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| Limits: Why Malthus Was Wrong and Why Environmentalists Should Care |
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Dennis Meadows. Mostrar todas as mensagens
Mostrar mensagens com a etiqueta Dennis Meadows. Mostrar todas as mensagens
terça-feira, 4 de julho de 2023
Livro de Giorgos Kallis- O erro de Malthus (revisão)
terça-feira, 31 de janeiro de 2023
Crescer ou não crescer, eis a questão?
“Parece mais sensato propor à América Latina um olhar de a-crescimento, no qual o objetivo do crescimento económico seja deslocado de sua centralidade, e indicadores como o PIB sejam complementados com outros. Uma economia em que haverá setores que necessariamente devem crescer, como a saúde, a educação ou a habitação, e outros que podem permanecer iguais, mas também haverá aqueles que devem diminuir porque expressam opulência e impactos socioambientais intoleráveis”, escreve Eduardo Gudynas, pesquisador do Centro Latino-Americano de Ecologia Social - CLAES, em artigo publicado por Brecha, 27-01-2023. A tradução é do Cepat.
Eis o artigo.
Nos últimos anos, nos países mais ricos, multiplicam-se os questionamentos sobre a obsessão pelo crescimento económico como condição central para a compreensão do desenvolvimento. Uma obsessão que, quando concretizada, também tinha um lado obscuro em seus impactos sociais e ambientais. Entre as diferentes respostas alternativas, surgiu o chamado decrescimento, conforme resenhado no excelente artigo de Geoff Mann publicado no Brecha em 20 de janeiro (“Darle la vuelta a la ecuación”). Mas várias questões permanecem pendentes, especialmente desde uma perspectiva do Sul. A mais óbvia é se o decrescimento faz sentido para um país latino-americano ou se, em vez de resolver nossos problemas, não os agravaria.
Os defensores mais entusiastas do decrescimento encontram-se na Europa Ocidental, entre alguns académicos e ativistas sociais. Por outro lado, em quase toda a América Latina, as abordagens têm sido muito mais limitadas e permaneceram distantes dos grandes movimentos sociais. A novidade mais recente é que essa inusitada palavra veio à tona na Colômbia, como resultado das intenções da nova ministra de Minas e Energia de limitar a exploração de petróleo. Encurralada pelas interpelações da imprensa, chegou a justificar a medida apelando à ideia do decrescimento.
Um equivalente uruguaio dessa posição seria como se o ministro da Pecuária, Agricultura e Pesca dissesse que deseja limitar a expansão da soja ou da celulose e, ao clamor da media sobre uma catástrofe económica, respondesse dizendo que a economia deve reduzir.
Na Colômbia, o debate se intensificou quando o novo presidente, Gustavo Petro, apoiou a ideia, indicando que “hoje a ciência sabe que o consumo de petróleo e carvão deve diminuir substancialmente, que o consumo de carne bovina, desde que seja sustentado por combustíveis fósseis, deve diminuir em escala global”, e concluiu dizendo que devemos nos acomodar ao “equilíbrio da vida no planeta” (1).
Uma palavra gatilho
Os usos atuais do termo decrescimento têm origem na França, com economistas e ativistas políticos. O décroissance foi popularizado pelo economista Serge Latouche nos anos 2000, entendendo-o como um slogan ou palavra gatilho para atacar a obsessão pela ideia de desenvolvimento como crescimento perpétuo (2). Com o passar dos anos, tornou-se mais complexo, e agora, na academia, é definido como uma "crítica à economia do crescimento", que busca a "abolição do crescimento económico como objetivo social", ao mesmo tempo em que incentiva alternativas baseadas na simplicidade, no convívio, no cuidado e na partilha. Isso implicaria uma redução equitativa da produção e do consumo, de modo a reduzir os fluxos de energia e matérias-primas (3).
Não é de estranhar que, para a grande maioria dos que vivem nos países do Sul, um apelo a decrescer não faça muito sentido. Eles imediatamente imaginam contrações económicas com consequências negativas para suas vidas. É um termo que se choca com ditados repetidos há décadas, que assumem que o emprego e o bem-estar derivam do crescimento da economia.
Por outro lado, para algumas pessoas e movimentos de países ricos, o decrescimento faz sentido, pois reduziria os impactos sociais e ambientais, aplacaria o consumismo e até mesmo a extração de recursos naturais. No entanto, essas conceituações de decrescimento não oferecem argumentos ou modelos precisos para o Sul, onde, para muitos, o problema é o subconsumo que traz a pobreza.
De qualquer forma, o questionamento ao crescimento, como adverte o artigo de Mann, contém verdades que não podem ser ignoradas. Em 2022, as economias da Argentina e do Uruguai, por exemplo, apresentaram bom crescimento económico, mas esses indicadores macroeconómicos não se traduziram em melhorias nas condições de vida da maioria. A história latino-americana está repleta de casos semelhantes, em que o crescimento económico beneficia alguns poucos, mas sempre se defende indicando que geraria derramamentos ou gotejamentos que atingiriam o restante da população.
Limites do crescimento
Ao mesmo tempo, fica claro que o crescimento económico perpétuo proposto pelos economistas é impossível. Pelo menos desde a década de 1960, houve alertas sobre os chamados limites do crescimento, tanto sociais quanto ambientais. Os mais evidentes estão no esgotamento dos recursos naturais (por exemplo, as reservas limitadas de minerais ou hidrocarbonetos) ou na incapacidade de lidar com impactos ambientais crescentes (manifestada, por exemplo, nas mudanças climáticas). As economias não podem crescer indefinidamente porque o planeta é finito.
No Uruguai, tais limites já estão diante dos nossos olhos. A agropecuária está limitada às terras disponíveis no país, razão pela qual o aumento da produção passa por uma maior intensidade, o que desencadeia múltiplas alterações sociais e econômicas, enquanto a pressão sobre o solo se multiplica e a água é contaminada. Apesar disso, políticos, empresários e quase toda a academia parecem minimizar ou ignorar esses limites.
Na Colômbia, por outro lado, alguns desses limites são mais prementes. Há quem avalie que as suas reservas exploráveis de hidrocarbonetos têm apenas cinco anos, o que significaria que sua economia não pode mais crescer à custa das receitas do petróleo. Nessas condições, não surpreende que o novo governo use a palavra decrescimento para discutir o futuro da economia nacional.
Mas esses casos mostram que o decrescimento postulado para o Norte rico, como descreve o artigo de Mann, não pode ser transplantado para a América Latina. Impor uma redução geral das economias seria catastrófico. Mas ele consegue nos obrigar a questionar se o crescimento econômico deve ser a questão essencial que deve orientar e organizar uma economia. A resposta é “não”, por vários dos motivos que já foram referidos e outros que todos podemos acrescentar. Parece mais sensato propor para o Uruguai, e outros países da região, um olhar de a-crescimento, no qual o objetivo do crescimento econômico seja deslocado de sua centralidade, e indicadores como o PIB sejam complementados com outros. Uma economia em que haverá setores que necessariamente devem crescer, como a saúde, a educação ou a habitação, e outros que podem permanecer iguais, mas também haverá aqueles que devem diminuir porque expressam opulência e impactos socioambientais intoleráveis.
Não devemos cair nas modas, repetindo a moda do decrescimento porque se popularizou em Paris, Madri e Berlim, mas buscar as nossas próprias soluções ajustadas às nossas urgências e necessidades.
Notas
1. Gustavo Petro no Twitter, 02-09-2022.
2. Ver, por exemplo, La apuesta por el decrecimiento, por S. Latouche, Icaria, Barcelona, 2008.
3. ‘Decrescimento’, por G. Kallis, F. Demaria e G. D’Alisa, em Decrescimento. Vocabulário para um novo mundo. Porto Alegre: Tomo Editorial, 2016.
Leia mais
quinta-feira, 11 de agosto de 2022
sexta-feira, 18 de março de 2022
Há limites para o crescimento económico? É hora de encerrar uma discussão de 50 anos
Cinquenta anos atrás, dia 16 deste mês, o grupo System Dynamics no Massachusetts Institute of Technology em Cambridge tinha uma mensagem dura para o mundo: o crescimento económico e populacional contínuo esgotaria os recursos da Terra e levaria ao colapso económico global até 2070. Esta descoberta fez "The Limits to Growth", um dos primeiros estudos de modelagem para prever os impactos ambientais e sociais da industrialização.
Consultar o post Relatório Meadows
Fifty years ago this month, the System Dynamics group at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in Cambridge had a stark message for the world: continued economic and population growth would deplete Earth’s resources and lead to global economic collapse by 2070. This finding was from their 200-page book The Limits to Growth, one of the first modelling studies to forecast the environmental and social impacts of industrialization.
For its time, this was a shocking forecast, and it did not go down well. Nature called the study “another whiff of doomsday” (see Nature 236, 47–49; 1972). It was near-heresy, even in research circles, to suggest that some of the foundations of industrial civilization — mining coal, making steel, drilling for oil and spraying crops with fertilizers — might cause lasting damage. Research leaders accepted that industry pollutes air and water, but considered such damage reversible. Those trained in a pre-computing age were also sceptical of modelling, and advocated that technology would come to the planet’s rescue. Zoologist Solly Zuckerman, a former chief scientific adviser to the UK government, said: “Whatever computers may say about the future, there is nothing in the past which gives any credence whatever to the view that human ingenuity cannot in time circumvent material human difficulties.”
But the study’s lead author, Donella Meadows, and her colleagues stood firm, pointing out that ecological and economic stability would be possible if action were taken early. Limits was instrumental to the creation of the United Nations Environment Programme, also in 1972. Overall, more than 30 million copies of the book have been sold.
Researchers such as Johan Rockström at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research in Germany advocate that economies can grow without making the planet unliveable. They point to evidence, notably from the Nordic nations, that economies can continue to grow even as carbon emissions start to come down. This shows that what’s needed is much faster adoption of technology — such as renewable energy. A parallel research movement, known as ‘post-growth’ or ‘degrowth’, says that the world needs to abandon the idea that economies must keep growing — because growth itself is harmful. Its proponents include Kate Raworth, an economist at the University of Oxford, UK, and author of the 2017 book Doughnut Economics, which has inspired its own global movement. But the debates haven’t stopped. Although there’s now a consensus that human activities have irreversible environmental effects, researchers disagree on the solutions — especially if that involves curbing economic growth. That disagreement is impeding action. It’s time for researchers to end their debate. The world needs them to focus on the greater goals of stopping catastrophic environmental destruction and improving well-being.
Economic growth is typically measured by gross domestic product (GDP). This composite index uses consumer spending, as well as business and government investment, to arrive at a figure for a country’s economic output. Governments have entire departments devoted to ensuring that GDP always points upwards. And that is a problem, say post-growth researchers: when faced with a choice between two policies (one more green than the other), governments are likely to opt for whichever is the quicker in boosting growth to bolster GDP, and that might often be the option that causes more pollution.
A report published last week by the World Health Organization (see "Valuing Health for All" ) says that if policymakers didn’t have a “pathological obsession with GDP”, they would spend more on making health care affordable for every citizen. Health spending does not contribute to GDP in the same way that, for example, military spending does, say the authors, led by economist Mariana Mazzucato at University College London.
Both communities must do more to talk to each other, instead of at each other. It won’t be easy, but appreciation for the same literature could be a starting point. After all, Limits inspired both the green-growth and post-growth communities, and both were similarly influenced by the first study on planetary boundaries (J. Rockström et al. Nature 461, 472–475; 2009), which attempted to define limits for the biophysical processes that determine Earth’s capacity for self-regulation.
Opportunities for cooperation are imminent. At the end of January, the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services announced a big study into the causes of biodiversity loss, including the role of economic systems. More than 100 authors from 40 countries and different fields will spend two years assessing the literature. They will recommend “transformative change to the systems leading us to catastrophe”, says study co-chair, political scientist Arun Agrawal at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.
Another opportunity is an upcoming revision of the rules for what is measured in GDP. These will be agreed by countries’ chief statisticians and organized through the UN, and are due to be finalized in 2025. For the first time, the statisticians are asking how sustainability and well-being could be more closely aligned to GDP. Both post-growth and green-growth advocates have valuable perspectives.
Research can be territorial — new communities emerge sometimes because of disagreements in fields. But green-growth and post-growth scientists need to see the bigger picture. Right now, both are articulating different visions to policymakers, and there is a risk this will delay action. In 1972, there was still time to debate, and less urgency to act. Now, the world is running out of time
quinta-feira, 10 de março de 2022
Crescer até Rebentar? Os Limites ao Crescimento: A Crise Ecológica
Consultar o post: Relatório Meadows
Começou uma nova época geológica: impulsionado pelo aumento contínuo de gases com efeito de estufa na atmosfera desde a revolução industrial, o Antropoceno está a substituir a relativa estabilidade do Holoceno. Apesar dos grandes acordos internacionais como o Protocolo de Kyoto ou o Acordo de Paris e das boas intenções manifestadas em todas as outras conferências climáticas das Nações Unidas, encontramo-nos perante alterações climáticas numa dimensão nunca experimentada pela humanidade que são acompanhadas pela rápida expansão da exploração dos recursos naturais e da destruição dos ecossistemas que sustentam os seres humanos e dos quais fazemos parte.
Utilizando uma abordagem baseada na área biologicamente produtiva necessária para absorver as emissões de carbono e gerar todos os recursos consumidos, a Global Footprint Network apurou que a pegada ecológica per capita está atualmente acima dos limites planetários em todos os continentes, menos em África. Mais, de acordo com dados da Oxfam, é apenas uma pequena elite global que é responsável pela maior parte das emissões: As emissões do 1% mais rico da população mundial correspondem a mais do dobro das emissões da metade mais pobre, e, ao mesmo tempo, os 10% mais ricos são responsáveis por mais de 50% das emissões. Ou dito doutro modo, a população dos Estados Unidos emite, em média, 14.5 tCO2 per capita por ano quando algumas populações de África subsariana têm um emissão de 0.2 tCO2 por pessoa / ano, sendo a pegada carbónica média do 1% do topo mais de 75 vezes superior à da metade da população mundial com menores emissões.
Focando sobretudo nas emissões de carbono e na crise climática, estas abordagens não incluem as outras vertentes da crise ecológica: a restante poluição atmosférica, a poluição de aquíferos, lagos, rios e oceanos, a poluição dos solos agrícolas e das zonas industriais, a presença de produtos radioativos, metais pesados e compostos químicos que podem funcionar como disruptores endócrinos, o lixo eletrónico e os plásticos e microplásticos, e, particularmente, a perda da biodiversidade.
O último Relatório de Avaliação Global da Plataforma Intergovernamental de Políticas Científicas em relação à Biodiversidade e Serviços de Ecossistemas (IPBES), publicado em 2019, realçou que a Natureza tem sido modificada de forma significativa pela intervenção humana, provocando um declínio da grande maioria dos indicadores dos ecossistemas e da biodiversidade e ameaçando mais espécies com a extinção global do que alguma vez no passado. De acordo com o IPBES, esta perda de biodiversidade representa um sério risco em relação à segurança alimentar. Além disso, as alterações do uso dos solos e a exploração dos ecossistemas marinhos também têm um efeito negativo sobre a Natureza que, por sua vez, é agravado pelas alterações climáticas, enquanto os incentivos económicos à atividade humana têm beneficiado as atividades nocivas em detrimento da conservação e restauração.
Abundam agora as propostas de pactos verdes, novos e menos novos, europeus ou não, para solucionar a crise. No entanto, o Gabinete Europeu do Ambiente analisou detalhadamente as possibilidades de dissociar o crescimento económico dos seus impactos ambientais e concluiu que é impossível atingir o “crescimento verde” dentro dos limites planetários. O Banco Mundial concluiu que a necessidade de produção de minerais, tais como grafite, lítio e cobalto, poderia aumentar em quase 500% até 2050, estimando que mais de 3 mil milhões de toneladas de minerais e metais seriam precisas para o desenvolvimento da energia eólica, solar e geotérmica, bem como o armazenamento de energia. As necessidades energéticas para atingir essa transição ultrapassariam a produção atual e aumentariam ainda mais os impactes ambientais desastrosos. E segundo dados publicados em 2022, as economias mundiais já consomem atualmente mais de 100 giga toneladas (Gt) de materiais por ano, na sua maioria minérios não-metálicos, metálicos e combustíveis fósseis, o que corresponde a quase quatro vezes mais que em 1972, ano da publicação do relatório “Os Limites ao Crescimento”. No últimos anos, de 2018 a 2020, a taxa de reciclagem e reutilização baixou de 9.1% para 8.6%, o que realça a insustentabilidade do uso dos recursos e a inverosimilhança da economia circular no sistema vigente.
Quando as narrativas da transição verde e sustentável são ilusórias e incongruentes, as zonas de sacrifício que este sistema requer já não se limitam a terras longínquas cujo nome mal sabemos pronunciar. O extrativismo e a mineração desenfreada estão a chegar ao interior de Portugal, ameaçando os sistemas biológicos, a produção alimentar e o modo de vida da população local. Embora a resistência se organize e as ações contra a mineração e em defesa da vidatentem fazer-se ouvir, as autorizações para a prospeção e a exploração são emitidas, mesmo que seja em cima do fim do prazo e com legalidade duvidosa. Ao mesmo tempo, a agricultura super-intensiva devasta o Sul do país, nomeadamente perímetro de rega do Alqueva, enquanto Portugal é uma das zonas mais afetadas pelas alterações climáticas no que diz respeito a fenómenos atmosféricos extremos, redução da pluviosidade e seca que neste mês de fevereiro é severa ou extrema em mais de 90% do território nacional.
Estamos a viver em sociedades de complexidade elevada, caraterizadas pelos aumentos substanciais e contínuos da extensão e da intensidade das atividades humanas que provocam uma forte e crescente perturbação do sistema terrestre. A civilização humana, na sua expressão tecno-industrial moderna, representa um sistema termodinâmico não equilibrado que depende de esforço e de energia que é proveniente de combustíveis de alto teor energético, onde um barril de petróleo corresponde a 10.000 – 25.000 horas de trabalho humano. Globalmente, os combustíveis fósseis são responsáveis por aproximadamente 80% do consumo de energia primária, verificando-se um aumento anual contínuo em termos absolutos, apenas interrompido por crises económico-financeiras ou pandémicas, sendo os principais responsáveis pelas emissões de gases com efeito de estufa (GEE) que têm vindo a aumentar continuamente até ao início da pandemia de covid-19 em 2020.
De acordo com o Programa Ambiental das Nações Unidas, as promessas de contribuições nacionais (NDC na sigla inglesa) para reduzir as emissões que foram assumidas até agora são insuficientes e acabam por colocar o mundo a caminho de um aquecimento global de 2,7ºC até ao final do século, incompatível com a estabilidade climática. Quando seria necessário haver uma redução anual de 7,6% da emissão de GEE a nível mundial, mesmo durante o ano de 2020, com a atividade económica fortemente atingida pela pandemia de covid-19, a redução de emissões provenientes de fontes fósseis fora apenas de 5.4%, calculando-se ter havido um novo aumento de 4.9% já em 2021, devido à retoma económica, anulando quase na totalidade a – embora insuficiente – redução em 2020. E, possivelmente, a realidade ainda será pior que as previsões. A China já anunciou o aumento da produção de energia a partir de carvão com os centrais a trabalhar na sua máxima capacidade, tendo a mineração de carvão atingido novos recordes em 2021. Nos Estados Unidos, é a mineração de bitcoins com a sua avidez por energia elétrica que reanima as centrais a carvão prestes a serem desligadas.
Apesar de ser inegável que tenha havido uma maior cobertura noticiosa da crise climática, esta informação está repleta de notícias avulsas sobre ondas de calor, seca, incêndios e outros desastres ambientais, sem relacionar esses fenómenos com um sistema extrativista assente no crescimento exponencial e infinito. Assistimos a debates televisivos sobre as conclusões do Painel Intergovernamental sobre as Alterações climáticas (IPCC) que são interrompidos por diretos intermináveis sobre um qualquer assunto do momento como, por exemplo, a chegada de uma atleta medalhado ao aeroporto, sem nunca enquadrar as verdadeiras causas do problema. Faltam as perguntas diretas ao governo sobre o favorecimento de empresas altamente poluidoras o que é complementado com a inexistência de debates pré-eleitorais com foco na crise ecológica. Claramente, os órgãos de comunicação social hesitam de colocar o próprio sistema em causa e ficam limitados a incluir temas na agenda mediática que não abanam os alicerces da sociedade de consumo atual.
Perante todas as dimensões da crise ecológica, o sistema socioeconómico vigente tem-se vindo a mostrar incapaz de corrigir uma marcha aparentemente irreversível em direção ao colapso, e a lógica intrínseca do capitalismo industrial globalizado acaba por se revelar incompatível com a vida humana dentro dos limites planetários.
Afinal, já estaremos irremediavelmente para além dos Limites ao Crescimento e o colapso tornar-se-á inevitável? Ou ainda haverá algo a fazer para travar este destino e criar comunidades solidárias e conviviais que sejam capazes de se adaptarem às condições do Antropoceno, renunciando ao delírio das desastrosas práticas atuais, restaurando os ecossistemas, e redescobrindo formas de viver que não assentam nas supostas benesses do modernismo tecnológico?
Este artigo insere-se na série de eventos e artigos sobre “Os Limites ao Crescimento – 50 Anos depois: Crescer até Rebentar?”
Em 1972, o relatório ao Clube de Roma “Os Limites ao Crescimento”, compilado por uma equipa internacional de analistas de sistemas do MIT sob liderança de Donella Meadows, falecida em 2001, Dennis Meadows, Jørgen Randers e William Behrens III, analisou as interações entre cinco fatores básicos que contribuem para os problemas que as sociedades modernas enfrentam e que, em última análise, limitam o crescimento num planeta finito: população mundial, industrialização, poluição, produção alimentar e exaustão de recursos. Utilizando modelos informáticos sofisticados, os investigadores tentaram compreender a dinâmica da aceleração progressiva do desenvolvimento global, quer no que diz respeito ao declínio dos recursos naturais, quer em relação à poluição, analisando doze possíveis cenários. Concluíram que continuar como se nada fosse ( “business as usual”) provocaria o colapso dentro de cem anos. Contudo, também seria possível alterar esta previsão, estabelecendo políticas diferentes e podendo assim alcançar uma situação de estabilidade ecológica e económica que fosse sustentável no futuro. Ao mesmo tempo, este equilíbrio global poderia satisfazer as necessidades materiais básicas de cada ser humano, dando a todas as pessoas oportunidades iguais para realizarem o seu potencial. Na época, o apelo a uma discussão das conclusões do relatório por uma comunidade mais ampla, e nomeadamente fora do domínio científico, não fora ouvido e os defensores do capitalismo industrial contribuíram deliberadamente para a perceção pública errada de que o relatório tinha previsto o colapso num futuro próximo, e mesmo antes de 2000. No entanto, os dados empíricos recolhidos desde a publicação do relatório e das suas subsequentes atualizações confirmaram a validade do modelo.
Numa recente entrevista, conduzida por Richard Heinberg para a revista Resilence Dennis Meadows fala sobre o relatório original e a sua visão do futuro, realçando a vantagem de construir redes de pessoas, conviviais e frugais quando o colapso não atingirá todas as pessoas da mesma forma.
“Outra coisa que eu diria é que, independentemente do que acontecer nas próximas décadas, em cada momento há sempre uma oportunidade de fazer muitas coisas diferentes. Algumas delas irão melhorar a situação, e outras irão piorá-la. E é eticamente satisfatório, e provavelmente até eficaz de alguma forma, tentar encontrar as coisas que irão tornar as coisas melhores.”
terça-feira, 22 de fevereiro de 2022
Entrevista a Dennis Meadows no 50º aniversario da publicação do livro The Limits to Growth
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Only rarely does a book truly change the world. In the nineteenth century, such a book was Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species. For the twentieth century, it was The Limits to Growth. Not only did this best-selling 1972 publication help spur the environmental movement, but it showed that the underlying dynamics of the modern industrial world are unsustainable on the timescale of a couple of human lifetimes. This was profoundly important information, and it was delivered credibly and clearly, so that every policy maker could understand it. Sadly, the book was rejected by powerful people with vested interests in the Western growth-based economic model that was overtaking the rest of the world. Today we are starting to see the results of that rejection.
Of the book’s four authors, only Dennis Meadows and Jørgen Randers are active (Donella Meadows died in 2001). I recently reached out to Dr. Meadows, whom I’ve gotten to know during the past few years, to see if he would be willing to engage in a short discussion, on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of The Limits to Growth. He graciously agreed.
Richard Heinberg: Dennis, it is an honor to have this opportunity to interview you. Congratulations on having co-authored the most important book of the past century. I’m delighted that you’re willing to reply to a few questions.
First, how is reality tracking with the scenarios you and your colleagues generated 50 years ago?
Dennis L. Meadows: There have been several attempts, recently, to compare some of our scenarios with the way the global system has evolved over the past 50 years. That’s difficult. It’s, in a way, trying to confirm by looking through a microscope whether or not the data that you gathered through a telescope are accurate. In fact, accuracy is not really the issue here. Our goal in doing the original analysis was to provide a conceptual framework within which people could think about their own options and about the events that they saw around them. When we evaluate models, we always ask whether they’re more useful, not whether they’re more accurate.
Having said that, I will also say that the efforts which have been undertaken have generally concluded that the world is moving along what we termed in our 1972 report to be the standard scenario. It’s an aggregated image of the global system, showing growth from 1972 up to around 2020, and then, over the next decade or two, the principal trends peaking out and beginning to decline. I still find that model very useful in understanding what I read in the papers and in trying to think about what’s coming next.
RH: Generally, when it comes to discussions about environmental impacts on society, resource depletion gets a lot less attention than pollution. Nearly everybody talks about climate change these days, but the background assumption seems to be that, if we reduce emissions to “net zero,” we can continue living essentially as we do now—with a consumer culture, 8 billion people, and cruise ships (hydrogen powered, of course). There’s very little discussion in the mainstream—even among most scientists, it seems to me—about how growing population and consumption will lead to a series of depletion crises even if we somehow avert the worst climate impacts. How do you see the impacts of depletion and pollution developing as constraints on future growth?
DLM: I would say that depletion and pollution are already constraints on future growth. Take just oil, for example. In the 90s, the average price was about $30 a barrel. We’re now in the vicinity of $100 a barrel, even taking inflation into account. That is beginning to put a significant damper on investment decisions. And plus, there is of course, no possibility of avoiding climate change, even if we did reduce emissions to net zero. The lifetime of CO2 in the atmosphere (its half-life is about 120 years) means we’re going to have to live for the rest of this century with the consequences of almost everything we’ve dumped into the atmosphere up until now.
The last time the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere was this high was about 4 million years ago. There were no humans around, and sea level was about 60 feet higher than it is today. This is not science fiction. We know that if the Antarctic ice sheet melts off, it will raise global sea levels by about 190 feet. That will add, of course, to the expansion of the water in the oceans which is coming from warming temperatures. We also see that the Arctic ice sheet is melting. And there’s absolutely no reason I’ve seen to imagine other than that the effects of current warming will accelerate that process.
However, it is useful to imagine (although it’s a fantasy) that we could eliminate climate change as an issue. Even then, major changes would be required. If you read the papers and look at the data, we see that natural resources are deteriorating on every single continent. We’re far above sustainable levels. Even if we could avoid climate change, there is no possibility of sustaining 8 billion people at anything near the living standards we’ve come to expect. There have been some academic exercises to calculate how many people the earth could support. That’s really a silly sort of exercise, because it ignores most of the values and goals that we have for making human life on this planet worthwhile: equity, liberty, welfare, human health. These things are all intimately affected by overpopulation. I don’t know what a sustainable population level is now, but it’s probably much closer to a billion people, or fewer, if we aspire for them to have the kind of living standards and the political circumstances that we enjoy in the West.
Depletion in the future is probably going to manifest most directly through what look like political forces. As countries like the United States and China become dependent on imports to sustain their living standards, which they are already with respect to oil, they will begin to implement political, military, and economic measures to gain control over those assets abroad. And that’s certainly going to bring us into conflict. Diverting resources off to the mechanisms of control will reduce the kind of growth that’s possible domestically. We can argue about how much technology will make new resources available to us, but the key thing to remember is that, generally speaking, technology is to be understood as a way of using fossil energy to secure something. And as our fossil energy resources start to decline, the ability of technology to make evermore abundant resources available is certainly going to go down.
RH: The Limits to Growth was heavily scrutinized and criticized. Much of the criticism was unfair and based on numbers from the book that were taken out of context and treated as forecasts—which they explicitly weren’t. But I wonder, with 50 years of hindsight, if any critics made you rethink some of your early assumptions or conclusions?
DLM: Of course, I’ve often wondered how I would do things differently if I knew back in 1972 what I know now, and were once again constructing a team and organizing an effort to develop and analyze a global model. By and large, I think we made the right choices. I’ll talk in a moment about energy where, I think some important changes could have been made. One of our crucial assumptions was to look at the globe as a whole, and not try to differentiate amongst regions or countries. In hindsight, I think that was the right thing to do—although it did, of course, open us up to criticism. As little as we know about long-term global trends, we know even less about the dynamics of international transfers of people, finance, resources, energy, and so forth. So, trying to make a multinational model for the long term is going to leave you with an extremely complicated set of assumptions, all of which are based on ignorance, and that’s not a very useful model.
RH: The Integrated Assessment Reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are not systems models like World3 (the model used for The Limits to Growth) and do not consider the possibility of degrowth, only growth. Can you reflect on the differences in modeling approaches and what implications they have—for example, for the most extreme scenarios for greenhouse gas emissions?
DLM: There are profound differences between what we did and the modeling which has been carried out in support of the IPCC. I respect that effort enormously. I know many of the people involved in trying to model long-term climate change. They are excellent scientists, and they’re doing good work. They have generated much useful new knowledge. But the nature of their analysis is just totally different from what we did. It wouldn’t be too much of an exaggeration to say that the IPCC model starts first with what is politically acceptable, and then tries to trace out its scientific consequences, whereas we looked at what was scientifically known, and then tried to trace out its political consequences.
The IPCC model leaves many things exogenous. To use it you have to specify population growth assumptions, economic GDP level assumptions, and so forth. We worked very hard to make the important determinants of our model endogenous. It means that it evolves over time in response to changes that are occurring within the model. Making the important variables, like population, exogenous saves you a lot of criticism. You can give a bunch of different scenarios, and within that set, almost any politician will find something that they like.
The IPCC scenario is just telling us about climate change, and does not get into other issues. We were trying to provide an overall framework. So, they’re both useful efforts, just totally different. It’s like picking up a hammer and picking up a paintbrush, and asking which is better. And of course, the answer is, each has its own purposes.
RH: The Limits to Growth model just has “resources” as inputs to the economy, with energy included as a resource. I wonder if you see energy as special, as it takes energy to access all other resources, such as minerals. Would you think resource declines in general will follow energy declines specifically?
DLM: The most serious omission in our model, as far as I now understand it, was energy. We lumped all forms of energy implicitly into either the nonrenewable resource sector, or, in some farfetched way, the agricultural sector. That implicitly assumes that energy is infinitely substitutable—an assumption the economists make all the time, but which is, of course, totally erroneous.
I still remember when the oil embargo occurred, I think it was in 1972. And economists said, “Well, don’t worry. The energy economy in the United States is only 4 or 5 per cent of GDP. So even if it stops totally, the GDP isn’t going to go down very much.” Well, of course, that’s just an incredibly silly way of understanding reality. If there’s no energy, there is very little GDP. Whether or not the decline in energy availability will track closely or only loosely with resource availability remains to be seen. Energy availability, of course, is not only a matter of physical quantities, but also useful energy. The concept of energy return on investment (EROI) is extremely important, and probably well known to the people who monitor your website. We know that it’s trending down. Charlie Hall, in his pioneering work, has done the best job I’ve seen to calculate what EROI needs to be in order to sustain an economy as complex as ours. We have a ways to go, but it will be the decline of energy return on investment, which is the biggest problem.
RH: In rereading your book, I was struck by the excellent recommendations you made, starting on page 161. If only these had been adopted back then by policy makers globally! Unfortunately for us all, they weren’t, for the most part (though some successful efforts were made to slow population growth). Now, 50 years on, do you think different recommendations are appropriate?
DLM: I went back and looked at all three editions of our book. I couldn’t find anywhere that set of recommendations, excellent or otherwise. [RH Note: Dennis is correct here, of course: there are no “recommendations” per se, merely hypothetical conditions, such as the application of policies to produce an equalization of birth and death rates starting in 1975, that were fed into the scenarios in an attempt to produce a stable world condition throughout the 21st century.] However, whatever it was that we recommended back then certainly is not relevant now. In 1972, the impact of humanity on the globe was probably below sustainable levels, and the goal at that time was to slow things down before we hit the limit. Now it’s clear that the scale of human activities is far, far above the limit. And our goal is not to slow down, but to get back down: to find ways to maneuver the system, in a peaceful, equitable, hopefully fairly liberal way, and bring our demands back down to levels that can be borne by the planet. That’s a totally different question than the one we addressed. It would require a totally different kind of model than the one we built, and a totally different set of books than the ones we wrote. We were careful in our analyses, when describing our different scenarios, never to make statements about the output of the model, after the first major variable peaked and started to go down, because we understood that that would bring very profound changes in the social and the political system, which would almost undoubtedly make our model quite irrelevant. So, there’s still lots of interesting research to be done. There’s a whole new set of interesting questions. But you’ll have to look elsewhere than our work in order to get started on it.
RH: Do you think policy makers are any more open now than they were then?
DLM: It’s not a question of whether policymakers are open or not; it’s whether they’re more likely now to take constructive action than they were 50 years ago. That’s a complex question, and I don’t know the answer. Action requires not just openness, but also resources and concern. I’ve been able to convince people that, for example, climate change is coming. They don’t take action, not because they don’t believe me, but because they just don’t care. They’re focused on a short-term perspective within which the current system is giving them the power and the money they aspire to. They see no need for change.
It’s ironic, but with these kinds of problems over time, the concern tends to go up, but the discretionary resources tend to go down. And it’s often the case that, by the time policymakers become sufficiently concerned about something to start wondering what to do, they no longer have sufficient discretionary resources to be very effective. And this is all compounded with what I call the time horizon vicious circle. Because we haven’t taken effective action in the past, crises are mounting. It’s in the nature of the political response that, when crisis comes, you focus more and more on the short term, and your time horizon shrinks. And because that leads you to do things which fundamentally don’t solve the problem, the crisis gets worse. So, as the crisis gets worse, the time horizon shrinks even more, bad decision making increases, and the crisis goes up even further. That’s where I see us now.
I’ve used the metaphor sometimes of the roller coaster, which, for my German audiences, the most prominent example would be the one at Oktoberfest in Munich. In 1972, using this metaphor, I could say that the situation was kind of like a group of people standing at the ticket window and wondering whether or not they ought to get on the train. They still had a chance not to do it. But, in this analogy, they did. They got on the car, and they enjoyed a short period of growth up to the top of the first hill. Now they’re about to start to descend, and they no longer have much room for constructive action. All they can do is hold on and hope to survive the trip. That’s a simplistic way of understanding our situation, but it puts policymaking into a useful perspective.
RH: Of all the recommendations you made then (or new ones), what is the single most important? Is there a pebble of an idea that can start an avalanche of change?
DLM: The recommendations we made back in 1972 simply aren’t relevant now. So, although I could say, in theory, stopping population growth or increasing people’s concern for those far away might have been the most important things we could have done 50 years ago, now it’s really too late for that. If I were trying to start a new momentum for change, it would be on understanding the nature of human perception. Why is it that we tend to focus on the short term and the local, when in fact, the fundamental solutions to these problems are long-term and far away? And there’s a lot of research to be done. Economists have predicated their recommendations on the assumption that GDP will continue to expand forever. Certainly, it will not. We need to understand the implications of that and try to think through what practical policy recommendations could be implemented in response to that fact. I think about those things, but I certainly haven’t come to the point where I’m able to spell out a set of detailed recommendations.
RH: What do you think about the prospects for people to relinquish the idea of maximizing their power over nature, and to accept the idea of “enough” as an organizing principle for a good life? Would that be going against our genes, or just our cultural conditioning?
DLM: To an extent that we don’t appreciate in most cases, our species, Homo sapiens, and therefore its global society, are the result of 300,000 to 400,000 years of evolution, during which there was high survival value in focusing on the short-term nearby, and not worrying about the long-term far away. As a consequence, that’s the mental and the institutional endowment we have now for dealing with questions that, for the first time, really need something else. There are two ways we change: socially and biologically. Fundamental genetic change in our species requires 3,000 or 4,000 years. It takes about that long before a constructive mutation can become fairly widespread. Social adaptation can, at least in theory, occur quicker, so the question here is: what are the prospects for our social system to change in ways that are more congruent with the reality? It’s high in theory. In practice, I’m not sure. The dominant issue we face is that the current system is serving the interests of many people very well. There are a lot of people who get wealth and political power from the current system. And of course, when somebody else recommends a change, the people with that power are going to resist, and they have resisted. The fossil fuel industry is one example, but there are thousands. You can’t understand the nuclear debate if you don’t realize that some people are making millions of dollars by building nuclear reactors.
So, you need to ask not a physical scientist like me, but a sociologist or political scientist about the prospect for changing society. In the past, change happened rapidly under periods of crisis, not typically during periods of peace and success. As the crises grow we will see what change is available.
RH: You’ve done some research into how people change their behavior; have you learned some lessons that might be valuable for young activists?
DLM: I’m an old activist. I’m 80 years old. I don’t imagine that I have the capacity to put myself in the head of somebody who’s just starting out life and sees 60 or 70 years ahead of them. Nonetheless, I might offer at least a few things for them to consider. One is to recognize that people are motivated by many different factors: wealth, affection, fame, power. And if you want somebody to change, you need to understand what motivates them, and to persuade them that the change you recommend is going to serve their interests. This will be easier if their interests extend to people far away or out into the future. But one way or another, they need to find it to be in their self-interest. I’ve seldom found somebody who was willing to drop everything and do things I told them to do just because I thought it was a good idea.
Another thing I would say is that, no matter what happens over the next decades, at each moment there’s always an opportunity to do many different things. Some of them will make the situation better, and some of them will make it worse. And it’s ethically satisfying, and probably even effective in some way, to try and find the things that will make things better.
I don’t know what’s coming. I look at those downward sloping curves in my scenario, and I honestly don’t know what it’s going to look like on the ground over the next 40 to 50 years. But my guess is that some people may come through this period not even being much aware of collapse, whereas others, of course, are already far into the decline of their personal situation, their culture, their community, and so forth. Whatever turns out to be the case, I know that the people who have some practical skills, modest aspirations, and a good social network are going to fare better. So, if I were to conclude with any sort of simplistic recommendation, I guess it would be to build up your social networks. Use them as a source of new ideas, support, reinforcement, and satisfaction.
RH: Dennis, thank you again for talking with me, and deep and sincere thanks for all you’ve done over the years to help us understand our global predicament.
segunda-feira, 19 de outubro de 2020
domingo, 15 de dezembro de 2019
Dia Mundial do Decrescimento
Em 1971, foi dado a público o resultado de um estudo, encomendado a uma equipa de investigadores do Instituto de Tecnologia de Massachusetts pelo chamado Clube de Roma. O estudo tinha por objectivo prever as consequências a médio e longo prazo para as sociedades humanas e o mundo natural, do prosseguimento de um caminho de desenvolvimento económico e social assente no contínuo crescimento da produção de bens materiais, acompanhado do crescimento acelerado da população mundial que se verificava e hoje continua a verificar-se. O estudo tirou partido de um programa de simulação em computador criado por um investigador daquele instituto. Em 1972 o relatório do estudo foi publicado em livro com o título “Limites ao Crescimento” [1] Desde então foram vendidos cerca de 30 milhões de exemplares em trinta línguas.
Na simulação das consequências da interacção entre os sistemas do planeta Terra e os sistemas humanos, cinco variáveis foram tomadas em consideração na descrição dos padrões de crescimento: população mundial, industrialização, poluição, produção de alimentos e esgotamento de recursos. A problemática das alterações climáticas não estava então ainda na ordem do dia.
Na altura, os autores do estudo resumiram assim, em poucas linhas, o seu pensamento: “Após exame dos resultados das simulações informáticas efectuadas, a equipa de investigadores chegou às seguintes conclusões: tendo em conta o status quo, isto é, a não alteração das tendências históricas de crescimento, os limites do crescimento na Terra tornar-se-ão evidentes daqui até 2072, o que provocará um declínio brusco e incontrolável da população e da capacidade industrial”.
No estudo “Limites ao crescimento” não podiam ser feitas com segurança previsões específicas mas apenas apontadas linhas gerais de uma possível evolução futura das sociedades humanas tendo em conta, por um lado, a finitude dos recursos naturais, ainda que imperfeitamente conhecida, e, por outro, um crescimento exponencial da população e o impacte que necessariamente tem sobre o ritmo de esgotamento desses recursos.
Trinta anos mais tarde, membros destacados do grupo de investigadores, responsável pelo trabalho que conduzira à publicação de “Limites ao Crescimento”, procederam à revisão e actualização da obra publicada em 1972. O novo livro foi dado a público em 2004 com o título “Limites ao Crescimento: Actualização 30 Anos depois” [2] Um dos autores, o Prof. Dennis Meadows, então no MIT, onde dirigiu o Projecto do Club de Roma sobre a “Situação Difícil da Espécie Humana”, deu a público nessa altura uma entrevista na qual, olhando retrospectivamente para as três décadas anteriores, explicou [3]: “Em 1972 era inconcebível para a maioria que os impactos físicos das actividades humanas pudessem avolumar-se a ponto de alterar processos naturais básicos do globo. Mas hoje, rotineiramente, observamos, reconhecemos e discutimos, o buraco do ozono, a destruição das pescarias marítimas, as alterações climáticas e outros problemas globais”. Importa notar que, se na sua versão dos anos 70, o discurso sobre “limites ao crescimento” se focava sobre a questão de como reduzir o ritmo do crescimento, em 2004 a mensagem era outra: “Temos agora que dizer às pessoas como gerir um decréscimo programado das suas actividades para valores abaixo dos limites impostos pelos recursos naturais”. Reparemos na diferença entre crescimento reduzido e decrescimento. É esta a diferença de crucial importância entre o paradigma de desenvolvimento actual e aquele que entendemos ser indispensável adoptar se se quiser assegurar um futuro sustentável no planeta para a nossa espécie.
Dez anos mais tarde, Graham Turner, investigador da Universidade de Melbourne, procura avaliar em que medida a situação existente em 2014 e a evolução verificada ao longo de quase 40 anos, se mostram conformes com as previsões de 1972 do grupo do MIT [4]. Apoia-se numa compilação exaustiva de dados publicados por diversos organismos do sistema das Nações Unidas, da Administração Oceânica e Atmosférica Nacional dos EUA, e ainda de outras fontes como o Relatório Estatístico da British Petroleum sobre a Energia Mundial. O estudo confirma que as previsões do livro “Limites ao Crescimento” se mostram correctas, no fundamental.
As previsões de 72 assentavam na hipótese de um cenário de evolução correspondente à manutenção daquilo que em inglês se designa por “Business As Usual” ― o cenário BAU. Ora, este, numa tradução livre, “o negócio como habitual” é o que de facto, no essencial, se vem mantendo, pelo que as conclusões de Turner não devem ser motivo de espanto.
De acordo com o estudo, o cenário corrente de “Business As Usual” levaria ao colapso global da economia e do meio ambiente em que, em consequência de uma disrupção das funções económicas normais, as condições de vida se degradariam a um ritmo superior ao do crescimento historicamente verificado, impondo, subsequentemente, o decréscimo da população mundial. Teríamos assim em perspectiva um colapso económico e social neste século.
A exploração intensa e desregrada dos recursos naturais associada ao crescimento sem limites dá uma nova dimensão ao impacte das actividades humanas sobre o mundo natural ― clima e ecossistemas da Terra. O impacte global dessas actividades começa a ser significativo a partir de fins do século XVIII com a entrada em cena da máquina a vapor, momento histórico tomado por muitos autores como o início do mais recente período geológico, o chamado Antropoceno. A marca da actividade humana aparece com clareza nos gráficos abaixo.
A observação destes gráficos suscita justificada preocupação por mostrarem uma evolução extraordinariamente rápida dos valores das grandezas representadas num muito curto período histórico.
Interessa saber também que desde o início da Revolução Industrial a população mundial é multiplicada por 7. Em 2001 a taxa de crescimento da população mundial era de 1,3% ao ano o que corresponde a uma duplicação em 55 anos.
Por seu lado, o consumo de energia primária aumentou 20 vezes.
O aquecimento global, questão central do nosso tempo
São ameaças de distinta natureza, a todas sobrelevando, em nosso entender, pelas consequências que lhes estão associadas, a ameaça de guerra nuclear e o aquecimento global. No actual contexto geopolítico em que se assiste a um crescendo de tensões entre potências nucleares e ao recrudescimento de uma corrida aos armamentos, há uma probabilidade não desprezável de que um conflito nuclear possa ser desencadeado por erro de cálculo ou falência técnica de sistemas de alerta. No passado, no chamado período da “guerra fria”, tal já esteve perto de acontecer. A situação é hoje mais séria porque então se mantinham canais de comunicação entre as duas maiores potências nucleares que hoje não existem. Importa também ter em atenção que um conflito nuclear pode ser desencadeado por potências nucleares menores que têm já ou podem vir a ter interesses incompatíveis nas suas zonas de influência. É o caso do Paquistão e da Índia. Mesmo um conflito nuclear regional, digamos assim, poria em risco a sobrevivência da vida sobre a Terra, em consequência da formação de “nuvens de cinzas” constituídas por aerossóis de partículas de carbono, que ascenderiam à estratosfera impedindo a radiação solar de atingir o solo. As cinzas seriam o resultado dos incêndios provocados pelas explosões nucleares e da formação de tempestades de fogo, nomeadamente em zonas urbanas. Em artigo publicado no Boletim dos Cientistas Atómicos, Alan Robock, professor no Departamento de Ciências Ambientais, na Universidade de Rutgers (EUA), diz-nos o seguinte [5]: “ hoje sabemos que os efeitos atmosféricos de um conflito nuclear se prolongariam por pelo menos uma década (…). De acordo com os nossos cálculos, uma guerra nuclear regional entre a Índia e o Paquistão, que usaria menos de 0,3 por cento do arsenal global existente, provocaria uma alteração climática sem precedentes nos registos históricos da humanidade e uma diminuição global do ozono de dimensão idêntica ao buraco actual na camada de ozono mas que se distribuiria por todo o planeta.” No caso de um conflito nuclear generalizado a temperatura média à superfície do globo poderia descer consideravelmente e manter-se assim durante vários anos com graves consequências para as actividades agrícolas e, é claro, a produção de alimentos.
Mau grado o cenário terrível de um conflito nuclear, há razões para pensar, que ele é evitável. Daí ser compreensível o entendimento de que a ameaça mais séria que hoje se perfila no horizonte é o aquecimento global, fenómeno que está em marcha e que importa contrariar.
Nem todos pensam assim, todavia, e negam a própria existência do problema.
sexta-feira, 7 de junho de 2019
quinta-feira, 26 de novembro de 2015
Documentário: Final Warning - Limits to Growth
domingo, 6 de abril de 2008
The Clock : Energetic Limits to Growth (escrito ou avisado já em 1999)
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| Camile Pissaro- Seated Peasant, 1892 |
The fraction of energy produced by conventional nuclear plants can not be significantly increased because of a shortage of fuel. [18] Moreover, all but one of the new "fast breeder" reactors have been abandoned because they are "too costly and of doubtful value". [19]
by Jay Hanson
By definition, energy "sources" must generate more energy than they consume; otherwise, they are "sinks".
In 1972, the Club of Rome (COR) shocked the world with a study titled The Limits To Growth. Two main conclusions were reached by this study. The first suggests that if economic-development-as-we-know-it continues, society will run out of nonrenewable resources before the year 2072 with the most probable result being “a rather sudden and uncontrollable decline in both population and industrial capacity.” [[1]] The second conclusion of the study is that piecemeal approaches to solving individual problems will not be successful. For example, the COR authors arbitrarily double their estimates of the resource base and allow their model to project a new scenario based on this new higher level of resources. Collapse occurs in the new scenario because of pollution instead of resource depletion. The bottom line is traditional forms of economic development will end in less than 100 years – one way or another. The COR study has been much belittled but proof of the COR's thesis can readily be found in the real-world concept of “net energy” and that is the focus of this article.
Net Energy
Net-energy analysis became a public controversy in 1974 when two stories made the news. In the first, Business Week reported that Howard Odum had developed a “New Math for Figuring Energy Costs.” Among other results, this new math indicated that stripper oil well operations were energy sinks rather than energy sources. According to this analysis, these operations could be profitable only when cheap, regulated oil was used to produce deregulated oil. The other net-energy story of 1974 was the study of Chapman and Mortimer asserting that a rapidly growing nuclear program would lead to an increased use of oil rather than to the desired substitution (see Net-Energy Analysis by Daniel T. Spreng, Oak Ridge Assoc. Univ. & Praeger, 1988).
As we know from physics, to accomplish a certain amount of work requires a minimum energy input. For example, lifting 15 kg of rock 5 meters out of the ground requires 735 joules of energy just to overcome gravity –and the higher the lift, the greater the minimum energy requirements. [[2]] Combustion engines that actually do work – so-called “heat engines” – also consume a great deal of energy. [[3]] The efficiency of heat engines is limited by thermodynamic principles discovered over 150 years ago by N. L. S. Carnot. [[4]] Thus, a typical auto, bulldozer, truck, or power plant wastes more than 50 percent of the energy contained in its fuel.
One seldom thinks about the energy that is utilized in systems that supply energy – such as oil-fired power plants. But energy is also utilized when exploring for fuel, building the machinery to mine the fuel, mining the fuel, building and operating the power plants, building power lines to transmit the energy, decommissioning the plants, and so on. The difference between the total energy input (i.e., the energy value of the sought after energy) minus all of the energy utilized to run an energy supply system equals the "net energy" (in other words, the net amount of energy actually available to society to do useful work).
We mine our minerals and fossil fuels from the Earth's crust. The deeper we dig, the greater the minimum energy requirements. Of course, the most concentrated and most accessible fuels and minerals are mined first; thereafter, more and more energy is required to mine and refine poorer and poorer quality resources. New technologies can, on a short-term basis, decrease energy costs, but neither technology nor “prices” can repeal the laws of thermodynamics:
** The hematite ore of the Mesabi Range in Minnesota contained 60 percent iron. But now it is depleted and society must use lower-quality taconite ore that has an iron content of about 25 percent. [[5]]
** The average energy content of a pound of coal dug in the US has dropped 14 percent since 1955. [[6]]
** In the 1950s, oil producers discovered about fifty barrels of oil for every barrel invested in drilling and pumping. Today, the figure is only about five for one. Sometime around 2005, that figure will become one for one. Under that latter scenario, even if the price of oil reaches $500 a barrel, it wouldn't be logical to look for new oil in the US because it would consume more energy than it would recover. [[7]]
Decreasing net energy sets up a positive feedback loop: since oil is used directly or indirectly in everything, as the energy costs of oil increase, the energy costs of everything else increase too – including other forms of energy. For example, oil provides about 50% of the fuel used in coal extraction. [[8]]
Oil
One of the most important characteristics of energy is its “quality”. Fuels come in varying qualities. For example, coal contains more energy per pound than wood, which makes coal more efficient to store and transport than wood. Oil has a higher energy content per unit weight and burns at a higher temperature than coal; it is easier to transport, and can be used in internal combustion engines. A diesel locomotive wastes only one-fifth the energy of a coal-powered steam engine to pull the same train. Oil’s many advantages provide 1.3 to 2.45 times more economic value per kilocalorie than coal. [[9]]
Oil is the highest quality energy we use, making up about 38 percent of the world energy supply. No other energy source equals oil’s intrinsic qualities of relative ease of extraction, transportability, versatility and cost. The qualities that enabled oil to take over from coal as the front-line energy source in the industrialized world in the middle of this century are as relevant today as they were then.
Unfortunately, forecasts about the abundance of oil are warped by inconsistent definitions of “reserves”. In truth, every year for the past two decades the industry has pumped more oil than it has discovered, and production will soon be unable to keep up with rising demand. Almost 50 years ago, the geologist M. King Hubbert developed a method for projecting future oil production. Hubbert found that when approximately one half the Estimated Ultimately Recoverable (EUR) oil had been produced in an oil basin, production “peaks” and then declines towards zero. He calculated that oil production in the lower-48 states would peak about 1970. His prediction has proved to be remarkably accurate. Both total and peak yields have risen slightly compared to Hubbert's original estimate, but the timing of the peak and the generally declining production trend are correct.
For the last 50 years, many geologists and oil companies have published estimates of the total amount of crude oil that will ultimately be recovered from the Earth over all time. Remarkably, these assessments of EUR oil have varied little over the past half century [10] and global oil production is now expected to peak around 2005. [[11]]
The End of the Consumer Economy
Although economists are trained to treat energy just like any other resource when it comes to “supply and demand”, it is manifestly not like any other resource. Net energy is the pre-condition for all other resources. The coming peak in global oil production signals the end of the consumer economy because nothing can replace conventional oil.
Economists frequently cite Canada's Athabasca oil sands as a handy replacement for conventional oil. [[12]] But oil sands and tar shale are very energy-intensive, environmentally destructive, and not all that large anyway. For example, back-of-the-envelope calculations show that the Athabasca oil sands could supply less than three years' worth of oil for the global economy. Three hundred billion barrels of oil (AEUB) gushing out of a pipe would only last 12 years at present World consumption of 70 million barrels a day. Oil sands would last just three years if we super-optimistically assume 25 percent net energy for the digging, etc. over the entire resource. “The mining operation involves stripping off the overburden; separating the bitumen with steam, hot water and caustic soda, and then diluting it with naphtha. After centrifuging, liquid bitumen at 80°C is produced, which is then upgraded in a coking process and subjected to other treatments, eventually yielding a light gravity, low sulphur, synthetic oil.” (The Coming Oil Crisis, p. 121, Campbell, 1997)
How about natural gas? Unlike oil, natural gas can not easily be shipped by sea. It must be liquefied prior to shipment, then shipped in specially designed refrigerated ships destined for specially equipped ports, and then regasified for distribution – at an estimated 15 to 30 percent energy loss. [[13]] Moreover, natural gas cannot be easily stored like oil or coal. Global natural gas production is expected to "peak" sometime between 2010 [[14]] and 2020. [[15]] Hopes of exploiting the ice-like methane hydrates from the ocean floor also appear doomed because the solid is unable to migrate and accumulate in commercial volumes. [[16]] Today’s euphoria over methane hydrates reminds me of that which surrounded oil shale and tar sands a couple of decades ago. With regard to coal, U.S. coal production rose to a record high of 1,118 million short tons in 1998. U.S. coal, however, is expected to become an energy "sink" – not worth digging out of the ground – by 2040. [[17]]
What about nuclear energy? The fraction of energy produced by conventional nuclear plants can not be significantly increased because of a shortage of fuel. [[18]] Moreover, all but one of the new "fast breeder" reactors have been abandoned because they are "too costly and of doubtful value". [[19]]
The expansion of solar energy systems is limited by the availability of land. Estimates are that about 20 percent of U.S. land area (about 450 million acres) would be required to support a solar energy system that would supply less than one-half (37 quads) of our current energy consumption (80 quads). [[20]]
Fuel Cells to the Rescue?
The automobile industry is planning to put fuel-cell-powered automobiles on the road by 2004. But the new cars won’t be on the road for long because these fuel cells use hydrogen via methanol that is made from fossil fuel. [[21]] Hydrogen is not a “source” of energy – it’s an energy “carrier” (like electricity). About 95 percent of the hydrogen used in the U.S. market is produced by a chemical process known as “steam methane reforming”. [[22]] A carbon-based feedstock (usually natural gas or coal) is combined with steam under high pressure and temperature to produce hydrogen at about a 35 percent energy loss. Methanol is usuallyproduced from natural gas or coal at a 32 to 44 percent net energy loss. [[23]] In the U.S., oil production "peaked" in 1970 and is declining towards zero. Scenarios for widespread use of hydrogen are therefore likely to include steam reforming of gasified coal or biomass. But the coal will be gone in 40 years and there just isn't enough land for biomass!
Money Is Not Energy
Energy companies are in business to make money – not energy. For example, economic subsidies allow ethanol companies to waste energy while making a profit. Specifically, about 71% more energy is used to produce a gallon of ethanol than the energy contained in a gallon of ethanol. [[24]] Obviously, alternative energy technologies that require energy subsidies are only viable as long as we don't need them!
From the standpoint of achieving society’s goal of a long-term solution to our energy problems, profit is simply the wrong objective for energy companies. Even without direct and indirect subsidies of $650 billion a year [[25]] it's conceivable that energy companies could make money – but lose energy – by burning one $10-barrel of oil today in order to pump one-half of a $50-barrel tomorrow. The price of oil is expected to rise sharply – and permanently – when global oil production peaks in less than ten years.
Economists Can't See It Coming
"Energy" is defined as the capacity of a physical system to do work. Over a hundred years ago, scientists pointed out that energy – not money – is the true source of the capitalist's wealth:
It is, in fact, the fate of all kinds of energy of position to be ultimately converted into energy of motion. The former may be compared to money in a bank, or capital, the latter to money which we are in the act of spending ... If we pursue the analogy a step further, we shall see that the great capitalist is respected because he has the disposal of a great quantity of energy; and that whether he be nobleman or sovereign, or a general in command, he is powerful only from having something which enables him to make use of the services of others. When a man of wealth pays a labouring man to work for him, he is in truth converting so much of his energy of position into actual energy...The world of mechanism is not a manufactory, in which energy is created, but rather a mart, into which we may bring energy of one kind and change or barter it for an equivalent of another kind, that suits us better - but if we come with nothing in hand, with nothing we will most assuredly return. [Balfour Stewart, 1883] [[26]]
But economists still do not study energy [[27]] – they study money and prices. Physics incorporated thermodynamics – moved from “production” to “circulation” – over 100 years ago. But modern economic texts, such as McConnell & Brue, 1999, and Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1998, still do not discuss thermodynamics or entropy! Money isn’t a measure of anything “real”, like joules or kilograms. Money is merely social power because it "empowers" people to buy and do the things they want – including buying and “doing” other people.
Economists frequently point to “prices” and make claims about the real world. This or that is “better off” they say, and go on their way. But the price of a thing does not reveal its quantity or its quality, particularly in the energy business. At best, the relationship between prices and natural resources is nonlinear. A good analogy for the oil market is the float in a carburetor: as the engine demands more gas, the float falls and allows more gas to flow in from the tank. But the float has no information concerning the amount of gas left in the tank until the fuel line is unable to keep up with demand. So it is with the market. As the demand for oil increases, the increase in price signals oil companies to pump more oil out of the ground – which lowers prices again. But the oil market has no information about the amount of oil left in the ground until production is unable to keep up with demand. In October 1980, Julian Simon challenged Paul Ehrlich and colleagues to a $1,000 bet that in ten years the price of any raw material they selected would fall (measured in constant 1980 dollars). In October 1991, Ehrlich paid up. The prices of the five minerals chosen (copper, chrome, nickel, tin and tungsten) had dropped substantially. [[28]] Obviously, though, prices did not reflect the fact that ten years’ worth of minerals had been taken out of the ground! One concludes that prices give no warning of approaching resource exhaustion.
How much is $10 worth of oil? It depends upon when and where you bought it. What's the net energy of $10 worth of oil? If oil costs $10 a barrel, how much is left in the ground? Who knows? Prices simply measure states of mind. This means that economists issue opinions on opinions. In short, economists are pollsters with an attitude. Based on the best information we have at hand today, sometime during the coming century the global economy will “run out of gas”, as fossil energy sources become sinks. One can argue about the exact date this will occur, but the end of fossil energy – and the dependent global economy – is inevitable.
Conclusion
Imagine having a motor scooter with a five-gallon tank, but the nearest gas station is six gallons away. You can not fill your tank with trips to the gas station because you burn more than you can bring back – it’s impossible for you to cover your overhead (the size of your bankroll and the price of the gas are irrelevant). You might as well put your scooter up on blocks because you are "out of gas" – forever. It's the same with the American economy: if we must spend more-than-one unit of energy to produce enough goods and services to buy one unit of energy, it will be impossible for us to cover our overhead. At that point, America’s economic machine is “out of gas” – forever.
I’ll conclude with an observation of Cosmologist Fred Hoyle who stated, “It has been often said that, if the human species fails to make a go of it here on Earth, some other species will take over the running. In the sense of developing intelligence this is not correct. We have, or soon will have, exhausted the necessary physical prerequisites so far as this planet is concerned. With coal gone, oil gone, high-grade metallic ore gone, no species however competent can make the long climb from primitive conditions to high-level technology. This is a one-shot affair. If we fail, this planetary system fails so far as intelligence is concerned. The same will be true of other planetary systems. On each of them there will be one chance, and one chance only.”
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Jay Hanson has been a member of his local utility’s Integrated Resource Planning advisory committee. He owns a computer business that designs and manufactures software and hardware and also runs the Internet Website: www.dieoff.org.
Jay Hanson
78-7230 Puupele Road
Kailua-Kona, HI 96740
Tel: 808/324-6645
[1] p. 23, THE LIMITS TO GROWTH, Meadows et al.; Universe, 1972. Anecdotes about the Club of Rome have become "urban legends". An urban legend is a good story that appears mysteriously and spreads spontaneously in varying forms, contains elements of humor or horror (the horror often "punishes" someone who flouts society's conventions), and is usually false. Even authors of peer-review scientific articles [ e.g., Cook and Sheath in NATURE & RESOURCES, 33(1): 29 (1997) ] have been seduced by these good stories. If one actually reads the material, & finds that none of the COR's so-called "predictions" have failed.
[2] For a vertical lift: joules = meters X kg X 9.8
[3] Internal combustion, steam, or gas turbines are called heat engines because they convert fuel into heat, then into mechanical motion.
[4] A typical gasoline engine with a compression ratio of 8:1 cannot exceed a theoretical 45 percent efficiency, in practice might be about 35 percent; for a diesel with 20:1 it's 55 percent, 45 percent; for a turbine with 30:1 it's 60 percent, 50 percent.
[5] p. 11, BEYOND OIL, by John Gever et al., Univ. Pr. Colorado, 1991.
[6] p. 12, Gever.
[7] p. xlv, Gever.
[8] p. 314, GETTING DOWN TO EARTH, by Robert Costanza et al., Eds.; Island Press, 1996
[9] p. 87, Gever
[10] p. 7, OIL AS A FINITE RESOURCE, by James J. MacKenzie; WRI, 1996; Online version: http://www.wri.org/wri/climate/finitoil/eur-oil.html
[11] THE END OF CHEAP OIL, by Colin J. Campbell & Jean H. Laherrère; Scientific American, March 1998; http://dieoff.org/page140.htm
[12] MODELS OF DOOM, Editorial; The Economist, Dec 1997; http://www.economist.com/editorial/freeforall/20-12-97/xm0002.html
[13] Natural gas loss estimated by Walter Youngquist Ph.D. & Chair Emeritus, Dept. Geology, Univ. Oregon (personal correspondence).
[14] Franco Bernabé, chief executive of the Italian oil company ENI SpA cited in CHEAP OIL, by Howard Banks; Forbes Magazine, June 1998; http://www.forbes.com/forbes/98/0615/6112084a.htm
[15] p. 119, THE COMING OIL CRISIS, by Colin J. Campbell; Multi-Science Publishing Company & Petroconsultants, 1997.
[16] p. 120, Campbell, 1997 ; OCEANIC HYDRATES: an elusive resource, by J.H.Laherrere, August, 1999,
[17] p. 67, Gever.
[18] p. 90, ENERGY FOR TOMORROW'S WORLD; by the WEC; St. Martin's Pr., 1993.
[19] JAPAN PUTS REACTOR PROGRAM ON THE BACK BURNER; Nando Times, Oct. 1, 1997;
[20] FOOD, LAND, POPULATION AND THE U.S. ECONOMY, by David Pimentel & Mario Giampietro; CCN, 1994;
[21] FUEL CELLS 2000; http://www.fuelcells.org/fuel/fct/goingon.shtml
[22] HYDROGEN, by Daniel Morgan & Fred Sissine; CNIE, 1995; http://www.cnie.org/nle/eng-4.html
[23] DEVELOPMENT PATTERNS FOR LNG SUPPLY AND DEMAND, by Arthur T. Andersen et al; EIA, 1997; http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/issues97/lng.html (See ref. # 46)
[24] ENERGY AND DOLLAR COSTS OF ETHANOL PRODUCTION WITH CORN, by David Pimentel; Hubbert Center Newsletter # 98/2, 1998; http://hubbert.mines.edu/news/v98n2/mkh-new7.html
[25] Worldwide, subsidies worth at least $650 billion – the equivalent of 9 percent of government revenue – specifically support natural-resource-intensive industries and activities, including mining, oil drilling, energy use and driving. p. 35, THE NATURAL WEALTH OF NATIONS, by David Malin Roodman; Worldwatch & Norton, 1998.
[26] p. 132, MORE HEAT THAN LIGHT, Philip Mirowski; Cambridge, 1989.
[27] Physics incorporated thermodynamics – moved from "production" to "circulation" – over 100 years ago. But modern economic texts such as McConnell & Brue, 1999, and Samuelson & Nordhaus, 1998 still do not discuss thermodynamics or entropy!
[28] p. 330, ECONOMICS, Samuelson & Nordhaus; McGraw-Hill, 1998.
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