority viewpoint among politicians from Africa to India and plays to the potential geopolitical divide that the Ukraine war is now triggering.

What applies to energy also applies to food and minerals — Ukraine and Russia account for about 12 percent of calories traded in the world, and the impacts of the war on food supplies are already been felt across the world. Furthermore, many of the materials necessary for a clean energy transition also rely on unstable global supply chains involving, among others, Russia, which I don’t have space to discuss in detail here.

So what do we do about it? This is a time for putting all the cards on the table and exploring a new type of climate politics.

Like the coronavirus crisis before it, the Ukraine war is unlikely to be the last global systemic shock with the potential to derail climate action. There will be other crises, and we can’t keep kicking the climate can down the road at every crisis. We need to develop a plan now, one that, as climate writer Gabrielle Walker told me in an email, “is dynamic and flexible, keeps everything on the table and adapts according to current circumstances”.

First, we need to acknowledge that in a world where the goal is to get rid of the foundational source (fossil fuels) that provides about 80 percent of our energy, climate solutions can’t be decoupled from energy security. Modern societies can’t function without a reliable supply of energy.

Even if renewables are now the cheapest source of power and Western countries come together to accelerate their deployment, implement serious measures to increase efficiency and reduce consumption, develop new approaches such as geothermal and hydrogen, and massively invest in new technologies (for instance for storage), it’s going to be impossible for them to maintain their economies’ stability over the short-medium term without fossil fuels and nuclear power. It takes years to bring a solar plant online, for example. In other words — and I say this as a climate activist — we will have to live with “impure” solutions to the energy crisis in the short term while keeping our eyes on the longer-term climate targets.

Second, while working on securing their energy supply, Western countries need to get much more serious about funding energy infrastructure across the global South — it’s a question of equity, but also crucial to counter the geopolitical divide that is starting to build. It’s also worth noting that China still has a net-zero commitment and is still very much interested in being a provider of low-carbon solutions (think solar technology) to the world. That’s also a conversation that should not become a fatality of Russian bombs.

Reframing the way we use the concept of net-zero could also be helpful here — although it does need a more stringent definition, possibly linking permission to offset some emissions more strictly to actual decarbonization. It could be framed not as a climate goal, but as a secure way ahead for the world, the mechanism by which energy security and decarbonization can both be achieved.

Christiana Figueres, the Costa Rican diplomat who directed the process that led to the Paris Agreement, told me in a discussion the other day that “what’s happening now should be a holy-shit moment for climate.” Her colleague Tom Rivett-Carnac, who was also on the call, added that the world “will hopefully come together around the challenge of incorporating the short-term energy security and social stability concerns into the long-term decarbonization imperative.” And not just those who identify as climate scientists, climate experts, climate investors or climate activists, but everyone who cares about keeping the planet welcoming for human life. So far, that unity has not been a characteristic of the climate community.

On February 28, 2022, a shocking report went almost unreported, knocked off the front pages by the war in Ukraine that started four days earlier. The IPCC, the United Nations panel that assesses the state of climate science, published a devastating second part (of three) of its sixth assessment describing how climate breakdown is accelerating. (The report’s “summary for policymakers” needs to be unanimously agreed, word by word, by all 195 member governments.) The UN Secretary-General António Guterres called it “an atlas of human suffering and a damning indictment of failed climate leadership.”

That was followed, on March 8, by the International Energy Agency releasing its Global Energy Review report, which says that 2021 registered “the largest ever year-on-year increase in energy-related CO2 emissions in absolute terms,” with a rise of 6 percent, mainly driven by coal, and reaching their highest level ever. Meanwhile, record rainfall brought calamitous floods and deaths to Eastern Australia. In other words, the climate crisis is accelerating, and the urgency to decarbonize is indisputable.

It’s now vital to reconcile short-term energy goals and long-term climate goals in this deglobalizing world with a unity of purpose and direction. Meanwhile, the suffering and destruction intensifies in Ukraine, and confronting it is urgent.

And failing to do both at the same time would affect the world for generations to come. When he gave his inaugural speech in 2019, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said something that is a fitting message for the whole world today. He said: “We will build the country of other opportunities … and for that, we need people in power who will serve the people. This is why I really do not want my picture in your offices, for the President is not an icon, an idol or a portrait. Hang your kids’ photos instead and look at them each time you are making a decision.”

domingo, 13 de março de 2022

Países da Oligarquia 2022

Global democracy rating hits new low


Uma oligarquia é um sistema governamental em que o governo é controlado por um pequeno grupo de pessoas, ou oligarcas . O termo "oligarca" vem de uma palavra grega antiga, "oligarkhia", que significa "o governo de poucos". Os oligarcas normalmente obtêm o controle por meios financeiros, como doações pesadas a políticos que, por sua vez, governam de maneira ditada pelos oligarcas. No entanto, os oligarcas também podem ganhar influência por meio de seu status social/nobreza; fama; Educação; ou conexões políticas, religiosas ou militares. As oligarquias nas quais uma família governa muitas vezes resultam na transmissão do poder de geração em geração. Vários países modernos podem ser descritos como oligarquias, incluindo Rússia , China ,.

Tipos de oligarquia

Oligarquia é na verdade um termo abrangente que engloba pelo menos 13 variações específicas de "governo de poucos". Por exemplo, uma aristocracia é uma oligarquia na qual a classe dominante é composta por aristocratas ou nobres. Uma plutocracia é uma oligarquia na qual a classe dominante é composta por indivíduos extremamente ricos que usam seu dinheiro para influenciar a política, geralmente com o objetivo de ganhar ainda mais dinheiro.

As oligarquias são boas, más ou neutras?

Em teoria, as oligarquias não são boas nem más. Por exemplo, uma oligarquia em que o povo governante sempre tomasse as mesmas decisões que a população em geral tomaria estaria governando paralelamente à vontade do povo. A maioria das pessoas consideraria isso uma "boa" oligarquia. No entanto, muitos teóricos, de Aristóteles ao influente sociólogo alemão Robert Michels, observaram que, na esmagadora maioria dos casos em que algumas pessoas recebem poder sobre um grupo maior, essas poucas acabarão escolhendo estabelecer políticas que se beneficiem às custas de o povo como um todo. Em outras palavras, uma oligarquia só se torna "má" se e quando os oligarcas agem para remover os freios e contrapesos de seu próprio poder, violar (ou ignorar) o estado de direito,

O impacto de um governo oligárquico sobre seu povo

Quando os governos da oligarquia se tornam mais egoístas, eles normalmente se tornam mais autoritários e assumem o controle, às vezes até políticas governamentais opressivas ou exploradoras. A desigualdade de renda tende a aumentar à medida que a riqueza é canalizada para os governantes em vez da classe trabalhadora. A classe média encolhe à medida que os ricos ficam mais ricos e os pobres ficam mais pobres. Além disso, uma oligarquia amargurada tende a inibir o crescimento econômico e a agilidade criativa devido a uma classe dominante focada em manter o status quo, normalmente à custa de ações que beneficiariam as classes média e baixa. Por fim, uma oligarquia pode resultar em líderes fantoches – políticos fracos que se apresentam como líderes fortes, mas na verdade são meras figuras de proa controladas pelos oligarcas que financiaram suas campanhas eleitorais.

Lista de países que são oligarquias*:

Como "oligarquia" é um termo subjetivo ligeiramente amorfo, não há uma lista definitiva de quais países são e não são oligarquias. No entanto, um forte argumento pode ser feito para cada um dos seguintes países: China, Irã , Arábia Saudita , Coréia do Norte , Rússia, Turquia , Ucrânia , Estados Unidos (debatido), Venezuela e Zimbábue . Observe que oligarquia não é necessariamente um termo exclusivo. Por exemplo, enquanto o sistema de partido único da Coreia do Norte a qualifica como uma oligarquia, ela também pode ser classificada como uma ditadura stalinista hereditária e até mesmo uma monarquia absoluta.

Oligarquia na Rússia

Uma das oligarquias mais conhecidas é a Rússia, que os historiadores dizem ter sido governada por uma ou outra oligarquia autoritária desde pelo menos os anos 1400. A dissolução da União Soviética de aproximadamente 1988-1991 foi um ponto de inflamação particular para a oligarquia, porque permitiu que um pequeno grupo de indivíduos ricos (principalmente banqueiros) ganhasse o controle de muitos dos recursos e serviços públicos mais valiosos do país (como campos de petróleo ). Isso resultou em uma situação em que os políticos governavam o país, mas os oligarcas governavam os políticos. Por exemplo, um pequeno grupo de oligarcas ricos financiou a reeleição do presidente russo Boris Yeltsin em 1996 e conseguiu exercer uma tremenda influência sobre Yeltsin, além de se beneficiar financeiramente do conhecimento interno sobre as políticas e ações econômicas do governo.

Embora o atual governo da Rússia tenha se distanciado publicamente de muitos dos antigos oligarcas, é notoriamente egoísta e corrupto, e é amplamente considerado como tendo substituído um conjunto de oligarcas por outro. Por exemplo, o presidente russo, Vladimir Putin, em 2020, liderou uma emenda constitucional que, entre outras coisas, redefiniu seu limite de mandato para que ele pudesse permanecer presidente até 2036, em vez de renunciar quando seu mandato expirasse em 2024 (apesar de já ter sido presidente de 2000-2008 e 2012-presente). Este é exatamente o tipo de movimento de consolidação do poder que os governos da oligarquia fazem.

Além disso, os críticos apontam que, enquanto a Rússia realiza eleições, os oligarcas dominantes controlam todos os aspectos dessas eleições: dita a cobertura da mídia e a publicidade política que antecede o evento, elimina certos candidatos da oposição (por meios muitas vezes obscuros), conta os votos reais , e assim por diante. Este arranjo levanta questões significativas sobre a integridade das eleições na Rússia. Como resultado de cenários como esses, a Rússia marcou apenas 5 pontos em 40 possíveis em uma avaliação de 2021 dos direitos políticos dos cidadãos russos pela Freedom House (e apenas 15/60 em liberdades civis) e é classificada como uma clara oligarquia . Em 2018, o Tesouro dos EUA divulgou uma lista de oligarcas russos, nomeando 96 no total, além de 114 figuras políticas, como parte das consequências das tentativas russas de interferir nas eleições presidenciais de 2016. No entanto, foi rapidamente revelado que a lista simplesmente copiou uma lista de bilionários da revista Forbes e destacou aqueles com cidadania ou herança russa.

Oligarquia nos Estados Unidos

As opiniões divergem sobre se os Estados Unidos podem ser considerados uma oligarquia. Os americanos desfrutam de muitas características de um governo democrático, como eleições e liberdade de expressão. No entanto, existem evidências substanciais de que corporações poderosas e indivíduos ricos têm uma influência significativamente maior na formulação de políticas do que os cidadãos comuns. Por exemplo, corporações e até mesmo pessoas físicas estão legalmente autorizadas a doar grandes quantias de dinheiro para campanhas políticas de políticos, permitindo que seus candidatos escolhidos – normalmente aqueles que colocam os interesses corporativos à frente dos interesses de pessoas não ricas ou do meio ambiente – financiem muito mais. propagandas, assistentes e outros recursos (até mesmo campanhas de desinformação) do que seus oponentes. Corporações e indivíduos também podem contratar lobistas para influenciar os políticos que já estão no cargo. Diante desse cenário, muitos economistas e pesquisadores sustentam que, embora os Estados Unidos sejam uma democracia em teoria,é uma oligarquia na prática — ou pelo menos está indo na direção de uma.

Fonte: World Population Review

(com mapa interactivo actualizado)

sexta-feira, 4 de março de 2022

Índice de Liberdade de Imprensa (Press Freedom Index) 2021


2021 World Press Freedom Index: Journalism, the vaccine against disinformation, blocked in more than 130 countries.



The 2021 World Press Freedom Index compiled by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) shows that journalism, the main vaccine against disinformation, is completely or partly blocked in 73% of the 180 countries ranked by the organisation.

This year’s Index, which evaluates the press freedom situation in 180 countries and territories annually, shows that journalism, which is arguably the best vaccine against the virus of disinformation, is totally blocked or seriously impeded in 73 countries and constrained in 59 others, which together represent 73% of the countries evaluated. These countries are classified as having “very bad,” “bad” or “problematic” environments for press freedom, and are identified accordingly in black, red or orange on the World Press Freedom map.

The Index data reflect a dramatic deterioration in people's access to information and an increase in obstacles to news coverage. The coronavirus pandemic has been used as grounds to block journalists’ access to information sources and reporting in the field. Will this access be restored when the pandemic is over? The data shows that journalists are finding it increasingly hard to investigate and report sensitive stories, especially in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.

The 2021 Edelman Trust barometer reveals a disturbing level of public mistrust of journalists, with 59% of respondents in 28 countries saying that journalists deliberately try to mislead the public by reporting information they know to be false. In reality, journalistic pluralism and rigorous reporting serve to combat disinformation and “infodemics”, including false and misleading information.

“Journalism is the best vaccine against disinformation,” RSF secretary-general Christophe Deloire said. “Unfortunately, its production and distribution are too often blocked by political, economic, technological and, sometimes, even cultural factors. In response to the virality of disinformation across borders, on digital platforms and via social media, journalism provides the most effective means of ensuring that public debate is based on a diverse range of established facts.”

For example, President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil (down 4 at 111th) and President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela (down 1 at 148th) promoted medically unproven Covid-19 remedies. Their false claims were debunked by investigative journalists at media outlets such as Brazil’s Agência Pública and in-depth reporting by Venezuela’s few remaining independent publications. In Iran (down 1 at 174th), the authorities tightened their control over news coverage and stepped up trials of journalists in order to weaken the media’s ability to scrutinise the country’s Covid-19 death toll. In Egypt (166th), President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi’s government simply banned the publication of any pandemic statistics that didn’t come from the Ministry of Health. In Zimbabwe (down 4 at 130th), the investigative reporter Hopewell Chin’ono was arrested shortly after helping to expose the overbilling practices of a medical equipment supply company.

Biggest movements in the Index

Norway is ranked first in the Index for the fifth year running even though its media have complained of a lack of access to state-held information about the pandemic. Finland maintained its position in second place while Sweden (up 1 at 3rd) recovered its third place ranking, which it had yielded to Denmark (down 1 at 4th) last year. The 2021 Index demonstrates the success of these Nordic nations’ approach towards upholding press freedom.

The World Press Freedom map has not had so few countries coloured white – indicating a country situation that is at least good if not optimal – since 2013, when the current evaluation method was adopted. This year, only 12 of the Index’s 180 countries (7%) can claim to offer a favourable environment for journalism, as opposed to 13 countries (8%) last year. The country to have been stripped of its “good” classification is Germany (down 2 at 13th). Dozens of its journalists were attacked by supporters of extremist and conspiracy theory believers during protests against pandemic restrictions.

The press freedom situation in Germany is nonetheless still classified as “fairly good,” as is the case in the United States (down 1 at 44th), despite the fact that Donald Trump’s final year in the White House was marked by a record number of assaults against journalists (around 400) and arrests of members of the media (130), according to the US Press Freedom Tracker, of which RSF is a partner. As a result of falling four places, Brazil joined the countries coloured red, indicating that the press freedom situation there is classified as “bad”. The vilification and orchestrated public humiliation of journalists have become trademarks of President Bolsonaro, along with his family and closest allies. Brazil shares the “bad” classification with India (142nd), Mexico (143rd) and Russia (down 1 at 150th), which deployed its repressive apparatus to limit media coverage of protests in support of Kremlin opponent, Alexei Navalny.

China (177th), which continues to take Internet censorship, surveillance and propaganda to unprecedented levels, is still firmly anchored among the Index’s worst countries, which are indicated in black on the World Press Freedom map. Right below China is the same trio of totalitarian countries that have historically occupied the bottom three places. Two are Asian: Turkmenistan (up 1 at 178th) and North Korea (up 1 at 179th). The third is African: Eritrea (down 2 at 180th). Regardless of their continent, these countries maintain absolute control over all news and information, enabling the first two to claim they had no Covid-19 cases and the third to maintain complete silence about the fate of 11 journalists who were arrested 20 years ago, some of whom have allegedly been held in metal containers in the middle of a desert.

The country that fell the furthest in 2021 was Malaysia (down 18 at 119th), where the problems include a recent “anti-fake news” decree allowing the government to impose its own version of the truth. Big descents were also registered by Comoros (down 9 at 84th) and El Salvador (down 8 at 82nd), where journalists have struggled to obtain state-held information about the government’s handling of the pandemic. Most of the 2021 Index’s biggest gains are in Africa. Burundi (up 13 at 147th), Sierra Leone (up 10 at 75th) and Mali (up 9 at 99th) have all seen significant improvements, including the release of four journalists with the independent Burundian media Iwacu, the repeal of a law criminalising press offences in Sierra Leone and a fall in the number of abuses in Mali.

Index region by region


Europe and the Americas (North, Central and South) continue to be the most favourable continents for press freedom, even though the Americas registered the biggest deterioration in its regional violations score (up 2.5%). Europe registered a sizeable deterioration in its “Abuses” indicator, with acts of violence more than doubling in the European Union and Balkans, compared with a 17% deterioration worldwide. Attacks against journalists and arbitrary arrests increased in Germany (13th), France (34th), Italy (41st), Poland (down 2 at 64th), Greece (down 5 at 70th), Serbia (93rd) and Bulgaria (down 1 at 112th).

Although there was less deterioration in Africa’s “Abuses” score, it continues to be the most violent continent for journalists, and the Covid-19 pandemic fuelled the use of force to prevent journalists from working. In Tanzania (124th), President John Magufuli called the virus a “western conspiracy,” suggesting that Tanzania had kept it at bay “by force of prayer.” He imposed an information blackout on the pandemic before his death in March 2021.

In the Asia-Pacific region, the “censorship virus” spread beyond China, in particular to Hong Kong (80th), where the National security law imposed by Beijing seriously threatens journalists. Australia (up 1 at 25th), experienced a disturbing variant: in response to proposed Australian legislation requiring tech companies to reimburse the media for content posted on their social media platforms, Facebook decided to ban Australian media from publishing or sharing journalistic content on their Facebook pages.

The Eastern Europe and Central Asia (EECA) region held onto its second-to-last position in the regional rankings, in part because of events in Belarus (down 5 at 158th), where journalists were subjected to an unprecedented crackdown in an attempt to cover up the massive street protests in response to the contested presidential election result.

There has been no significant change in the Middle East & North Africa (MENA) region, which maintained last place in the regional rankings. In Algeria (146th) and Morocco (down 3 at 136th), the judicial system is being used to help silence journalists, while the Middle East’s most authoritarian countries – Saudi Arabia (170th), Egypt (166th) and Syria (up 1 at 173rd) – have taken advantage of the Covid-19 pandemic to reinforce their methods for gagging the media and to reaffirm their monopoly on news and information. In this region, still the toughest and most dangerous for journalists, the pandemic has exacerbated the problems that have long plagued the press, which was already in its death throes.

RSF’s global indicator – its measure of the level of media freedom worldwide – is only 0.3% lower in the 2021 Index than it was in 2020. However, the past year’s relative stability should not divert attention from the fact that it has deteriorated by 12% since this indicator was created in 2013.

Related documents

Fonte: RSF

domingo, 20 de junho de 2021

Ainda Ronaldo e a Coca-Cola



Por João Mendes
Gostei de ver a UEFA a sair em defesa da Coca-Cola, na sequência da ronalidice a que assistimos há dois dias. Até porque nem todos se podem dar ao luxo de cuspir no prato onde comeram, como fez Cristiano Ronaldo.
Por causa deste episódio, fui espreitar os patrocinadores oficiais do Euro 2020. E descobri que pelo menos um terço das empresas patrocinadoras são geridas por oligarcas e directamente controladas por um regime totalitário:
Qatar Airways: a companhia aérea de um regime absolutista, cuja Constituição se baseia na Sharia, onde o testemunho de uma mulher em tribunal vale metade - literalmente - do testemunho de um homem, e onde se aplicam penas como a flagelação ou a lapidação. Direitos humanos? Que se fodam os direitos humanos.
Gazprom: empresa energética do regime russo, gerida por um oligarca que come na mão de Vladimir Putin, de seu nome Aleksej Miller. É também um dos principais patrocinadores da Liga dos Campeões. Como se o dinheiro do futebol europeu não fosse já suficientemente sujo.
Hisense: tecnológica chinesa, dona da Lenovo e da Xiaomi, controlada pelo regime de partido único chinês. Tem tentáculos no Schalke 04, na NASCAR, em provas organizadas pela Red Bull e já patrocinou, anteriormente, o Euro 2016 e o Mundial de 2018. Na volta também tratam da "segurança" destes eventos.
Tiktok: rede social chinesa, "propriedade" de Zhang Yiming, um empresário que é o 13° mais rico da China. Vassalo de Xi Jinping, a sua ByteDance, casa-mãe do Tiktok, é suspeita de ser uma fachada para um sistema de vigilância internacional do regime chinês, alimentada pela cortesia dos milhões de utilizadores do Tiktok.
Sorte desta malta, nenhuma destas empresas está sediada em Cuba, Venezuela ou Coreia do Norte, os três únicos regimes ditatoriais que o Ocidente democrático não tolera. Todos os restantes torturadores, lapidadores e assassinos são bem vindos e neoliberalíssimo capitalismo cá os espera, de braços e pernas bem abertas. Pelo preço certo em euros, tudo se resolve. Que role a bola.